

1914

INDEXED

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

607691

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Education and the Working-Class

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
New Zealand:

The Great Strike—The Intervention of the Farmers—Seamen and Coal-Miners—The Strike in Auckland—The Government's Naval Policy

MARCH · MCMXIV

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
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THE IRISH CRISIS

THE storm which has overhung the country for many months has darkened almost to breaking-point. When Parliament met, there was much hope as well as apprehension in the atmosphere. The recess had been marked by two movements of great importance and of opposite tendencies. The first of these was the grim determination with which the men of Ulster perfected their organization for fulfilling the Covenant of September 28, 1912, by which they bound themselves to resist the establishment of Home Rule. The other movement was that of which Lord Loreburn made himself spokesman in a letter which he addressed to *The Times* of September 11, 1913. In that letter, while holding it "an extravagance to speak of civil war," he emphasized "the certainty that the passing of this Bill will be followed by serious rioting in the north of Ireland." At the same time he pointed to the probability of grave disorder in other parts of Ireland if the Bill were rejected. In these circumstances he announced that he "supported what has been independently recommended by others, that there should be a conference or direct communication between the leaders."

Lord Loreburn's appeal was undoubtedly supported by a very large and respectable body of opinion throughout the country. Coming as it did from a former Lord Chancellor in a Liberal Government and a lifelong friend of Home Rule, it produced a profound impression. It was received by the leaders both of the Government and of the

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Opposition with sincere, if cautious, approval. Afterwards they went further, and what are known as "conversations," or, in the words of Lord Loreburn, "direct communication," actually took place.

When the session opened, the shadow of Ulster was looming ever larger. Leaders of all parties had carefully avoided shutting the door upon schemes of compromise, but Mr Asquith confessed that the "conversations did not result in any definite agreement." In this state of affairs the King's Speech gave utterance to the prevalent sentiment. Its grave and unprecedented language must be quoted in full:

"The measures in regard to which there were differences last Session between the two Houses will be again submitted to your consideration. I regret that the efforts which have been made to arrive at a solution by agreement of the problems connected with the government of Ireland have, so far, not succeeded. In a matter in which the hopes and fears of so many of My subjects are keenly concerned, and which, unless handled now with foresight, judgment, and in the spirit of mutual concession threatens grave future difficulties, it is My most earnest wish that the good will and co-operation of men of all parties and creeds may heal dissension and lay the foundations of a lasting settlement."

It is long indeed since Parliament was advised by the highest quarter in the land to handle a matter before it in the spirit of mutual concession in order to avoid "grave future difficulties." The debate which followed, however, did little to relieve men's minds. Mr Asquith devoted the first part of his speech to a recapitulation of the Liberal arguments against a general election, but he pitched the latter part in a much less argumentative tone. He recognized that upon the Government lay "the responsibility of initiative in the way of suggestion," and concluded with the assurance that "neither he nor his colleagues would close any avenue, however unpromising

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for the moment entrance upon it may appear to be, which directly or indirectly holds out the hope of leading to concord and to settlement." No indication, however, was given of the suggestions which he admitted it to be the duty of the Government to make. Instead, a promise was given that they should be produced at some future unnamed date when "certain financial exigencies," which had first to be provided for, should permit. This hesitation called forth loud protests. Not unnaturally people said that at this late hour no time should be lost in letting the country know where it stood. The upshot was that the Government was induced to quicken its pace. Mr Redmond visited Mr Lloyd George, and Mr Devlin visited Belfast, and on March 9 Mr Asquith produced in the House of Commons his proposals for amending the Bill.

Discussion had already concentrated on the possibility of excluding Ulster from the scope of the measure, and it was natural that this concession should be looked upon as the means of escape from the prospect of armed rebellion. There were, however, serious obstacles in the way. One of the great merits of the Bill, in the eyes of its supporters, was its recognition of Ireland as a nation. The exclusion of Ulster might be described, as Mr Austen Chamberlain described it on the first day of Parliament, as "a statutory denial and negation of the claim of Ireland to be regarded as an independent nation." Mr Asquith himself on the same occasion had alluded to "the difficulty which any plan for the exclusion of Ulster would bring in its train with regard to any permanent settlement of Ireland." Mr Redmond next day was content to accept Mr Chamberlain's description. "He has put into a phrase," he said, "exactly how this appears in our minds." It was evident, therefore, that, while the exclusion of Ulster seemed the easiest means of escape from the danger of civil war, the adoption of this plan by the Government presented formidable difficulties of another kind. Working on these facts with the help of

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such illumination as could be provided by the Ministerial press, the public had little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the Government's plan would prove to suggest some kind of separate treatment of Ulster short of complete exclusion.

Such was in fact the case. On March 9, in a speech which, unlike his contribution to the debate on the Address, was in his best manner and worthy of a most anxious occasion, Mr Asquith unfolded his plan. In language which went far beyond any previously used either by himself or his colleagues, he admitted "the prospect of acute dissension and even of civil strife" in Ulster if the Bill were passed as it stands. On the other hand, "if at this stage Home Rule were to be shipwrecked, or permanently mutilated, or indefinitely postponed, there is in Ireland, as a whole, at least an equally formidable outlook." "The hazards," he continued, "in either event are such as to warrant in all quarters, I think, not indeed a surrender of principles, but any practical form of accommodation and approach which would lead to an agreed settlement." After discussing and putting aside certain alternatives, he went on to propose on behalf of the Government a scheme of what he called "provisional exclusion," which, he explained, was put forward "not as a solution but as an expedient which may pave the way in time for a final settlement." The plan was that each of the Ulster counties, Belfast and Londonderry being treated as separate counties, should ballot for itself whether it should be excluded or not. Any county in which there was a majority in favour of exclusion should be excluded from the scope of the bill for six years, at the end of which time it should automatically come within the jurisdiction of the Irish Parliament.

The reception given to these proposals was not encouraging. Mr Bonar Law declared that "if they are the last word, then the position seems to me to be a very grave one." Sir Edward Carson acknowledged that, once the principle of exclusion was admitted, the details might be a matter for

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negotiation, but he refused, so long as the time-limit was retained, to ask Ulster even to consider the proposals. Mr Redmond, on the other hand, while accepting the Government's plan with evident reluctance, declared that "in his view Mr Asquith had gone to the very extreme limits of concession." Mr William O'Brien and Mr Healy, for their part, refused to have anything to do with the proposal.

It was evident that Mr Asquith had gone as far as he could hope to induce the Irish Nationalists to go with him, in the endeavour to placate the hostility of Ulster, and that Ulster was not satisfied. It is easy, indeed, to understand the objections of both Irish parties to the plan. From the Nationalist point of view, as Mr O'Brien said, the amendments would "set up a new Act of Disunion in Ireland among Irishmen themselves." From the point of view of Ulster, as Mr Bonar Law argued, "if you think it is wrong to compel them to come in to-day, how can you think it is right to compel them to come in to-morrow?" The acceptance of the plan, moreover, by the predominantly Unionist counties would appear as the betrayal of those districts in Ulster in which there might be a Nationalist majority: and lastly, the very brief description of his proposals vouchsafed by the Prime Minister made it impossible to say what the position of Ulster as a whole would really be.

The immediate result of the proposals was a yet further fall in the political weather-glass. The Government had apparently made their last offer, and it was less than Ulster could accept. On March 14 Mr Churchill delivered an uncompromising speech at Bradford, and on March 16 Mr Asquith even refused to explain the machinery of his plan, on the ground that it was useless to do so in view of the temper in which it had been received. On March 19 Mr Bonar Law announced that the Opposition would abide by the result of a Referendum (without plural voting) on the Bill as amended by Mr Asquith's proposals, and

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that Lord Lansdowne would advise the House of Lords to accept it on these terms. Mr Asquith's reply seemed, however, to hold out no hope that the suggestion would be entertained.

The Parliamentary situation is thus once more exactly what it was when Parliament rose in August, 1913, with this difference—that the country is now on the actual verge of civil war.

II

TO this crisis the United Kingdom has been led by a process as relentless as the march of a Greek tragedy. Liberal statesmen are not the Solons nor yet the Cleons which their followers and their opponents conceive them to be. They are able but fallible men, and they made a choice four years ago which most able men would have made in their place. They had an end to gain—the passage of the People's Budget and the restoration of the Parliamentary balance between the Commons and the Lords. The case was urgent, and it was of paramount importance in their eyes. It could be won only by the firm adherence of the Irish Nationalists to the Liberal-Labour ranks. Whatever the sacrifice of independence which acceptance of that support might involve, it involved no sacrifice of principle, nor even of self-respect. Home Rule was still upon the standards of the party. The pledge against transferring it from the standards to the Statute Book had expired at the first general election of 1910; its coming expiry had indeed been proclaimed by Mr Churchill, in the throes of a by-election at Manchester, as early as 1908.* Well may it have seemed to practical men that a

* "But when this Parliament has reached its conclusion, I am strongly of opinion—and I speak on the authority of the Prime Minister—that the Liberal Party should claim full authority and a free hand to deal with the problem of Irish self-government without being restricted to some measure of administration and devolution of the character of the Irish Council Bill."—Mr Churchill in Manchester, April 20, 1908, as reported in the *Manchester Guardian*.

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promise to carry it sooner than they might otherwise have attempted to do was but a small concession to make for the immediate achievement of their main political aim. It is true, indeed, that some members of the Cabinet—including the Prime Minister—had hoped to see the Irish question approached in this century along a different road; but even the most consistent of men may modify their views in circumstances which they have not foreseen.

Coalition government is always open to objection and the gravity of the course taken by the Government did not arise from the process of coalition itself, but from the questions to which the process was applied. Had Ministers been rather less able as politicians in the critical summer and autumn of 1910, which saw the failure of the inter-party conference summoned after King Edward's death and the flinging back of the constitutional question into the vortex of party politics; had they shown less eagerness to gain an immediate point, and in their stead more vision, more constructive power, more breadth; had a certain easy opportunism not vitiated their judgment of means as apart from ends—then indeed they would not have failed to realize that the method which seemed to be simplest at the moment was in reality incapable of solving the great constitutional problems to which they were addressed. There can be no doubt that vision was lacking also on the Unionist side at that momentous turning-point in English and Irish history; but the initiative after the Conference was with the Government, and on the Government must fall the responsibility for what the breakdown of the Conference has produced.

It was, to begin with, a profound error of judgment to suppose that a fundamental change, or series of changes, in the constitution of the realm could be carried and enforced without some general measure of national assent. No single party can claim to remould the framework of the State to suit its own ideas. To be stable, an alteration of the constitution must be a resultant from the conflict of party

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opinions, not the arbitrary work of one party alone. There was some excuse, so far as the Parliament Act was concerned, for the failure of its authors to realize how revolutionary would be its effect upon the normal working of the legislative machine. But the Act was admittedly a provisional measure, which would be superseded, as its Preamble stated, by the creation of a Second Chamber with properly defined powers. It might therefore have been reasonably applied to the passage of ordinary legislation, however contentious, pending the reform of the House of Lords; but the constitutional interregnum which it created was not justly to be used for the enactment by duress of any further change in the fundamental institutions of the kingdom.

Unhappily the arrangement with the Irish Nationalists by which the Government had been enabled to carry the Parliament Act committed Ministers to the introduction of another great constitutional innovation—Home Rule—before they attempted to settle the fundamental Parliamentary question which was left in suspense. It committed them, moreover, to the same error of method in the Irish question as in the constitutional issue between the Commons and Lords—the error of attempting to carry great constitutional changes, like ordinary party measures, by the overriding force of party discipline. Accepting these conditions, they ignored the certain resistance of the Ulster Unionists and framed a measure in which the feeling of Nationalist Ireland alone had adequate part.

Such a method could only be successful on the assumption that the great division of faith, opinion and sentiment which has been the keynote of Irish history for three centuries and more was no longer fundamental or even real. If that assumption proved to be at variance with the facts, the error was certain to prove fatal to the primary objects of the Home Rule policy—the appeasement of Ireland and the relief of Westminster. At variance with the facts it was, as all who knew Ulster knew only too well;

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and now the facts have asserted themselves in their inexorable way. The consequences can no longer be obscured. In Ireland, the problem has been complicated by all the furies of the older times which were slowly passing away; in England, party relations, already embittered, have been raised by Irish associations into a greater obstacle to settlement than ever before. If the end in politics sometimes justifies the means, the means much more frequently defeat the end. There was never a clearer instance than Mr Asquith's and Mr Redmond's position to-day; for, having adopted the wrong method when they first set out, they must now either abandon their policy and set out afresh, or else they must carry their policy in conditions which make its failure inevitable.

It would have been unreasonable to hope that the Nationalist party, unaided and alone, would recognize the danger of steering their traditional course. Their political organization has long-established affiliations in all parts of the world which its modern representatives are bound to respect. Protestant Ireland is the symbol to them of an alien ascendancy to which they trace the whole long tale of Irish woes, and, like their fathers, they seek to will it away by a sheer act of faith. Something of this attitude to unwelcome facts is a not uncommon feature of the Irish temperament; it is sometimes heroism and sometimes cowardice, and noticeable at all times in the atmosphere of Irish life.

The "All-for-Ireland" movement initiated by Mr William O'Brien and Mr Healy after the great success of the Land Conference, which brought all types of Irishmen in friendly counsel round one board, had shown, it is true, a clearer and longer perception of the modern Irish need. What Mr Healy is wont to call "a composition" between all parties was indeed the only road to settlement of the political question as of the agrarian one. But the influence of the "All-for-Ireland" League has not yet been very wide, and its failure to transform the stereotyped appeal of the

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official Nationalist machine is a good measure of the political monopoly which that appeal has acquired. For the whole mind of the Irish democracy, since its new political power was shaped and mobilized by Parnell, has been set on a single dream. Every measure of practical utility, every opening for some instalment of reform, has been prejudiced, if not lost, by visionary expectations from the coming of Home Rule. This was the panacea, the only political aim which was worth a moment's endeavour, the only subject on which politicians had any need to speak. The most far-seeing of Irish Home Rulers have been the keenest to lament the dominance of this one idea. Ordinary political thought of a practical kind had ceased through it to exist. It had hypnotized the mind and force of the country into an enervating belief that agitation was the all-sufficient means of bringing the millennium.

It was clearly impossible for Nationalist politicians to escape of their own initiative from this devouring preoccupation, which gave them such power as they had yet been able to assert; but the duty of British statesmanship in the twentieth century was to bring the sentiment as quickly as possible into some true and practical relation with the actual conditions and necessities of Ireland as a whole. Working with the "All-for-Ireland" movement, and striving to free the politics of their own time from the blindness and rancour of the past, English and Irish statesmen might together have produced a new political atmosphere, in which the two Irish nations would have composed their differences and set to work in unison upon the regeneration and development of their common heritage. But the malicious fate which has always dragged Ireland into English politics at critical moments in her history was still awake. Irish policy, in the climax of the English constitutional struggle, became a governing factor in controversies which had nothing to do with the Irish question as such. Instead of mediating between the two Irish nations, each English party, in pursuit of its own objects, has inflamed

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the old Irish divisions and identified itself with one of the Irish camps, so that the Irish problem is now worse complicated than ever by association with the larger issue between the English forces of conservatism and the English forces of change. No Irishman ever did his country a worse service than the man who taught her that Irish union could be founded on English strife.

The partisan process by which the Government's Irish Bill was framed was little calculated to bring about a reconciliation of Irish differences; but the crowning misfortune has arisen from the circumstances attending the passage of the Parliament Act and from the interdependence of all the measures which are to be passed under it. Having pledged themselves in the course of the English struggle to a one-sided treatment of the Irish problem, Liberals have been unable to reconsider their Irish policy without sacrificing all the other causes which they have at heart. All the political force behind the other measures in the Liberal programme, such as Welsh Disestablishment and franchise reform, and all the hopes for the future which centre in the success of the Parliament Act itself, have been concentrated in the maintenance of an untenable view of Irish affairs. The assumption that the deep divisions of Irish life are unreal and can be ignored has been made in all sincerity by every organ and spokesman of the Liberal party for nearly two years. In the hardening processes of political conflict it has become an essential part of a militant political creed. Liberals have thus become blind to all but one aspect of the constitutional struggle in which they are engaged. In the Ulster preparations they see only a gross menace to constitutional government; in the support given to Ulster by the Unionist party they resent a constitutional outrage. There was never a stranger example of the effect of the party system on human minds than this attitude in men to whom "government by consent of the governed" has long been a cherished political principle.

The Parliamentary situation is thus locked in a fatal

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chain of errors and engagements going back to the struggle over the Budget of 1909. Ministers are not their own masters. Anxious to make concessions for the sake of Irish peace, they are debarred by the strong hand of their Irish allies from making the concessions adequate. If they stand by their allies, they will have to face civil war. If they part from their allies, they lose all which they have fought for during three strenuous years. It is a desperate dilemma.

III

THE Unionist position is hardly less difficult.

As its name implies, it is a fundamental principle of the party that Gladstonian Home Rule, as embodied in the Bills of 1886, 1893 and 1912, is a bad thing. The real base upon which this principle rests is the belief that the establishment of an Irish Parliament with the powers proposed would amount, sooner or later, to virtual separation. Unionists believe that the Bill if carried would not only weaken the United Kingdom to a dangerous extent, but would work grave injury to Ireland herself through the loss of her rightful position in the Commonwealth. Home Rule, in fact, is opposed just as much on British as on Irish grounds.

From these principles the party as a whole has never departed. But the exigencies of democratic politics have driven them to lay a disproportionate stress on the Irish side of the question. Home Rule, so Unionists believe, would be equally or even more objectionable from the Imperial point of view if Ulster were entirely Nationalist. But Ulster is not, and has announced her intention of resisting, even by force of arms, any attempt to deprive her of her due position in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. This plain danger of civil war is the feature

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in the Home Rule controversy which has caught the public eye, and it was inevitable that the Opposition should make the fullest use of so powerful an argument.

In doing so, however, it has been forced into an ambiguous position. The party which prides itself on its devotion to the constitution and its maintenance of the principles of law and order is found to be condoning open and violent resistance to constituted authority. If it is true and right to say that Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right, will this lesson be lost upon other discontented elements of society, not only in the United Kingdom, but in our dependencies beyond the seas?

And the dangerous consequences of this attitude do not end here, for those in Great Britain who justify the acts of the Ulster Covenanters are bound to ask themselves what their own position must be in the event of conflict. And not only theirs, but that of their friends and sons and brothers who hold his Majesty's commission or serve in the armed forces of the Crown. Thus it is that language has been used—hardly indeed by the leaders, but certainly by some of their followers—which hinted, not obscurely, that the army would be found a broken reed upon which to rely in the fight with Ulster.

The subject is a very difficult one, for it is manifest that the imminence of civil strife, in whatever form, may sometimes confront soldiers with the most grave of all dilemmas between public duty and private conscience. When that dilemma begins to be felt, the anxiety bred of it must necessarily spread to those throughout the nation whose connexion with the army, whether through past service or present relationship, is close; and it is only proper that attention should be called to it by men, like Lord Roberts, who speak with unchallenged authority from the soldier's point of view. The English precedents, moreover—for instance, in the American War of Independence—show that the plea of conscience has been put forward by officers and allowed considerable latitude by British

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Governments. It must be obvious, indeed, that the subject is not one on which it is possible to dogmatize. The decision must be left to the conscience of the officers affected.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that for politicians to make appeals to the conscience of the army must create a most dangerous precedent. The King's soldiers, whether they be commissioned or non-commissioned, have no more politics than His Majesty; they cannot be quoted, or claimed in support, by any kind of partisan. It is therefore well that Sir Edward Carson has put on record his detestation of the imputation that the Ulster leaders had sought to tamper with the loyalty of the troops. Speaking at Manchester on December 3, 1913, he said:

"There have been gross misrepresentations of all our actions, but I think nothing more gross than the way they try to represent our dealings with the British army. They never will see that one of our greatest ambitions is to see the United Kingdom great and powerful against all foes. They tell us sometimes that we are trying to tamper with the army. It is a foul lie. It would indeed be poor pluck to say, 'We are prepared to fight because we know the army will not act.' No. I have said before and I say now—and in doing so I am merely associating myself with what fell from Lord Derby last evening or the evening before—I say this, that it would be a bad day for the country if the army under any circumstances were to refuse to obey the lawful orders of those who are put in command over them. Of course they must. But it is for that very reason that statesmen and politicians ought to look ahead. It is for that very reason that statesmen and politicians ought to know to what their acts lead. No one will blame the army for shooting upon Ulstermen. But the country will hold the Government that puts forward the army as responsible. You can control the Government."

This has the true patriotic ring, and Sir Edward Carson repeated it in the House of Commons on March 20. It is

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to be wished that all the utterances of Unionist orators had been equally free from reproach.

The truth is that the Unionist party failed to realize, just as the Liberals did, that after their defeat in 1910 the constitutional question and all that lay behind it would have to be settled by other than party methods, if the country was not to be plunged into a struggle which would jeopardize its institutions and do incalculable havoc to its political life. The opportunity of compromise was brought by King Edward's death, which imposed a truce upon all parties and made possible the Conference, prolonged through the summer and autumn of 1910. The history of the Conference has never been revealed, but it is impossible to acquit the Unionist members who attended it of a blindness, at least equal to that of their opponents, to the consequences which lay before the country if they failed. From that time the party has drifted from defeat to defeat without ever having succeeded in setting before the country any clear alternative to the policy of the Parliament Bill.

Upon the introduction of the Government of Ireland Bill in the following year, the party fought an uphill fight in very trying conditions during all the Parliamentary debates on the measure. When those debates are reviewed by future historians, a tribute will be paid to much solid and conscientious work on the part of Unionist members, in spite of the depressing handicap imposed upon them by the policy of the Parliament Act combined with stringent application of the closure and the guillotine. But here again the attitude was purely negative. There was an almost entire failure to realize that in the changed conditions of the times some alternative Irish policy was an essential requirement in men who were fighting the Liberal and Nationalist alliance for the good of Ireland as well as for their own. And the inevitable result has been that, despite the force of their criticism in Parliament, their standing with the country has not much improved. The guidance of Unionism has passed from the heads of the party to the representatives of the

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Covenant. Such concessions as have been made by the Government are due to the power of the Volunteers, and not to the power of the Opposition Front Bench.

The failure of the Unionist leaders to produce an alternative policy at an earlier stage exposes them to fatal suspicion now. Having followed Ulster, they are accused of using Ulster as a pawn in the party game. Having failed to impress their own standpoint upon the country, they are charged with complicity in the Covenant as a means to defeating the Parliament Act and the other measures besides Home Rule which the Parliament Act now harbours under its wing. The constitutional demand for a general election before force is employed against the Covenanters has thus been deprived of its proper power, for it can be too easily dismissed as a device for retrieving the disasters of 1910 and 1911. Colour has, moreover, been lent to this suspicion by the Unionist position on other questions of the day. If, their opponents argue, they had been entirely sincere in their case against the Home Rule Bill, they would have taken every means to make it the single issue in the country, and they would have declared in unmistakable English that Tariff Reform and all other issues were for the time being laid aside. So far from doing this, they have declared within the past few weeks that if a Unionist Government is returned to power, it will regard itself as free to carry the Edinburgh programme of Tariff Reform.

This criticism, though easily overstated, is damaging; for defence of a threatened constitution is not well associated with advocacy of so fundamental a change in the political and economic system of the country as Tariff Reform. The weakness of the party's course on the fiscal question suggests, moreover, that it is mainly concerned with manœuvres for recovering power; and this impression is much accentuated by the constant suspicion that it is seeking to defeat democracy by means of the House of Lords. Seeing, for instance, that the House of Lords has no power in the last resort to amend or delay the Home

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Rule Bill, some Unionists have argued that the object should be attained by the rejection or amendment of the Army Annual Bill, which is the sole authority by which the forces of the Crown are paid, maintained and disciplined. The rejection of the Bill is not a possibility that need be discussed, but its amendment on such terms as to prevent the use of the troops against Ulster until a general election has been held has been much in the air. Even this amendment, however, involves a limitation of the executive power of His Majesty's Government which no Government could possibly accept. It would necessarily be taken as a challenge from the unrepresentative Chamber to the authority of the Chamber which makes and unmakes Cabinets. Whatever its warrant in constitutional theory, it would, in fact, be treated as a move in the party game which began in 1909. If Ulster were in actual and open revolt, if civil bloodshed were in fact the certain consequence of the passage of the Bill on the usual terms, or if the conscience of the Army were known to be perplexed regarding the commands which it might be called upon to obey, then indeed the House of Lords might claim with very great force the right to delay the conflict while it could—for the Bill, after all, was made an annual Bill with the express purpose of enabling Parliament to prevent what it might regard as a tyrannous use of military force by the Executive of the day. But the Chamber and the party which claim to have the constitution in their especial care could not seek to make rebellion easy in advance without bringing down a just and certain retribution upon the constitutional cause. The question, in any case, has now become an academic one, for a large part of the Army itself has put forward the plea of conscience and secured its acceptance by the Government.

Mr Bonar Law's speech in the House of Commons on March 20, in the Vote of Censure debate, showed with unmistakable sincerity the deep concern with which the Unionist leaders have seen the crisis drawing nearer, and

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beyond their power to arrest. The Opposition leader's speech was indeed remarkable for the candour with which it admitted the responsibility of the party system for the present deadlock and the generosity with which it forbore to press a strong debating case. But the mere fact that, while in suggesting the Referendum Mr Bonar Law pledged himself to abide by the result, Sir Edward Carson gave no such pledge, is a clear sign that the Unionist party, like the Liberal party, no longer entirely controls its own destinies. It is the position of the Covenanters upon which everything now depends.

IV

IT may be galling to Englishmen—it is certainly so to the rest of Irishmen—that Ulster should have succeeded in asserting this dominant position; but the fact is incontestable, and the consequences will be grave if it is not adequately recognized within a period which has gradually shortened from months to weeks, and will very soon shorten from weeks to days. The pride of the Ulster Protestants, their power of action, their narrowness of mind, their religious bigotry, their absolute self-sufficiency—these are factors which will have to be dealt with, however unreasonable their present manifestation may seem to be. The time for argument and persuasion has gone, and it will not return until full consideration has been paid to an attitude which has been gradually hardened into adamant by disbelief and ridicule.

It is very difficult for people at a distance to realize the intensity with which the Ulsterman holds his creed. For the most part, they do not know his history; and they have little conception of how that history has burnt itself into the every-day existence of the province. It sounds absurd that men should regard the Union Jack as the symbol of a

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party creed and sing the National Anthem as a prayer for the discomfiture of their fellow-countrymen. But the actual circumstances of life in Ulster need not be studied long for light to dawn upon the mystery. The vehement declarations of disloyalty to the Throne and the Empire in which Nationalist organs and speakers have traditionally indulged have, of course, to be judged in the light of Irish history if they are to be properly appraised. They need not greatly trouble Englishmen; but they explain why the Union Jack and the National Anthem have a significance in Ulster quite different from their normal significance in the British world.

Nothing, again, has been more common in Nationalist agitation than the fiercest denunciation of the British Army, coupled with exhortations to Irishmen not to betray their country by enlisting in it. This also need not be taken too seriously on the English side of the Irish Channel; but it gives some justification for the feeling of the Covenanters towards the threat that the British Army will be used to force them under a Nationalist Government.

There may be too much arrogance and intolerance in the Ulster position, but neither Englishmen nor Scotsmen should forget that they are responsible for the history which planted the forebears of these Covenanters in the North-east of Ireland. It is enough that these men believe themselves to be arming to defend their fundamental rights of citizenship in the United Kingdom. They are not seeking to destroy the existing order of society, as Mr Churchill's rhetorical analogies at Bradford implied; they are only seeking to preserve it from what they regard as a menace to established liberty. They may be reasoned with, if they are thought to be wrong; but they cannot be coerced without irreparable injury to both British and Irish interests. Till the end of the eighteenth century Ireland was governed in conformity with the views of the Protestant minority, backed by the physical force of England. The Liberal party has now drifted into an attempt to settle

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Ireland on the converse of the same principle. It is no remedy of injustice to invert it.

Is it unreasonable in the Ulster Unionists to refuse the proposal of "delayed inclusion" put forward by the Government?

There is not much to recommend the discussion of a scheme as to the details of which the Government intentions are unknown. Mr Asquith has stated, for instance, that it is not yet settled whether the excluded counties should have a separate Post Office from the rest of Ireland, or a separate Judiciary, or Custom Houses along their land frontiers. All these are details, it is true, as compared with the principle of exclusion, or rather of delayed inclusion, which is the main inspiration of the scheme; but they are details of vital importance to any adequate consideration of its feasibility.

There are, however, certain broad considerations with regard to the scheme which may be briefly pointed out.

The objections to it, very succinctly stated, may be put under two heads—the question of area, and the question of the time-limit. The Government plan of polling the province of Ulster by counties, with Belfast and Londonderry as separate counties, would result, on the showing of the last election, in the exclusion of Belfast City, Antrim, Down, Londonderry and Armagh. Derry City, with its bitter memories and its almost equal population of Unionists and Nationalists, would separate itself from County Londonderry by a majority of from twenty to thirty votes. The remaining counties—Donegal, Tyrone, Fermanagh, Monaghan, and Cavan—would vote by varying majorities for inclusion under the Dublin Parliament. It is considered, even in Nationalist circles, that one or two of the border counties—Tyrone and Fermanagh—might vote for exclusion in spite of their Nationalist majorities; but the point is a very doubtful one, and it does not greatly affect the merits of the scheme.

The main consideration is the utter injustice of the arrangement to the minorities on either side of the line,

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wherever the line is drawn. In the six border counties the Covenanters have no less than thirty battalions of volunteers and a regiment of horse, organized and well supplied with arms—in all, thirty thousand strong. It is difficult to believe that this stalwart minority would in any case be deserted by their Unionist brethren in the four counties round Belfast; but it is quite certain that, if they were abandoned, they would simply fight for themselves, and their example would inevitably provoke disorder and violence among the Nationalist minority in the four counties, who would claim the right to resist exclusion from the Irish Parliament by the same means as those who were resisting inclusion under it.

Wherever the responsibility for them may lie, these are the facts; and they show that the Government scheme, whether or not the parties agreed to it at Westminster, would bring to Ireland, not peace, but a terrible recrudescence of the hatred and bitterness which statesmen are seeking to dispel.

If the difficulty presented by the question of area holds out this forbidding prospect, the difficulty presented by the time-limit holds out a worse. It is possible to contend that violence could be localized in the border counties and ultimately stamped out, if it is assumed that the rest of Ireland would give violence no countenance and that the peace of the United Kingdom as a whole would not be troubled by further Irish agitation. But insistence on the time-limit puts any such assumption out of court, because the tremendous interest of the excluded counties in the two elections to be held before the time-limit expires would compel them to keep their case before the United Kingdom electorate by every means in their power. Their experience in the past two years has shown them that there is only one way of making sure that English politicians will not forget them, and that is preparation for civil war. They would take that way relentlessly, and British politics would be confused and embittered for six years more by the constant menace of the very catastrophe which the exclusion proposals are

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intended to avert. Statesmen could not pay danegeld for present security in a more futile form.

Much, moreover, as the United Kingdom would suffer, the legacy to Ireland would be an even darker curse. When once an Irish Parliament had been established in College Green with the powers conceded to it by the present Bill, a free and unfettered revision of the settlement would have become so difficult as almost to be impossible. If Unionists won either of the elections before 1921, they might seek by every means at their disposal to frame a scheme of self-government for Ireland to which all Ireland would consent, but the position already given to the Dublin Government would raise a thousand obstacles to any settlement which Ulster could accept. The only alternative would be that the excluded counties should remain excluded, and the dismemberment of Ireland thereby made permanent. If, on the other hand, both elections were to end in Unionist defeat, the six years' postponement would only have condemned Ireland to a fiercer internal struggle, the wounds of which it might take another century to salve.

V

IT is possible for the Government to avert a civil conflict in three ways—by abandoning the time-limit in their scheme of exclusion, or else by consenting either to a Referendum or to a general election. It is not possible for the Opposition by themselves to avert it; they do not possess the necessary majority, and they cannot bind the Covenanters. It seems useless to approach either the Covenanters or the Nationalists with arguments on the subject of exclusion. An impassable gulf yawns between the extreme concessions which for different reasons each side is prepared to make, and their English allies must support them. Both offers are in any case only temporary expedients, which do not pretend to furnish a permanent solution of the crisis. The party system is thus bankrupt,

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and there seems to be no chance of any real settlement until all parties have learnt afresh their real strength at the polls. Since, moreover, the Government evidently cannot abandon the time-limit and still retain its majority, a general election or a Referendum are the only real alternatives to civil war.

What is the predominant feeling of the electorate now towards the Irish controversy? It is difficult to say. The by-elections show in the main a large indifference. Where changes have occurred, they have been due for the most part to other causes—to the growing division between Liberalism and Labour, or else to the persistent unpopularity of the Insurance Act. The party organizations have been full of fight; as usual, they demand forward policies and a fine "no surrender" attitude. But there is no sign that their demands reflect the feelings of the doubtful element in their canvass-returns which ultimately decides their fates. If the Unionist case has made but little impression as yet, so has the Liberal one. So far as the Home Rule issue has told at all, it has told in favour of the Unionist candidate; but the plain fact seems to be that neither the English nor the Scottish electorate has yet realized the gravity of the danger now confronting the country's peace. If this has any significance, it is that there is very little support in the country at large for an unyielding attitude in either party. Audiences cheer compromise on general principles, without much understanding what it is all about.

Unhappily the time has passed for conference between the parties. As they stand, they are both so tied and hampered by their engagements that free discussion is impossible even in the quiet of a council-room, and on either side the leaders are answerable to great bodies of men whose feelings are too keenly engaged in the conflict of the moment to realize fully whither the conflict is drawing them.

The same difficulty applies to the suggestion—valuable at an earlier stage though it might well have been—which

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has been put forward by the *Westminster Gazette*. Seeing that some form of exclusion with a time-limit would be proposed, the *Westminster Gazette* suggested that "it should be accompanied by the appointment of a statutory Commission or Convention to explore the question of Home Rule all round, and report to Parliament before the period expired."* This suggestion was immediately welcomed by *The Times*, and it was mentioned with approval by Sir Edward Carson in his final speech in the House of Commons.† It can hardly be doubted that, if the Government had been in a position to accept it, they would have done so, since it embodies the idea set forth by the Prime Minister when he first introduced the Home Rule Bill. As it has not been accepted, the conclusion is inevitable that all such expedients have been found impossible.

The atmosphere must be cleared and the temperature lowered, before any such method of settlement is possible. The rule of common sense would, indeed, be soon restored, if matters came to open conflict in Ulster—but at what a cost! The cost, as Mr Bonar Law most truly said when suggesting a Referendum, of having "added another terrible chapter to the long catalogue of bitter and indelible memories which have been the curse of Ireland."‡ Fighting can settle nothing; it will only make settlement a thousand times more difficult.

**Westminster Gazette*, March 11, 1914.

† "Let me put another proposition to the right hon. gentleman [the Prime Minister]. He has told us over and over again that this Bill is to be the precursor of federation for the whole United Kingdom. I always doubted it, but if that is so, don't you get entirely out of that? If you have to reconsider the whole question in the next few years, why not put in your Bill that the Ulster counties shall be excluded until the whole question is reconsidered with a view to that federation of which this is the start? Everybody knows who has considered this question that whatever objection any subject of the Crown may have to a Federation Bill, he at all events cannot say he would fight, because as a subject of the King he is receiving equal treatment with every other subject. It is when you separate one class, and say that they are to have separate treatment from all the rest of the United Kingdom, and furthermore that they are to be handed over to their traditional enemies, then the right to fight arises."—Sir Edward Carson in the House of Commons, March 19, from *The Times* report, March 20.

‡ House of Commons, March 19, 1914.

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Nor can counsel be given an adequate range in the interval which remains before the Parliament Act is applied. Calm discussion—to say nothing of really comprehensive conference—is out of the question while the present Bill is suspended over Ulster like the sword of Damocles ready to fall at an appointed time. It would be very difficult when once the Bill had passed, even in an amended form, since the presence of a Home Rule measure on the Statute Book would necessarily hamper counsel at every turn and stand like a rock in the avenue to settlement. For if once the Bill has passed under the Parliament Act, the representatives of nearly half the people of the United Kingdom must feel that in a question affecting the very basis of British institutions the scales have been unfairly weighted against them by the rest of their fellow-citizens. Settlement will not be possible on such terms. What one half the nation does by force, the other half will in due time undo. The balance must be restored some day, for such is the governing instinct of the British temperament, with its sovereign gift of common sense and unfailing instinct for compromise. But the interval of conflict on fundamental issues cannot be prolonged without grave prejudice to the system as a whole and to the great responsibilities with which it is charged throughout the habitable globe.

These considerations were most justly urged by the *Westminster Gazette* when putting forward its suggestion for a statutory Commission or Convention to consider "Home-Rule-all-round." Its words are worth quoting now:

"We remain of opinion [it said] that, if anything like finality is to be desired, this is the only method which can secure it. Everything else, whether it is explicitly so stated or not, has a time-limit attached to it, and no effort of politicians can remove it, until we have an agreed constitution which will be beyond the changes and chances of General Elections. We fully appreciate the reluctance of politicians to take upon themselves a great new obligation at the close of this exhausting struggle.

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A sigh of despair goes up at the very suggestion. And certainly it is impossible for the Government to do it of their own initiative without the help and co-operation of their opponents. But if the cry is for finality, and if provisional settlements are to be rejected as intolerable or unacceptable, this is the only road, and we believe the country generally is prepared to see its statesmen take it.”*

The Referendum is no adequate solution of the deadlock from this wider point of view, though it is infinitely preferable to civil war. It is a new principle in our representative system, and should not be adopted in haste as a mere solvent of a party-made impasse. If it resulted in a sufficiently clear majority for the Government, the immediate difficulties of the situation might be temporarily overcome; but it could not by itself provide for a final settlement, and it would only create fresh difficulties if the Government failed to win. For whatever might be the constitutional theory as to its effect upon the Ministry in power, Ministers would not be able to count upon the Nationalist vote, which is necessary to the passage of their other measures, if they had failed to carry Home Rule. They would therefore have no choice but to resign, and when they had resigned, no alternative Ministry could gather sufficient support to carry on. In that case the Referendum would only have proved the necessity for a general election. It would be simpler to avoid such further complications by holding a general election at once.

It would be absurd to underrate the strong objection of the Liberal party to this course. To concede a general election before the Home Rule Bill and their other measures become law under the Parliament Act is the greatest sacrifice which the Government can be called to make. It will demand the strongest public spirit to forego the party advantage which they have won by a prolonged and arduous fight. It will demand also the hardest personal decision which men of honour can have

* *Westminster Gazette*, March 11, 1914.

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to face, for they must choose between their obligation as Ministers to the whole country and their debt as political leaders to supporters who have stood by them with faith and constancy in the battle for all the measures now at stake.

But what is the alternative—if both general election and Referendum be set aside? It is civil war. Hard as the moral dilemma most certainly is, there was surely never an occasion so fitted by the great political maxim *salus populi suprema lex*.

The Prime Minister has argued that an election would not settle anything of itself. It would not. But it would clean the slate and render a broad settlement possible on the true merits of the question. And this result would be the same, whatever the losses and gains at the polls, because the state of Ireland would absolutely prevent the postponement of an honest attempt at settlement, whether Liberals gained, or Unionists, or their respective strength remained unchanged.

If the common sense of the country could make itself heard through the noise of conflict at Westminster, it would exhort statesmen on either side to take the road of compromise. There is no support in the electorate at large for the extremists on either side. The danger now imminent seems so impossible still that the general public will hardly wake to it until the evil has been done. The average man cannot believe but that some compromise will be found.

And only this road to effective compromise—a general election—now remains. Great sacrifice as it involves, it is the one way of escape from the miscalculation of forces which set the Liberal party three years ago upon a false, because one-sided, method of constitutional and Irish reform. Had Mr Chamberlain's old wisdom been with the country still at the great turning-point of 1910, it might well have availed to prevent the mistake which both parties then made. A prophecy which he made in Belfast in 1887, when he was still but a half-risen power, midway between the two great

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parties of the time, may come home to many of his old colleagues with fresh force to-day:*

"It is said that according to the old Liberal principle majorities must rule, whether large or small majorities. If that referred only to matters of ordinary legislation, I should be very glad to adopt and accept it. But I cannot help thinking that our opponents push their arguments too far. You will remember that in the American Constitution, which has recently been the object of the most unqualified eulogy by Mr Gladstone, although all subjects of ordinary legislation are left to be decided by the bare majority, the Constitution itself is treated as a solemn compact. It is a treaty, and a treaty which cannot be altered even in the slightest particular without what is practically the general assent of all concerned. I claim, then, for the minority in Ireland that at least it shall have a veto upon any settlement which may be proposed in this matter affecting its dearest interests and all which it sedulously and jealously guards. In any case, I am convinced that Ulster will have an important part in the future discussion of the subject. It cannot be put aside; and if, as I fear, it is likely we shall be called upon once more to resist proposals for the disintegration of the Empire, it is Ulster that will hold the key of the position."

Very large numbers of Liberals still find themselves unable in all sincerity to appreciate the strong sense of constitutional injustice which is impelling thousands of conscientious and law-abiding citizens to sign the English Covenant in support of the Ulster cause. The worst feature of Mr Churchill's speech at Bradford was the assumption, almost truculently made, that there is no difference between a movement, supported by the largest single party in the House of Commons, representative of nearly half the British electorate, and concentrated in defence of the existing order of government—no difference between such a movement and any sectional revolt against the existing

* Mr Chamberlain in Belfast, October 11, 1887.

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order of economic conditions or against the passage of laws which are not fundamental and can be easily amended or repealed. If that assumption be just, then, indeed, the threatened revolt of Ulster, and the loyalty to Ulster of the Unionist forces throughout Great Britain, may seem to be little more than an unworthy manœuvre to outflank the Parliament Act. But no such assumption can survive analysis in the light of this far-seeing warning delivered by a great Liberal more than a quarter of a century ago.

There can be no final or complete solution of the Irish question, unless it be not only accepted by all parties in Ireland but placed in a position of security above the changes and chances of ordinary party politics. Security cannot be guaranteed while the constitution is in its present transitional state. Parties as such have done their best, and failed. Unless statesmen of either side can rise above the trammels of party and take counsel that the State may come to no harm, there is disaster ahead not only for this country but for the world-wide system of government which has its roots in the British Commonwealth. The situation calls for courage and breadth of view in the leaders of both parties, and from both it demands some sacrifice of cherished ideals. Not easy for convinced Unionists, it is harder still for their opponents, since they must forego their present possession of power and some at least of the hopes which they have based on it. If, however, the greatest of these hopes is not to perish, if Ireland is to have peace within her borders and Irishmen are to be reconciled to the Imperial system throughout the world, then the effort to effect a settlement through one party alone must be given up. For even if some palliative can still be found by virtue of which the Bill may pass without open strife, the result will be a speculation, full of anxieties for the future, not a certain and lasting settlement.

Now, at the eleventh hour, there seems to be no means of reopening the path to genuine, and not makeshift, compromise until a general election has defined the limits

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of power on either side and set opinion free. When once a general election has been held, the path will be clear. It seems certain that neither party can hope to win outright, and there is in each a powerful body of moderate opinion which will then govern the course of affairs. At present the extreme forces are governing, and without an appeal to the people they cannot be restrained.

The method of settlement, when counsel is no longer darkened by the cloud of faction which at present prevails, is already widely agreed. It is that the grant of self-government to Ireland should be made an integral part of a general scheme of decentralization for the United Kingdom. Whether the measure adopted is called by the name of devolution, or of federalism, or of "Home-Rule-all-round," matters not a jot; the only essential condition will be that it should command a general assent. Such a settlement has been accepted in advance by Sir Edward Carson. It has often been put forward as an ideal by the Prime Minister and other members of the Government. It has been mentioned with approval by Mr Austen Chamberlain and other Unionist leaders. The necessity of attaining it by conference has been pointed out within the last fortnight by a representative Ministerial organ, the *Westminster Gazette*. Amongst great numbers of those who are signing the *English Covenant* it is regarded as an essential sequel to the defeat of the present Bill.

Can it be doubted that the good sense of the nation will be found to support a movement so representative of its best political thought? British communities in Canada and South Africa have faced the political problem presented by deep divisions of religion and of race, and have solved it by the united action of all parties. The results are shown in two stable and comprehensive constitutions based upon national consent. There is no other way to enduring peace in the British Isles. Sooner or later, it must be taken. If reason be not lost in the heat of party struggle, it will be taken at once.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRIKE

TO understand the Labour troubles in Johannesburg it is just as well to bear in mind a few facts which might be considered elemental and yet are apt to be forgotten. The Witwatersrand is a reef of auriferous rock some sixty or seventy miles long, which runs east and west through the high veldt of the Transvaal. Along the line of this reef clusters a great industrial population, British, foreign, and native, with Johannesburg for its centre. The Transvaal itself is a high plateau like the roof of a lean-to shed, resting upon the wall of the Drakensbergen to the east, where the country is over six thousand feet above sea-level, and sloping downwards to the bushveld and Bechuanaland Border, two thousand feet lower. The higher part of the table-land on which the reef is situated is a fresh, bracing and healthy country whose rolling downs provide pasturage for the flocks and herds of the pastoral Boers. These Boers are mainly the descendants of the Voor-trekkers, who left the Cape Colony owing to a quarrel with the British Government over native policy, slaves, land holding and other matters, and out of a desire for a free land and a free life. There is thus an ancient and not forgotten animosity between British and Dutch which has helped to make history in the country since it was first settled.

In the days before the war this racial quarrel was the main fact in Witwatersrand as in Transvaal politics. The British miners and their employers usually stood together in the

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long fight with Krugerism, and if the miner had a quarrel with the mine-owner, it was because the capitalist was thought too ready to make terms with the Dutch Government. This solidarity, to use a word much in vogue nowadays, of all classes on the Rand closely resembled the feeling which now keeps all classes of the Ulster Protestant population together: just as master and man in Ulster demonstrate in unison against what they regard as Nationalist tyranny, so master and man in the Transvaal used to demonstrate against the tyrannies of Krugerism. The war was fought, Krugerism disappeared; the Transvaal was given self-government; the British were given a vote; the new Colony was merged in the Union; and, with extraordinary rapidity, the situation changed. The old solidarity disappeared, and in its place the gold-mining industry divided itself into two political parties, one representing the employer and the bulk of the propertied classes, and the other organized labour. Not only so, but the Dutch party found many supporters along the reef, both because of the increasing number of young Dutchmen who go to work on the mines and because the main cause of the racial quarrel had for the moment disappeared. It was a little as if the Ulster question had been set at rest after a fashion, and the working-man of Belfast had turned from his political allegiance to his upper classes and begun to agitate his labour grievances.

The split was intensified by several conditions which may be mentioned in passing. The chief is that the Rand is a gold-field of "big propositions." The gold is thinly and finely distributed in particles so small as to be usually invisible before treatment. The ore, generally speaking, is low-grade: there is a small percentage of gold to the ton, and the reef is expensive to work, especially in the deep levels—where the shafts sometimes reach five thousand feet down. Where gold is found in the bed of a stream or in alluvial pockets, gold digging may be a democratic industry: the lonely digger may make an easy living and a syndicate of half a

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dozen poor men may reach to affluence. But on the Rand operations can only be carried out by vast joint stock undertakings, whose capital runs into hundreds of thousands or even millions sterling. There is not only the big company but there is the group which controls many companies, and so the employer becomes infinitely exalted and remote—separated from the men in many cases by six thousand miles of ocean and in all cases by the complicated machinery of a vast business organization. Thus the human factor so valuable for the smooth running of an industry—represented in the early days by such popular figures as Sir Percy Fitzpatrick for example—tended to disappear; and the working-miner found himself in the hands of a corporation, which usually paid him good wages, but did not arouse in his heart any passionate sentiment of loyalty.

This estrangement was intensified by special circumstances. The war broke up the industry and severed many old ties: it involved the mining companies in huge losses which forced them to economize in working costs. The scarcity of native labour created by the war forced the industry into the Chinese experiment; and the uncertainty attending that experiment—and its ultimate failure through government interference—was a long and heavy financial drain. It was not that the Chinese were in themselves a real grievance to the white miner. On the contrary, the terms of indenture were so favourable to the European that his position was in no way threatened by Chinese competition. But as white labour rests on a foundation of native or coloured unskilled labour, it suffers owing to the scarcity or the withdrawal of that labour. When therefore the industry, at a very ticklish time—already hard hit by the war—had to curtail operations owing to the stoppage of the Chinese supply, the white working-man, above and below ground, inevitably suffered.

And the pinch continued, for these heavy losses had to be met. Working costs were further reduced; the mine-manager was forced to speed up in every direction; in the

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contract system upon which most of the mining is done there is room for many economies which bear at least a superficial resemblance to injustice, and the white miner, not understanding the harsh necessity which drove his employer to these economies, not knowing anything that was passing in the mind of his employer, only knew that life in the mines and on the Rand generally was far less easy and far less profitable and pleasant than it had been before the war.

Still another cause of discontent lay in the scourge commonly called "miner's phthisis." This disease only became a serious evil with the introduction of the machine rock-drill, its cause being the fine particles of sharp metallic dust which are sent floating through the air by the drill, and also by dynamite explosions. These particles lacerate the lung tissues and gradually set up a diseased condition, by which the tissues harden and degenerate until the whole lung is "changed to stone" as the miners put it in a terribly expressive way. The malady, which is sometimes fatal even when no tuberculous microbe fastens on the injured lung, is the almost inevitable result of working in deep levels at rock drills or in their neighbourhood for a period of years. The proportion of miners attacked was terribly high—so high indeed, that for a time, gold-mining was an occupation more deadly than aeroplaning. At first the scourge was imperfectly understood and little was done to check it; but the appalling mortality and the work of medical men at last demonstrated both that the disease could be stopped and that it would be fatal to the industry unless it were stopped. Ventilation, the use of water-sprays to lay dust, the use of a better quality of dynamite to lessen the fumes which are a contributory cause—such expedients gradually improved the situation, until the Government Inspector of Mines was able, a year or so ago, to state with confidence that the scourge had been mastered and that the mines were once more places in which men could work with reasonable safety. The chief difficulty remaining is that

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miners themselves are apt to neglect the statutory precautions in order to save trouble or money, thereby not only endangering their own lives but the lives of those about them.

Such conditions formed the fertile soil of discontent upon which agitators worked. The agitators themselves were some of them zealots, some of them ruffians, some of them honest men embittered by these conditions. Together they worked in two main directions, one to form a political labour party, the other to create an organization of trade unions controlled by a central caucus. Both movements have flourished in Australia where the "Trades Halls," the centres of vast organizations, put parties into power and often decide the politics both of Commonwealth and State. The twin projects, however, could only have a moderate success in South Africa, and for several reasons. Only a minority of the constituencies are industrial, the bulk remaining chiefly agricultural. Moreover, the industrial population is not homogeneous, as it is in Australia, but is sharply divided into skilled and unskilled, black and white, the white workman with the vote and the black workman without it.

This division produces certain important consequences, which will be dealt with later. It is sufficient to observe here that South African Trade Unionism was weak in numbers, in funds, and in potential political power, and that a weak labour party is apt to be a violent party. The young South African Labour Party was tinged with violent and revolutionary views, in which the theory of "direct action" or the general strike mingled strangely with the political advocacy of parliamentary socialism. The general strike was a project which found favour among the agitators both because the hope of obtaining an actual majority in the Union Parliament was remote and because the Witwatersrand, dependent as it is for supplies carried by rail from outside and supporting an enormous population, as it were in the air, is peculiarly vulnerable to this sort of attack. It is like a vast and ill-provisioned garrison divided in sentiment

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and race so as to be dangerous to itself, and liable to be completely cut off from its source of supply by a small beleaguering force.

Here it may be said that the right to refuse to work is generally regarded as part of the liberty of a free man: the organization of that right so that a whole trade may use its refusal to work as a means of individual bargaining is a right within statutory limitations both in the Transvaal and in the other British Dominions, although in England, under the pressure of Trade Unionism in politics, it is now regarded like the other as a right absolute and unquestioned. But the right to organize a national stoppage, so as to bring a whole State to its knees, has never been, and cannot be, recognized as within the bounds of permissible action. It is a conspiracy against the existence of the State and will be treated as such by all wise governments. But least of all is the attempt permissible where, as in South Africa, a great native and savage or half-savage population might be starved or excited or instigated by such a conspiracy into dangerous insurrection. Unless we remember this "black menace" of a quarter of a million, possibly starving, and certainly excited, natives along the Reef, we shall not understand the real seriousness of the attack which the Union Government had to face.

But such an attack made it necessary to combine railwaymen with miners. If the miners struck alone, Johannesburg could still contrive to get along for a time—probably for longer than the miners could hold out; if the railwaymen struck too, the case of Johannesburg was desperate. That the case of the miners would also be desperate does not seem to have been a calculation that very much troubled the agitators. Only the hard lesson of experience seems able to teach what might be thought the obvious lesson, that in a general strike the working man is "brought to his knees" at least as quickly as the rest of society.

✓ These ideas were simmering in the mind of the South African working man, when a spark was set to the tinder by

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the manager of the New Kleinfontein mine. It is unnecessary to go into that fateful incident here. Sufficient to say that Mr Bulman, when he entered on his duties, rearranged the work of nine men in such a way as to dock them of part of their Saturday half-holiday. The men objected, and five were discharged without legal notice. The Company, when it realized the situation, yielded the point; but not in a manner to satisfy the men. The Company was in the wrong, and Mr Bain, the Secretary of the Miners' Union, took advantage of the error as a glorious opportunity to press for an "eight-hour day bank to bank for all underground workers." On this and other issues, the struggle soon far transcended the miserable little quarrel on the New Kleinfontein. Reinstatement and the treatment of strike-breakers complicated and embittered the dispute, and in a brief space the whole Rand was involved in a violent and ferocious struggle with capital ranged on one side and labour on the other.

The trouble began in the mining town of Benoni. The men who struck on the Kleinfontein and the neighbouring Apex mine at the end of May, 1913, poured into the place, and as the dispute developed enlisted their friends and sympathizers, as well as the hooligans of the place, in their vendetta against the mine management and the strike-breakers. Their leaders encouraged them to violence. ✓ ✓

Thus on May 26, Mr Crawford was telling them to "oil their engines with sand" and was extolling the persuasive powers of "a box of dynamite." Mr Mason two days later was suggesting to the police that if their superintendent got "a crack on the head with a brick" he would receive "more compensation than a constable." On June 15, Mr Waterston was advising the men to pull down the Kleinfontein fence. A fortnight later the *Strike Herald* was joyfully recording the fact that "scab hunting has been the popular sport," and Mr Mason was repeating his favourite axiom that "No scab has a right to live so long as there is a pool of water deep enough to drown him or a rope long

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enough to hang his carcass." Natives were threatened that if they refused to join in the strike they would be blown up with dynamite. A series of outrages and assaults were committed, frequently in broad daylight, the small force of police being often powerless to interfere. Men were knocked over with pick-handles and kicked almost to death. To be man-handled by an angry mob is among the most terrible of human experiences. Even women were subjected to a brutal persecution, as in the case of Mrs Scott and her daughter, who were driven out of their house in the middle of the night and their furniture burnt because one of the strike-breakers was engaged to Miss Scott. Not only was a general strike declared in the mines; but traders were not allowed to trade except by permit of the strike committee. Bakers were forbidden to supply bread to anyone on the New Kleinfontein "from a mine-manager to a trammer," and any storekeeper who was even suspected of disobeying orders had his store burnt about his ears.

Jack London, in a recent novel called *The Valley of the Moon*, gives a vivid account of the ferocious conflicts carried on between strikers and strike-breakers in San Francisco, where the gentle method of the picket is to break the arms of the black-leg and the black-leg's retort is a revolver shot in the stomach. The hatred felt by the men and fanned by the women for workers who are regarded as traitors to their class is hissed out in that horrid by-word, "Scab"; and even when men desire to work and have no quarrel with their employers the loathing expressed in the nickname and the dreadful consequences of earning it make the workers obey in fear and trembling the commands of their trade union bosses. They have placed themselves under a tyranny compared with which the yoke of the harshest employer is light, and this new social order, this state of violence within a state of law, is the more dangerous because the object of the leaders is impracticable: they desire to destroy the temple that they may build it again in three days. The whole basis and structure of society is accursed in their

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eyes: they would shatter it to bits and then remould it nearer to their hearts' desire. With such fanatics are linked hardy adventurers who see a living and a career in the direction of Trade Unions, and also honest workers who are apt to be misled by their clever and plausible colleagues and are used as tools by less scrupulous men. Only when the revolutionary methods grossly and palpably fail, do the moderate trade union leaders contrive to reassert themselves in the councils of their class. And sometimes not even then, for the more desperate sort are clever in debate: there is always an excuse for failure and always a new paradise beyond the next revolution.

✓ The trouble spread from Benoni along the reef: bands of strikers went from mine to mine "pulling out" the workmen. On June 30, Sir George Farrar, as representing the industry, protested to the government that mobs of strikers were permitted to trespass upon mines and compel the men, whether they were contented or not, to strike. In the prosecution of their cause the strikers called the famous meeting of July 4 in the Market Square of Johannesburg. The public announcement was only made on the morning of the meeting, and no permission was asked or given. The *Worker*, an official organ of the Labour party, had by this time formally declared "war" on society. "War having been declared in the shape of a general strike on the Rand, has now got to be fought...to victory.... Victory means bringing the South African public, and in particular, the Union Parliament, to its senses and its knees... the shoe has got to be made to pinch everywhere as tight as it will go."

The authorities tried to stop the meeting, when the crowd had already collected, and the police did their best to keep the people in the Square on the move. The police have been accused of brutality at this meeting: the figures may be allowed to speak for themselves. "Out of 264 policemen in the Market Square there were 88 casualties. Some of the men were very severely injured, teeth were knocked out,

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faces cut with broken glass bottles and heads cut open with stones. As regards the public, there were at the utmost only five serious casualties." The other events of that lurid night need not be recounted here. Park Station, the main station of Johannesburg, was burnt to the ground; out of the seventy-seven police who guarded it, forty-eight were injured, four very severely—as against fourteen injuries to civilians. One wretched negro was roasted alive in the Station, and the Fire Brigade was brutally attacked. The *Star* Office was burnt down with the help of dynamite bombs, and twenty girls and twenty men at work in the premises narrowly escaped with their lives. Other buildings were attacked—among them the Corner House, the huge offices of the chief mining group, and the Rand Club—gunshops were looted, and the police and military had to fight desperately in the streets and passages of the city. The loss of life was considerable: casualties were numerous and the whole affair was in the nature of a Revolution rather than an industrial dispute.*

The effect of this outbreak of anarchy in Johannesburg upon the native labourers in the mine compounds along the reef can easily be imagined. General Smuts subsequently accused the Labour leaders of having attempted to persuade the compound natives to form an industrial organization hostile to their employers. This has been denied. But whether it was so or not, there cannot be the least doubt that, from this point of view, the powerlessness of the Government to check the violence of the strikers created a very serious situation. During the debate in the Union Parliament on the second reading of the Indemnity Bill General Botha quoted a pronouncement by one of the Native leaders advising his people to organize for industrial purposes

* Those who would know more of these events, which were fully reported in the South African Press at the time, may be advised to read the Report of the Witwatersrand Disturbances Commission, which has been printed as a blue-book both in South Africa and in London, and the evidence on which this report is based.

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against their white employers. In this case also it has been denied that the advice was given in any hostile spirit. But such a denial, however true it may be, does not affect the real issue. Natives come from all parts of South Africa to work in the gold mines. Can anyone doubt that the tales of violent strife among Europeans which they must have carried back to their homes would have a most evil effect? In Basutoland, in Swaziland, in Zululand, in the Native Territories of the Cape Province, vast numbers of natives live at peace because the hand of the white man is effective to control them. But that control is based upon the prestige of the European. If this is threatened the peace of the Native Reserves is threatened also, and the menace of native unrest—that hangs always like a dark cloud upon the horizon of South African politics—instantly becomes more grave. The simple fact is that no South African Government can afford to ignore the effect of industrial disorder upon the native population. The state of Johannesburg in July was tantamount to a proclamation to the whole native population of the helplessness of constituted authority.

It was such considerations as these, and the accompanying disorganization of trade, that forced the Union Government to negotiate with the strike leaders. These negotiations were carried on by General Botha and General Smuts on the one side and Mr Bain and his colleagues—some of whom were on bail at the time—on the other, in circumstances peculiarly humiliating to the Union Government: "I admit freely," said General Smuts in his great speech of 4th and 5th February, 1914, "that it was one of the hardest things I have done in my life to put my name on a document together with that of Mr Bain and the others, but very often in life—and I have learnt it in my own previous experience—you have to incur humiliation and disgrace to do a great public service, and I feel as certain as I stand here this afternoon, that, but for the action of the Prime Minister in going to Johannesburg and settling that dispute that Saturday afternoon, there would have been not fifty thou-

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sand pounds to pay, but we would have had to pay a price which would have been appalling to the world."

The settlement was reinstatement of the strikers with compensation for the strike-breakers, and inquiry into industrial grievances. It was, however, a mere suspension of hostilities while both sides got to work upon organization and preparation for the real struggle. The next move of the Trades Federation was to threaten a general strike while keeping the date open. The threat was depressing and even paralysing to industry: many workmen were thrown on the streets: and the Government reply was to begin sending the native unskilled labour away from the Rand. The depression had its effect: many of the workmen showed their disapproval of Trades Hall methods; the general strike was declared off, and for the moment the Syndicalists appeared to be beaten. But then came the strike of coal-miners in Natal with a sympathetic movement in the Transvaal, and the threat that the railwaymen would refuse to black-leg—that is to say, carry coal and free labour. In passing it may be noted that on the theory of the sympathetic strike the railways have to bear the brunt of every stoppage, for there never was yet an industrial dispute in which the railways could not be shown to have been utilized by the employers, either to bring up "black-leg" labour, or send away "black-leg" goods.

At this time the Government seemed to play into the hands of Mr Poutsma, the secretary of the Railwaymen's Union. Mr Poutsma, it may be mentioned in passing, was educated in the school of Continental Syndicalism. He had been through the mill of anarchy in Holland, and had been imprisoned in a Dutch gaol for violence and incitement to violence. Mr Poutsma had been waiting for his chance, and the chance was given him when the Department of Railways at this juncture, decided upon a policy of retrenchment. Now it is obvious that, when railways belong to the State, the Department in the interests of the taxpayer must have the same powers of enlarging and con-

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tracting its staff as a private company: otherwise the State is on the straight road to bankruptcy. But it is also obvious that when men are being retrenched from a Government Department, the whole service is in a condition on which agitation works fruitfully and easily. The retrenchment put the railway service in a ferment. Their organization demanded that the policy be at once reversed, and Mr Poutsma in his negotiations with the Government showed that he would accept no settlement which was not a complete victory for him and a complete humiliation for the Department.

On January 7 there was a big meeting of railway workmen in Pretoria and Mr Poutsma announced that if the Government did not stop retrenchment and reinstate the retrenched men, the railway and harbour men would be advised to stop work the following morning, while the Federation of Trades declared its intention to support them by "sympathetic action." Messrs Bain, Mason and Waterston made what can only be called bloodthirsty speeches. All members of the Defence Force who stood by the Government were to be posted as "Scabs" throughout South Africa, and a circular was issued to the Trade Unions: "The General Strike Committee requests all your members to organize into commandoes for the purpose of greater efficiency in the Federation Forces."

At first the Railway strike seemed to be an almost complete failure. Then the Federation of Trades took it in hand and it instantly became more formidable. The Government, however, was able to give effective protection to railway servants who remained loyal, and a number of the strike leaders were arrested. Thereupon the Federation of Trades declared in favour of a general strike. This was the weapon on which the Syndicalists chiefly relied. Mr Poutsma had told them that the stoppage of the railways would starve the country into submission. They obtained a majority on a very small ballot—under 3,500 out of the 22,000 white miners on the Rand—in favour of a mining strike and they

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hoped to "pull out" the workers in every trade in the country.

As soon as the result of the ballot was known a general strike was declared. But this time the Government was prepared. Martial law was instantly proclaimed. In the middle of the night the chief railway centres in the Transvaal were occupied by strong forces of police. The mines were guarded by bodies of armed men, numbering one to every ten workers. The new Defence Forces were mobilized and the Burghers of the back veld rode in to their rendezvous with new rifles and belts full of cartridges. The mobilization was a most impressive piece of work—silent, speedy, universal. Everywhere armed and mounted men patrolled the streets: "the shadow of the Burgher was on Johannesburg." The strikers knew very well that this time there would be no shooting in the air, for a Burgher regards it as one of the cardinal sins to waste ammunition. The lines were all guarded: every vulnerable point where a dynamite cartridge could do damage had been thought of and protected. Control officers were in command of every town in the zone of danger; everywhere the armed strength of the Government was a visible and terrible fact.

But worse still, the general strike was by no means the complete success that had been anticipated. On Monday, January 12, the situation was serious: the railway stoppage in the Transvaal was fairly general; Bloemfontein went out on strike; Durban went out on strike; a very considerable number of men at the Salt River Works, near Cape Town, went out on strike, and the control of the railways seemed slipping out of the hands of the Government. But fortunately the running staff of the Cape Section held firmly by the Government, and many other railwaymen—chiefly the old hands—stood resolutely to their duty. A skeleton service was kept going, and with the growing protection of the Defence Forces it also grew in strength. The attempt to stop the baking of bread in Johannesburg, so that the Defence Forces might be starved

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out, was a failure. Mr Quinn, that most famous of master-bakers, formerly Mayor of Johannesburg and also a member of the Union Parliament, "in spite of physical infirmities himself donned the white apron, and, with a number of well-washed natives, he started baking bread."

The Executive Committee of the Trades Federation had fortified themselves in their Trades Hall, with the red flag overhead, and kept issuing imperfectly obeyed orders and fiery incitements, until they were beleaguered by Government troops. They swore to die rather than surrender; but a field gun was brought up; they were given a brief space to decide, and they decided with fair promptitude that discretion was the better part of valour. They surrendered and were lodged in gaol.

The Government had triumphed at last; the strike was over; the leaders in prison; the railways were running; the mines going at full blast; only two lives had been lost—and these by accident. More than that, the Syndicalists had been covered with the ridicule attending a gross and ignominious failure. It was then that the Government took the only step for which they have been seriously criticized: they took nine of the Syndicalist leaders out of the custody of justice and in circumstances melodramatic in their suddenness and secrecy, conveyed them to the coast, and placed them on board the Natal Direct Line Steamship "Umgeni," which was waiting with steam up in Durban Harbour. Except that a chance listener heard the strains of a revolutionary chorus issuing from a railway van, no one outside the Executive knew anything of the affair until the deported men were safely on the way to England. The outraged Transvaal Court expressed its impotent indignation, Mr Creswell and his friends made a futile effort to intercept the ship with a steam tug; but the Government plans were too swift and well laid for either the law or any rescue party to intervene.

The Government defence for this illegal action is set forth, clearly and frankly enough, in General Smuts's speech.

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He regarded the nine men as the worst and most dangerous of the ringleaders in a conspiracy against society. But there was no law to fit this conspiracy.

“The only crime which fits this state of affairs is high treason. But you attempt to indict these people for high treason and see what will be the result. Our law of high treason comes from the Middle Ages. If you wish to know what high treason is under our Roman-Dutch Law you must read Mattheus, a writer of the 16th or 17th century, when Syndicalism had never arisen, and when high treason meant the introduction of an armed force into the country or a conspiracy to upset the king or ruling authority. Our treason law does not fit these novel and extraordinary conditions which have arisen in the present case, and if you were to indict these people for the crime they have really committed, you would never obtain a conviction.”

In other words the men had committed no offence known to existing law under which they could be tried and punished. An example must, nevertheless, be made, and accordingly the men were deported—and to that extent punished—without trial.

That is obviously a very dangerous doctrine. Even under martial law—which is legally speaking no law—it is a good custom generally observed to try by court martial before punishment. An officer under martial law who punished without form of trial would find it hard to justify himself even to his military superiors. Thus even in a state of war the best tradition is against the Union Government's action, and a state of war, or anything even remotely resembling war, had ceased to exist before the act of deportation took place.

No reasonable person would attempt to deny, after examining the facts, as set forth above, that a dangerous and formidable conspiracy did exist against peace and good order in South Africa. Nor would he seek to blink the fact that with 250,000 natives on the Rand, the responsibility

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of the Union Government was heavy and the position at times was critical. But impartial opinion has not been convinced that at the time of the deportations a situation any longer existed so critical as to justify so grave a departure from the first principles of justice as punishment without trial. It is a precedent bad even in a state of war: demoralizing in a state of peace.

However that may be, the Union Government sought to cover this and all their other actions by a Bill of Indemnity, and carried the vast majority of the Union Parliament with them even to the extent of indemnifying the deportations. Mr Merriman protested with his usual eloquence, the salt of a personal grudge, as usual, adding a blue flame to the fire of his constitutional wrath. Sir Thomas Smartt thought the deportations a mistake, but voted for the whole Bill. The small Labour Party, heavily committed to the support of the revolutionaries, advanced an interested and disregarded opposition. General Hertzog, with his scout, Mr H. E. S. Fremantle, had stultified himself by encouraging the movement when it seemed to be going strong and repudiating it the day the red flag was hauled down by a policeman.

In England, the Liberal Press was obviously embarrassed. The Parliamentary Labour Party prepared to extend a welcome to the Syndicalist pilgrims which was probably more effusive than sincere. In the House of Commons, Mr Ramsay Macdonald denounced the political character of the deported men, while supporting their cause. In Unionist circles, the *Morning Post*, while justifying the other actions of the Union Government, took a strong line upon the "Umgeni" affair and pressed upon the Imperial Government the necessity of protecting the right of British subjects to appeal for justice in the last event to the King in his Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The Imperial Government was placed in rather a difficult position. In the Union Constitution it was given the clear right of reserving and disallowing any Bill of the Union

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Parliament, and also of allowing any aggrieved subject to appeal to the Privy Council. On the other hand, as Mr Harcourt was fain to admit, these "constitutional safeguards" were of no practical value: if they were used General Botha would resign; and no alternative Government could be found. Lord Gladstone would have to administer the country without an administration and with no other authority than governor's warrants. South Africa must be allowed to manage its own affairs, and the Indemnity Bill must be allowed.

General Botha and his able colleague have therefore triumphed all along the line: they have crushed an attempted revolution, disarmed the Opposition and discomfited General Hertzog. If party considerations enter the astute mind of General Smuts he must think not without satisfaction of a British vote hopelessly divided into two—employer and employed; and of Burghers reassured by the strong and thoroughly Afrikaner measure of martial law, mobilization and deportation.

How the events recorded above may affect the Empire is a question not easily answered. The Labour Party in England are being forced forward half against their will by an outraged trade unionism. Those who saw the great Trade Union Demonstration of Protest in Hyde Park on the first of March could not fail to have been impressed by the tremendous strength of the forces thus set in motion. The strong Labour vote which upset the Government candidate in the Leith Burghs was due at least in part to South African events, on which the labour candidate based his appeal for support. The end of the agitation is not yet and no one can say how far it will go; but it cannot fail to aggravate the already dangerous labour unrest and class feeling in the Mother Country. This aggravation will be due to the feeling, first, that the South African Government has shown itself opposed to labour organization as such, has used its armed forces to deny to the workmen the right to combine for the

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purpose of improving their position, and has justified its repressive doctrines by the mouth of its principal spokesman; and secondly, that the Home Government, by tamely acquiescing in the passage of General Botha's Indemnity Bill, has endorsed these doctrines and has furnished one more proof that the Liberal Party, for all its professions of democratic sympathies, is but one wing of the combined forces of Capitalism.

It is, perhaps, not unnatural that such a view should be held in Labour circles after the events chronicled above, but it seems to rest in reality on a failure to understand the peculiar structure of South African society, which differentiates it altogether from all other societies in which the "Labour Movement" has made itself felt. The special peculiarities of the South African State furnish the explanation if not the excuse alike of the brutal violence of the strikers and of the arbitrary use of illegal or extra-legal force with which it has been repressed.

The cardinal fact to be remembered is that, as has already been indicated, the men who constitute the "Labour Party" of South Africa are not the "working class" of the country in the sense in which that phrase is used in Europe. They are not the men who sell the labour of their thews and sinews for a small daily wage. They are a comparatively small aristocracy of skilled labour: they are skilled artisans and mechanics, foremen, supervisors, "shift-bosses"; and they are, judged by all ordinary standards, very highly paid. The "working class" is black or coloured, and no body of men in South Africa is more sternly repressive in its attitude towards the aspiration of black or coloured men to raise themselves in the industrial and social scale than are the white men's Unions. It is not for mere observers to applaud or condemn the morality of this attitude, but it is essential to take note of it. It is not an unnatural attitude: the black man's labour is cheap, his intelligence is weak, but his muscles are strong; he is a docile and simple creature; he has little or no idea of combining against his employer; and

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though anything but creative, he is highly imitative. He would thus be a very formidable economic competitor in a good part at least of the field of employment which the white man regards as exclusively reserved for himself, if he were allowed to enter it.

From this state of things certain very important consequences follow. In South Africa, as in all communities based on labour economically though not politically servile, there is always a considerable residuum of white men incapable of earning the high wage demanded by the white men's Unions, and forbidden by the strictest of social taboos from doing "Kaffir's work"—a floating population of unemployed. There are also considerable numbers of the more intelligent natives and coloured men who, whether the white man likes it or not, are daily progressing in education, if only through imitation of the white man's methods. In the case of a strike of the white employees, therefore, there is always a plentiful supply of strike breakers to be obtained. So long as the most highly skilled men remain at their posts—and their salaries are so very high that they are unlikely to strike willingly—the places of the strikers can be readily filled for the time being and without any very serious loss of efficiency by the employment of white men previously unemployed, and by the admission of natives and coloured men into the white man's field. The real "blackleg" is the black man. The history of the abortive strike of white miners on the Witwatersrand in 1907 entirely supports this view.

A white man's strike in South Africa is therefore practically bound to fail unless society generally can be frightened out of its seven senses at the very outset. If there is to be any hope of success all the white employees, however contented or well paid, must be "pulled out," "scabs" must be half or more than half killed, the strike must be made "general," and a state of affairs must be produced in which Governments and employers alike will surrender anything rather than allow it to continue for a moment longer.

[Violent measures necessitate violent reprisals, and no self-

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respecting society can be expected to allow itself to be bullied by a single class, be they dukes or demagogues—certainly not by so small a class as constitutes the white Trade Unions of South Africa. It is not fair to the South African Government to regard it as hostile to organized labour as such. In 1907 the Transvaal Government stood aloof altogether from the quarrel between the miners and their employers, and contented itself with preserving the peace and securing to every one, whether a member of a Union or not, the right to work if so minded. The Union Government would doubtless do the same in similar circumstances. The result, for the reasons above given, would almost certainly be, as it was in 1907, the condign failure of the strike, but it would hardly be fair to blame the Government for that.

The exceptional measures which the South African Government felt itself bound to take in the circumstances existing in January last have to be judged with proper reference to those circumstances. They must be justified, if at all, on the maxim *salus populi suprema lex*, and they were justified on that maxim—at any rate so far as they were confined within the four corners of the Union of South Africa. To preserve life and property is the first duty of government, and if, in the peculiar circumstances of South Africa, that duty cannot be discharged consistently with the law, so much the worse for the law. It is idle to complain of illegality; the law, borrowed as it is in the main from European countries, should be altered to fit the facts. So far as the matters with which the South African Government had to deal were matters of domestic concern, the responsibility rested with them to act as they thought best, and, so far, the doctrine of colonial autonomy, on which Mr Harcourt exclusively relied in defence of his refusal to interfere with or delay the passage of the Indemnity Bill, incontestably applies.

The deportations are a different matter. The point is not that they involved a breach of the law of South Africa: so

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did other acts done under martial law. The point is that they involved an illegal assumption of extra-territorial authority. When General Botha's Government determined on the deportations, they ceased to treat the difficulty they were dealing with as a purely domestic matter: at somebody else's—the Mother Country's—expense. They determined to get rid of a part, and not the least serious part, of their difficulty, the problem of keeping a handful of troublesome demagogues in order. This was an act not of strength but of weakness, a confession of impotence. And it is at this point that the theory of colonial autonomy on which Mr Harcourt laid so much stress breaks down. *Ex hypothesi* the nine deported persons, the majority of whom at least were domiciled South Africans, were such turbulent and dangerous characters that the South African Government could not control them. They were to be dumped on the shores of the Mother Country without the acquiescence of the Home Government having been sought or obtained.

The doctrine of colonial autonomy cannot properly be appealed to in defence of this proceeding. The natural inference from the inability of a Dominion to look after its own rascals is that that Dominion should not be entrusted with self-government, and if that inference is absurd in the case of the Union of South Africa, as of course it is, we are driven to the conclusion that the action taken ought to have been avoided.

It has been reserved for Mr Merriman, who is anything but an Imperialist in the ordinary acceptation of that much-abused term, to point out, in the South African Parliament, the Imperial aspect of the matter:

“My hon. friend [General Smuts] has managed, curiously enough, to strike the Empire two of its deadliest blows. He has got us into a most extraordinary mess with the Government of India, which is one of the most vulnerable points of the British Empire. Now he has sent home to England, at a critical time when England may be plunged into the brink of civil war, he

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has sent home nine missionaries who will go round inflaming a large section of the voters against the British Government, which has had as little to do with the business as Table Mountain has. Does he not see what a dangerous and unpatriotic thing it is to do? "

In the present case the actual consequences of General Botha's action are not likely to be so serious as Mr Merriman apprehends. England can absorb Mr Bain's ragged regiment without much trouble. But the consequences which would flow from the admission of the principle that action by a Dominion Government, no matter how much the Imperial Government may disapprove it on its merits, must be acquiesced in, provided the Dominion enjoys responsible government, even though the action in question be of an extra-territorial character, might well be serious indeed. There are necessary limits to the application of the doctrine of *laissez-faire* even in regard to the acts of responsible Dominion Governments within their own borders. Admittedly these limits have sometimes been reached in the matter of the position and rights of Indians in South Africa: they might conceivably be reached, though there is no reason to think it likely, in the matter of the treatment of the South African native problem. The Union Government is entrusted with the duty of governing the native population within its borders, but the consequences of any very grave mistake in the handling of the problem might not fall upon them alone. Native trouble might spread to Basutoland, to the Bechuana-land Protectorate, to Rhodesia, in which case a speedy retribution would fall upon an Imperial Government which had contented itself with the repetition of easy phrases about the silken cord which binds the Empire together.

But when the acts of Dominion Governments extend beyond their own borders the danger of a too facile complacency is plainer still. The signs of the times point to the creation of Dominion naval squadrons. So far agreements have been made with the Dominion Governments under

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which their ships are to be controlled by their own officers only within certain limited areas of the ocean. But there is no legal sanction behind these agreements. Suppose that orders rashly and ignorantly given by a Dominion Government to Dominion ships of war produced a mischievous effect upon a delicate diplomatic situation which the Dominion Government, having no responsibility for the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Empire, was not in a position to appreciate in all its bearings. Would it be a sufficient reply to the angry protests of an aggrieved Foreign Power to say that the Government of the United Kingdom was unable to interfere since interference would entail the resignation of the Dominion Government and no alternative Government was possible in that Dominion?

An improbable supposition has purposely been taken to illustrate a principle, but the supposition, though improbable, is not inconceivable. It is to the credit of the good sense of the responsible Governments throughout the Empire that the potential dangers involved in the present unorganized state of the Empire have not more often manifested themselves in actual practice. So long as Imperial relations continue as at present we can only continue to rely on that general good sense, but with the rapid growth of the Dominions in power, wealth, and sense of nationhood the potential dangers must, it would seem, grow greater until by some general readjustment of powers and responsibilities we succeed in making our practice conform to our still unchallenged theory that the Empire is to serve its great purpose in the world as a single, organic, though complex, State.

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AGAIN and again in discussing social or national or Imperial problems, when the question at issue has been plumbed to the depths, rival disputants find themselves driven back on to the inevitable conclusion:—"It is all a matter of better education." Yet there, as a rule, the issue is allowed to rest; for the discussion of education opens up dangerous ground which few feel competent to tread. In the eyes of the plain man education, as a subject of public controversy, bears an unfortunate reputation. "Education Bills" and "Education Questions" have too often presented him with an ill-assorted combination of high-sounding generalities and complicated technical details which have effectually conspired together to destroy his interest in the subject.

Yet, in spite of the maulings which it has received at the hands of unworthy sponsors, the subject remains all-important for the English-speaking peoples. What can be more vital to a State than the education of its citizens? And what more necessary to it, in the performance of this task of civic training, than a clear conception, founded on the underlying facts of human nature and of the national character, of what education really means and is capable of achieving?

During the last ten years, undeterred by political controversies and almost unnoticed by the general public, an attempt has been made to approach the subject from a new angle, in a spirit worthy of its importance. The Wor-

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kers' Educational Association, founded by a group of trade unionists and co-operators in 1903, has from the very beginning aimed at nothing less than the restoration of education to its rightful place among the great spiritual forces of the community. If its experiments have been tried, and its successes achieved, among students of the working class, this is not because there is anything narrow or sectional in its message; but rather because, in the modern world, it is the working class which is in closest touch with the great realities which education seeks to interpret; and because the working people of this country, in particular, have a long and honourable tradition of true educational endeavour.*

This movement has now been at work for over ten years, and the principles which inspired it have been thoroughly tested in action. Within the last year it has set foot in Canada and Australia (where it has branches in every State of the Commonwealth) and has attracted widespread attention in Germany, France and other continental countries. The time seems ripe, therefore, for an endeavour, both to describe the work that it is doing and to interpret its significance; for we seem to be face to face with nothing less than a new philosophy of education, full of potentialities unsuspected even by its English originators. In the following article, then, an attempt will be made, first, following out this line of thought, to suggest what education should be in a modern community; secondly, to describe what has been achieved by the Workers' Educational Association movement; and, lastly, to inquire what is the national and Imperial significance of the experiments which have been undertaken.

*On this point see Chapter I of *Oxford and Working Class Education*; the Report of a Joint Committee of University and working class representatives on the education of workpeople (Oxford 1908, 1s.); also Sadler's *Continuation Schools in England and Elsewhere*.

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I

WHEN people speak of education they are generally thinking of the instruction given to children by professional teachers in schoolhouses provided for the purpose. This is, of course, the most obvious aspect of education, and the manner in which a modern community carries out its responsibilities in this respect is one of the best tests of its intrinsic health and prosperity. But for our present purpose the subject is best not approached direct. Those who have it in their keeping, politicians and officials, teachers and psychologists and the rest of the tribe of "educationists" have invested it with such an atmosphere of mystery and technicality as to obscure its broader relations. We propose, therefore, for the moment to leave the children and adolescents entirely aside, and to concentrate the reader's attention on a problem with which—if he is not frightened by the name—he is certain to be familiar—the education of the grown-up citizen.

Anyone who has ever sat at the feet of a great teacher, either at school or in the wider life for which school is a preparation, knows what education *feels like*. But that does not make it easy to define. It is not the storing of the mind with information: it is not the love of knowledge and the search for truth: it is not the training of the judgment or the acquirement of a mental discipline: it is not the strengthening of the will or the building up of character: it is not even the forming of friendships based on that deepest of bonds, a common ideal and a common purpose in life. Education is something compounded of all these, but greater and deeper and more life-giving. One of the most striking definitions is perhaps that quoted by Dr Parkin in his *Life of Thring*, the famous headmaster of Uppingham School:—"Education is the transmission of life." Yet even this is not quite satisfying. Education is, indeed, as

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high and broad and deep as life itself. Yet it is not life itself, but life with a difference. It is not simply experience, but experience *interpreted*. Wordsworth, in a wonderful phrase, defined poetry as "emotion remembered in tranquillity." Poetry, as he knew, is not born amid the pomp and circumstance of experience, in crowded hours of glorious life; she is the still small voice of the soul, speaking in the quiet after the storm has passed. So it is with education. It is not experience itself, but the effort of the soul to find a true expression or interpretation of experience, and to find it, not alone, but with the help of others, fellow-students; for without common study—such as in a school or a University—there may, indeed, be reflection; there can be no true education. But where there is life and honest thinking and the free contact of mind with mind, where thought leaps out to answer thought and there is the sense of the presence of a common spirit, there, even if but two or three are gathered together, whether in a well-appointed building paid for out of rates and taxes, or in a squalid upper room, or in a primitive club house, or in a railway carriage going to work, or on the veldt under the stars, or at a street corner in an industrial town—there is a gathering of students and the nucleus of a university.

To those who complain that such a definition is too vague to be practically helpful one reminder must be sufficient. The Athenians of the fifth century before Christ are generally regarded as the most cultivated and the best educated community of whom history bears record. They originated or developed many of the most important activities of civilized life. They were, in fact, the great inventors and organizers of the things of the mind. Art and philosophy, democracy and the drama, we owe, not merely to their unwearying curiosity, their craving for vivid and many-sided experience, but to their supreme power of sifting, verifying, harmonizing, in a word *interpreting*, the problems of the world in which they lived. It was no vain boast of Pericles that Athens was "the school of Greece," and not of

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Greece only but of all subsequent generations; the Athenian mind, as we find it in contemporary writings, seems to have been carefully trained to live in the light of eternal realities, to be constantly testing theories by experience, and illuminating experience by study and discussion. Thus, for instance, Athens gives us not merely the spectacle of the first organized democracy, but also the first and perhaps still the most interesting series of speculations on the theory of democracy. As the Athenian went about his daily civic duties, as a judge or a councillor, a committee man or a parliamentarian, or on training or active service in the army or navy, he would bring the experience of political life to bear, in discussions with his fellows, on the problems of government.

Yet, supremely educated as they were, the Athenians had no organized system of national education. During their period of active greatness, primary education was not a State concern, secondary education practically non-existent. In other words, they received their education, not in schools and academies or from professional teachers, but from the daily practice of civic duties in a democratic state and in the university of the camp, the galley, the gymnasium, the workshop and the market place. This illustration may help, not merely to fill in the vague outline of the definition of education given above, but to explain how it is natural for a new educational philosophy to spring, not from the leisured class, but from the working class.

It is clear, then, from the example of Athens, as well as from the biographies of great men, that education can and should be continued all through men's active lives, right up to the decay of their physical powers. Education is, in fact, a sort of elixir against the ossifying disease called middle age; it is the necessary antidote against the routine of the modern world. By bringing in theory to illuminate practice, it corrects the deficiencies of both, and preserves the balance and proportion of mental life.

Every one engaged in active life is apt to think about his

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work, and every traveller who has armed himself with introductions knows how interesting busy men are when they can be induced to talk. It is a natural and obvious step to give men opportunities to systematize this thinking for the common benefit. Education simply means drawing-out, and the first task of adult education is simply to afford the active citizen the opportunity of being "drawn out." Socrates used to go to men in their workshops or button-hole them in the market place, and ask them leading questions. But modern experience has devised a more helpful method—that of the group or college.

For if there is one thing more than another that the history of schools and universities has taught us, it is that education is not an individual but a corporate matter. The individual by himself is powerless. That he is powerless for action has long been obvious; the history of all human institutions—of churches, of nations, of colonies, of trade unions—is merely a commentary on this text. But we are now beginning to realize that he is to a large extent powerless for effective thinking also. Solitude may breed the mystic, the philosopher, and even the scientist; but in all those great departments of knowledge which concern the thoughts and actions of mankind the thinker needs the stimulus and experience of his fellow men. The cloister was a better educator than the cave. The university superseded the cloister; and the modern world, with its immense growth of knowledge and of the facilities for communication, is learning to supersede, or rather, to re-create the university. What a man needs, if he is to keep his mind alert, to be applying knowledge to experience and to contribute his quota of thinking to his country, is the stimulus of a group of like-minded students. When men study together in this spirit, they not merely help one another by the interchange of ideas; if their association is based on a common purpose, they become merged into something akin to a new personality. The psychologists are now beginning to make clear to us, what is evident enough to the attentive reader of

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history, that a homogeneous group is greater and more powerful than the sum of the individuals composing it. A mediæval guild was more than a mere collection of craftsmen, as the early Church was more than a mere collection of disciples. Man is by nature a social animal, a member of a larger whole. It is one of the main problems of statesmanship to find the groupings in which the national qualities will be displayed to the best effect. It is one of the main problems of education to find similar groupings for students, whether young or old.

This is what is meant by the common assertion that education is a school of character. A school or a university is a place where the student *becomes something*, takes on a new personality. Sometimes he does so without "learning" anything at all—that is, without amassing any information from books. That is a pity. But it is a mistake to pit the two processes one against the other, or to assume, with some of the advocates of Latin and Greek, that the value of the schools which teach the dead languages, and send out into the world men of fine character who know and care nothing about them, is in any way bound up with the subjects supposed to be studied there. True education consists, neither in amassing knowledge, nor yet in rejecting it when it seems irrelevant at first sight, but in assimilating it until, by an effort not only of the mind but of the whole spirit, it becomes a part of one's very nature. Thus it is that some of the great educators of the past have had an almost morbid fear of book-learning. Plato in a famous outburst harangued against books because they could not answer an honest reader's questions; and St. Francis, in a beautiful story, rebuked a too-learned disciple who wished to add to his scanty belongings a copy of the Psalter. "You will be wanting a breviary next," was the Saint's argument. Religion, he felt, was too intimate and living a thing to be learned from books. If he felt this about the Bible what would he have said to textbooks or newspapers or magazines?

Thus, education is evidently necessary for the mental

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and spiritual health of the individual grown-up person. It has always been necessary; but never more than to-day, when the haste and hardness of life rub the bloom off men's thoughts and allow them all too little time for quiet and meditation and the deeper needs of the spirit. We have all of us nowadays more thoughts in our heads and more aspirations in our hearts than the rush of life allows us to be conscious of. Education and holidays are safety valves of the sub-conscious mind. Take them away, and modern man can never be his best self. They are, in fact, as necessary to the true health and freedom of an industrialized population as the recognized necessities of which modern governments provide it with a minimum standard. If anyone doubts this, let him look into the faces of the workaday inhabitant of London; or let him reflect on the appalling mental and emotional starvation revealed by the character of the popular entertainments and amusements of our large cities. The audience at a music hall or a picture show do not enjoy themselves; they are far too indolent and superficial for that. They simply sit back and allow paid hypnotists to titivate the repressed instincts and emotions which they have not the vitality to bring into action themselves.

"All this is very true," the reader may say, "but such is twentieth century life. We are living in an industrial age, not in ancient Athens or in mediæval Italy. Show me a body of modern working men who will abjure the public house, the picture theatre and the political club in order to go to school, after their day's work, with a modern Socrates, and I will begin to take your abstractions seriously."

The sign demanded can be shown.

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II

FEW parts of industrial England can appear more depressing at first sight to the casual visitor than the string of overlapping villages now comprised in the new County Borough of Stoke-on-Trent and known as The Five Towns. Smoke and slag-heaps have done their best to mar the appearance of a once beautiful countryside; nor have the towns themselves yet been able to do much to remedy the confusion and ugliness inseparable from nineteenth century industrialism.

Yet, a few weeks ago, addressing an audience of miners in a village schoolroom on one of the ridges overlooking this vale of smoke, a distinguished student of Sixteenth Century England spoke of what he termed the revival of humanism in the England of to-day. "Early in the sixteenth century," he said, "a great educational movement arose in Europe and penetrated to England. Men felt that new worlds were opening up before their eyes, that there were great kingdoms of the mind to be overrun and possessed. In those days there was a great Dutch scholar named Erasmus. He came to England to meet his fellow scholars. He went to the seats of knowledge, to Oxford and to Cambridge, where the new learning was at home. If Erasmus were to come to England on such a mission to-day, do you know," he asked the miners, "where he would be directed to come? *He would be taken to the Potteries.*" The miners looked surprised. Some of them had been in the pit all day; others were going down on the night shift; but that so much importance should be attached to their natural human desire to meet at regular intervals for an evening's tussle at economics seemed strange to them. Their tutor, for whom the regular five miles missionary journey up the hill at the end of his own day's work was more of a strain than he let them know, was, however, glad to feel that

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his work linked him with the great scholars of the past.

Let us follow Erasmus for a day or two as he takes stock of this new educational movement.

In one of the Five Towns there is a block of school buildings occupying a vacant plot by the side of a factory. Four great ovens, like giant champagne bottles, overlook the premises, and seem to leer wickedly into the playground. When Erasmus visits it at night, one of the rooms is still lighted. Some twenty-five men and women are gathered there, of various ages and trades, but predominantly of the working class. They have come together, he is told, for a university tutorial class in philosophy, which meets from 8 to 10. But they have come early: for it is not merely a class, but a club and a college; several of them are anxious, too, to have a private word with the tutor. The tutor, he learns, is an Oxford graduate with a good honours degree in his subject, but, if he talks to him, he will find that he has learnt most of his philosophy in discussions with working people. For of the two hours of a tutorial class, the first only is used for exposition: the second is sacred to discussion. So that a class consists, as has been said, not of twenty-five students and a tutor, but of twenty-six students who learn together. There is also a library in the room of some fifty or sixty volumes bearing on the subject: at least, the box is there, but the books are almost all in use, so that only the list of volumes is available for Erasmus's inspection. But the class, which is a democratic organism, has its own elected librarian and secretary, and from them he can learn all that he wishes to know. He will find that the books are not only diligently read, but form a basis for essays which are a regular part of the class work. He will discover how various and vexatious are the obstacles that industrial life sets in the way of this new type of university student—the ravages of overtime, the anxieties of unemployment, the suspicions of foremen and managers, the difficulties of obtaining quiet for reading and writing. He

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will hear of one student, nearly blind, who came regularly to class and made pathetic attempts to do his paperwork in large letters on a sheet of wallpaper; of another who found it quietest to go early to bed and rise again after midnight for an hour or two of study; of another who, joining a class at sixty-nine, attended regularly for six years until the very week of his death. And in the discussion, if he stays for it, he will hear the old problems of philosophy first raised in Plato (who is still used as a textbook) thrashed out anew from the living experience of grown men and women.

But he cannot stay, for he will be carried off to the parent class of the district, which is holding its 144th continuous winter meeting. Here he will find a new method. The tutor is standing aside: for the class has been turned for once into what university professors call a seminar. Two students are reading papers on special aspects of the year's subject, which is the French Revolution. Erasmus is in time for some of the second, a character study of Turgot contributed by a potter's engineer, who, as he afterwards confessed, had got up at 4 a.m. for a week to have it finished in time. The matter and the style are fully worthy of a university seminar; the delivery would do credit to a teacher of elocution. For here is a student who has been in public life and knows the value of the spoken word. He has put his heart into the subject, and is not ashamed to show it.

Here Erasmus can learn about the inner life and organization of this educational movement of which the Potteries form but a single centre.* The Workers' Educational Association was founded by a group of workpeople in 1903, with the object of stimulating the demand for higher education among their fellows. Its astonishingly rapid growth has been due mainly to the fact that it provided an outlet for forces that had long been

* See *University Tutorial Classes: A study in the development of higher education among working men and women*, by Albert Mansbridge (General Secretary of the Workers' Educational Association). Longmans, 1913 (2s. 6d.).

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gathering underground, but also, in part, to the method of organization adopted. The Association is not, like most societies, a collection of individual members; it has several thousand individual members in its ranks, for it welcomes all without distinction of place, but it is in the main a collection of affiliated societies. Unlike the middle-class, the working class is habituated to corporate modes of life. The trade union, the club, the chapel, the co-operative society have kept alive for working people the instinct and habit of association; even the factory is sometimes a kind of college. Hence to approach workpeople for any purpose is very different from approaching the scattered denizens of villadom. They can be approached through their societies, which are represented on the Workers' Educational Association by delegates who act as links between the Association and a vast potential public of students. There are also numbers of educational bodies affiliated, representing an educational supply corresponding to the working class demand. The Association, which is, for working purposes, divided into seven districts covering England and Wales, is democratically governed and, of course, holds itself aloof from all political parties or religious ties.

It was in 1907, after some four years' work in organizing the demand among workpeople, that the Association first approached the universities for help. In the summer of that year a National Conference was held at Oxford at which a resolution was passed inviting the co-operation of the University; and shortly afterwards a Joint Committee of seven University representatives, appointed by the Vice-Chancellor, and seven labour men, appointed by the Association, met to work out a definite scheme. The result of their deliberations was the issue of the Report mentioned above (p. 256) and the establishment, on the lines laid down in it, of the university Tutorial Class system.

The first University tutorial classes were established in Rochdale and the Potteries in 1908. There are now 145 in England and Wales, all of the same character as that

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described: and only difficulties of finance have prevented a far more rapid spread. They are the outward and visible sign of an alliance, which by now seems as permanent as it has proved happy and natural, between the universities and the great organizations of the working class. Every university in England has its "Joint Committee" for tutorial class work, consisting of an equal number of university and working class representatives. The Joint Committee, aided by grants from the State, is the controlling authority of the tutorial class; but the strength of each class is in its local management. Each class is pledged to at least a three years' course, and every student is in honour bound to abide by the conditions of the class. The class is, in fact, a little college or entity of its own, and it is the class meeting which chooses the subject of study and approves the tutor sent down by the Joint Committee.

But the working class students in the Potteries have done more than abide by the conditions which they pledged themselves to observe. They have set on foot an educational movement of their own.

The North Staffordshire coalfield not only embraces the Five Towns but also a number of villages which are scattered around it on every side, at distances of from two to ten or twelve miles. Here coal has been found, and here in rural surroundings an industrial population of miners has settled. These villages are for the most part difficult to reach, and are thus removed from all contact with the ordinary opportunities of civilization. The university tutorial class students three years ago discerned in these semi-industrial villages a great field for missionary work, and as this coincided in point of time with a demand for higher education which came from the miners themselves, the two parties were quickly brought together and a new educational movement set on foot. By personal effort, pit-head meetings, social evenings and every other means of tactful persuasion they communicated their enthusiasm to the villagers, till in the present session (1913-1914) there

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are not less than twenty-five class centres at work in connexion with what has been christened "The North Staffordshire Miners' Higher Education Movement." The tutors, who give their services unpaid, are in nearly every instance working men and women, members of tutorial classes in the Potteries, and the subjects studied are in most cases connected with the work in the tutorial class.

Let us return to Erasmus on the second day of his visit.

There are no classes during working hours, but his time will not be unoccupied. He may drop into the Labour Exchange to hear about the labour conditions of the district from a student who has work there: or into the Free Library to hear from the librarian about the new demand for serious books: or into the Local Education Office, where a wise official, who knows how not to interfere, is keeping friendly watch over developments. But most likely he will have time for none of these: for the miners and the potters among the students will be contending for every spare hour of his time in order that he may see at close quarters how their working day is spent. If he has not time for both, let him visit a pottery, Wedgwood's for preference. And if he has a student with him, he will discover how in one industry at least, philosophy can still animate craftsmanship. "The day I first read Bergson," said the potter who showed him round, "was an epoch in my life. *Creative Evolution*.—the words were a revelation. *Every touch of the clay a new creation*. There is the whole philosophy of our work." Thus in friendly talk Erasmus and his new friend wander through the rooms where the wheel is spinning, talking now of philosophy and now of Flaxman, who once worked here, until Erasmus, who has been in Lancashire, suddenly pauses to think why, in spite of the forbidding exterior, he has come to feel at home in this smoky and clannish world. Partly, he reflects, because life runs quietly here, because, even in the factories, there is no noise or sense of hurry or rushing, and the mind is free to follow her path undisturbed.

In the late afternoon, when the factories close down,

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Erasmus is fetched by another workman student, and carried out first by train and then in an antediluvian carriage (specially provided for this occasion) to an inaccessible village on the top of a hill. There in the schoolroom he finds an eager audience gathered together from this and the neighbouring villages. They have come to hear about the French Revolution, to be thrilled with the story of a great national drama. Erasmus, inured to lucubrations about scientific methods and documentary authorities, had almost forgotten that history is first and foremost a story. This evening reminded him. He saw the Bastille fall under his eyes, and felt the news of its capture reverberating through France. He lived for an hour in 1789, as the story rolled out from the lips of a trained public speaker. The miners and the field labourers and the village shopkeepers and the old village schoolmaster in the chair were in France too; question after question poured in till the primitive conveyance stood once more at the door. And so back to the wayside station and in the slow train to Stoke, with high converse on the way, of which Erasmus will bear an undying memory back to Holland.

III

THE remarkable educational movement of which the Potteries form but one among many centres, suggests a train of ideas which this is not the place to follow out at length. Time and experience are needed before their full significance can be revealed. But it is clear that the time has come for thinking out afresh, in the light of the changed conditions of modern life, the place and function of universities in the twentieth-century community. For the last four centuries universities have been regarded by English-speaking people mainly as training-grounds for public service, for the professions and for the life of a gentleman. They have, in a word,

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been finishing schools. The German graduate may be a man of learning, and the French the master of a polite and lucid literary style: but the "Oxford man" has been honoured primarily for what he is, not for anything he knows or does. Alma Mater has taken him to her bosom at an impressionable age and left an imperishable mark on his mind and his manners. But a new field of work is opening out before the English university of the future; to be the temporary home, not merely of the young who need to be prepared for life, but of students of riper years, who need the spirit of college and cloister in order to reflect on what life has taught them.

England has never stood in greater need of houses of quiet than to-day, places where men and women can repair for a few weeks or months to reduce their ideas to order, or to refresh their minds and spirits at the deepest springs of inspiration. Already that need is being in some degree satisfied. Oxford is filled summer by summer with tutorial class students, who come for a week or a fortnight or a month for common study and individual tuition. An old mediæval teacher, who gathered his wandering students from far and wide, would feel more at home in the Long Vacation Oxford of to-day than at any time since the foundation of the Colleges. And, though the subjects studied are different, though history, literature and economics predominate over theology, medicine and law, he would be conscious of the new vitality breathed into these human studies by contact with the living experience of thinking and feeling men and women. Oxford and Cambridge have it, in fact, in their power to become in a wholly new sense the intellectual and spiritual centres of England—and not of England only but of all the lands where their influence extends. Ideals can be better formed and policies thought out in the courts and gardens of a university than in the dusty purlieu of Whitehall or the crowded council rooms of industrial towns. If the great outstanding problems of the twentieth century are to be calmly and fearlessly met—

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if the old principles of British Government are to stand the test of new conditions, if justice and liberty are to prevail among the mingled races of mankind, if industrialism is to be made compatible with a civilized life for the working population, the university must arm the actors in these great causes with the knowledge and the power which come from the honest and fearless discussion of differences in an atmosphere of common study, and from the comradeship which is built up in the hours of insight and decision. *Idem sentire de republica*, to feel, not necessarily to think, alike about public affairs should be the privilege of university students, and their bond of union in the turmoil of life. In this, as in so many other of his great thoughts, Mr Rhodes was both a prophet and a pioneer.

IV

IT remains to pass on to another aspect of this new movement in education. The spirit and methods of the Workers' Educational Association will doubtless prove capable of adaptation to many fields of thought and activity. One such application, in particular, must be treated here, for it is closely relevant to the preceding discussion.

We have watched the new movement as it affects associations of students inside the English community. We have seen its working on groups of individuals. We must now consider its power to draw out the secret powers, not of individuals, but of nations; for nations, too, like individuals, need the reinvigoration which comes from an attempt to understand and to interpret the manifold experience of their life and history.

If education may be defined as the transmission and interpretation of life, what shall we say of National Education? The answer is easy. National Education is the transmission and interpretation of national life: its con-

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stant reinterpretation as the experience of the nation becomes richer and more manifold in its onward career.

A glance at the history of nations will illustrate what is meant by this rather abstract statement.

The path of history is strewn with the debris of nations. Some, like Assyria and Babylon, Macedonia and Carthage, have written their names large on some pages of history; others have passed away without leaving so much as a memorial behind them. Others again have survived, maintaining unimpaired not merely a racial but a national existence. How is this to be explained? How is it, for instance, that the Jewish nationality is still a living factor in the world of to-day, whilst of the language and culture of the Carthaginians, a Semitic nation of kindred stock, not a trace remains? Why has Babylon been taken and Armenia left? Why have Burgundy and Lorraine perished except as provincial names, while Bohemia and Poland still preserve the living seed of nationality.

There is no simple answer to these questions; but one thing is clear. Somehow or other the surviving nations have succeeded in the face of conquest, loss of territory, dispersion, persecution and the temptations of assimilation, in transmitting the essence of nationality from generation to generation.

What is nationality?

It is not the tie of blood: for that bond is sacred to smaller units, to the family and the tribe. It is not the broader basis of race: for many great nations, such as England herself, have grown out of an amalgamation of races. It is not language, for a nation, such as Switzerland, may have as many as four languages, none of them peculiar to itself. It is not the possession of territory or of national independence: for nationality is sometimes most tenacious when these are absent. It is not religion in the ordinary sense: for many nations, such as Germany and Canada, have more than one church which is a force in national life; whereas in the Middle Ages, when

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Christianity was a reality in the life of Europe, there was a single Church but many nations. It is not mere habit and the lapse of time: for the Jews have been in Europe for nearly two thousand years, yet their separate nationality has not been worn down. It is not merely common action and common suffering and a certain store of common memories: for the Irish have fought side by side with the English on a hundred fields and still remain Irishmen; and the Greeks and Serbs and Bulgars of Macedonia groaned and struggled for centuries under the Turks without being merged into a common nationhood. It is not the mere passionate attachment to scenes known and loved for centuries: else out of Lombardy and Tuscany and Sicily and the other fair provinces of the peninsula Italy could never have been born. All these are elements in nationality, but they are not its essence. No statesman or philosopher, speaking from outside knowledge or calculation, can lay his hand on the map and say, "Here is a nation." For nationality is not of the things which can be manufactured and set on a shelf. It needs to be made afresh every year and month and day by the life and thoughts and institutions of the people. In the life of nations there is no age nor youth as in the life of the individual. Nationality is immortal, like the fire in Vesta's shrine, so long as men choose to tend it. Some nations, old in years, scarred with the wounds of centuries, are eager and buoyant, looking forward to a limitless future. Others, born but a generation since, are falling into visible decay because those that live within their borders have no care for deeper things. For nationality, like the more intimate affection between individuals, is a thing to be felt rather than to be defined; and in the last analysis, if we ask, "Is Servia or Bohemia or South Africa or Australia a nation?" the only true answer is through another question, "Will men die for her?"

"The man who has no nation," said the Greek philosopher long ago, "is either a god or a beast." Despite the forces of commercialism, which break men up into com-

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peting units, despite the tendencies of cosmopolitanism, fostered by the facilities for travel and for the easy interchange of ideas and standards, nationality remains an essential factor in the life of civilized peoples.

Yet it is slowly changing its character and becoming educated into self-consciousness; for in face of the denationalizing influences of the day its whole existence is at stake, and it must either become explicit, responsible for its own continuance and the interpreter of its own experience, or, like so much that is "old-fashioned," it must pine and wither into a picturesque survival. In the days before railways and steamships and newspapers, before the spread of a few dominant languages over the greater part of the world, before the masterful irruption of Western Europeans into the quiet places of the planet, men needed no education in nationality, for it grew up in their hearts by habit and instinct out of the spirit of the community of which they formed a part. To-day all this is altered. All over the world, those who care for nationality may observe how nations, caught unguarded by the onrush of new ideas and influences, or by the temptation of new opportunities, are being robbed of half their manhood in the names of progress and education.

You cannot, by teaching or by environment give a man a new nationality, any more than by watering you can give a cut flower new roots. Yet teachers and missionaries, statesmen and propagandists, idealists and philosophers are constantly attempting to do so—sinning at once against humanity and against the dictates of human science. Nationality is an element that springs from the deepest side of men's nature; you can destroy it by severing men from their past and from the immemorial traditions, affections and restraints which bind them to their kin and country. But you cannot replace it; for in the isolated shrunken individual, the cut flower of humanity with whom you have now to deal, *you have nothing left to work on*. Such education as you can give him will be the education of a slave: a training not

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of the whole man, but of certain aptitudes which may render him a useful workman, a pushing tout, or even a prosperous merchant, but never a good citizen. And he will revenge himself on you, in the subtlest and most exasperating of ways, by triumphantly developing into a bad imitation of yourself.

Herein lies the central difficulty of education in what is called a "new country." New countries there may be, but there is no such thing as a new man. For man, in the deepest side of his nature, is immemorially old; and those make the best citizens of a new country who, like the French in Canada and Louisiana, or the Dutch in South Africa (to mention no specifically English examples), bear with them on their pilgrimage, and religiously treasure in their new homes, the best of the spiritual heritage bequeathed them by their fathers. New countries filled with new men are not new at all, but hoary with antiquity, older even than mankind, for the instinct of imitation, with its insatiable craving for the sensation of novelty (which is so often the master-motive of their life) is as old as any of our inherited instincts.

But nationality strikes its roots deep and is happily hard to kill. A single illustration may show its power. In the autumn of 1912 the English-speaking people of the United States, basking complacently in the thought that they were annexing new citizens from Southern Europe at the rate of a million a year, were startled to learn that thousands of newly made "Americans" were taking ship to the Balkan peninsula to offer their lives to the old countries. Tens of thousands more, who could not go themselves, sent money. The people of the United States awoke to the strange reality that, in spite of all the visible and invisible agencies of "assimilation," their country was not one nation but a congeries of nations such as the world has never seen before within the limits of a self-governing State. America had, in fact, become almost a school of nationality. Men who, in the scattered valleys of the Balkans or the isolated townships

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of Sicily and Syria, had never known what nationality meant, felt their sentiments expanding in the freer atmosphere of America. "We never knew we were Roumanians till we met our brothers over here," the writer was told by a Koutzo-Vlach from a remote village in the Pindus mountains, as he sat sipping Turkish coffee in an upper room in New York. It was no doubt disappointing to the older school of Americans to discover that the qualities and standards of George Washington cannot easily be grafted on to the descendants of Themistocles and the compatriots of General Savoff. But, even viewed from the standpoint of the American Republic, this outburst of nationality is reason for hope, not for despondency. For there is room in a great Republic or Commonwealth for many diverse nationalities, and here is evidence to show that the primary condition of successful government—civic devotion—is abundantly present. On a foundation of competing individuals no political edifice can be built; but self-respecting groups, bodies of men who have merged their personality in a larger whole, are the stuff of which durable Commonwealths can be made. Just as England learnt to see Scotsmen, not as Dr Johnson saw them, but as Sir Walter Scott saw them, so Americans need to open their eyes to all the human wealth which they have gathered in.

The problems of nationality which face the British Commonwealth are very different from those which face the United States, for nowhere in the world as in that great Republic have false theories of liberty and education persuaded statesmen on so large a scale (varying an old Roman phrase) to make a Babel and call it a nation. But just because the difficulties of the United States, spiritual, moral, intellectual, political, social and economic, are so acute, they are worth recalling: for the United States with its negroes, its Asiatics, its Slavs, its Italians, its Jews, its Dutch, Irish and Scandinavians, its Huguenots, Cavaliers and Puritans, inextricably intermixed and knit together by the bonds, not of nationality but of Statehood, forms,

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as it were, an epitome of the scattered problems of Britain.

What then is the moral to be drawn? What should be aimed at in the education of the different nations of the British Commonwealth.

The most essential element in the education of nations, as of individuals, is self-respect. You cannot educate a man until he *is* a man. Neither can a nation be fitted for the arts of progress and the lessons of civilization till it feels itself to be a nation. Education without self-respect is not the drawing-out of gifts and virtues. It is the smearing of a polish or the practice of a hideous mimicry. There is a clear and definite line, familiar to all who have travelled in "newly-developed" countries, between communities which are undergoing the process of education, enriching their national life with what they are able to assimilate of the gifts of the age, and communities which are studying the arts and ingenuities of imitation, attempting feverishly to keep pace with the newest devices of industrialism or the latest fashions of the great world. That way lies decadence. It was trodden of old by the Roman provincials when, in the third and fourth centuries after Christ, at the height of apparent prosperity, a slow torpor crept over the vast bulk of the Roman Empire. It has been trodden since by many races whom it would be invidious to mention. Yet the path can be retraced; and the history of Italy, from the end of the eighteenth century onward, affords an example of how a nation can win back its soul by drawing inspiration from the true springs of national life.

There is another point to be noted. National Education is too often regarded as a mere training of each generation for the tasks of its own day. We are exhorted to turn out well-equipped workmen and commercial travellers—"economic men," in fact—in order successfully to compete with our rivals in prosperity. But true National Education is not so ephemeral in its aims. Its gaze is also on the past and future. Looking backward and forwards, it sees in each

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generation a group of torchbearers who will hand on their light to the next. Thus, it will look far beyond the mere formal requirements of a modern school curriculum. It will seek aids for the work of national education wherever the genius of the nation has set its peculiar mark—in folklore, in songs, in the drama, in history, local and national, in poetry, in sport, in a knowledge of the countryside, and in every form of study or activity which tends to draw men together in a common purpose for the enrichment of the national life. National education is, in fact, as wide and various as the nation itself. *Nil humani alienum a se putat*. A wise system of education, whether among the child-races of Africa or among the dominant nations who control them, will seek to follow the national bent in all things wholesome and of good report, relying always, in its sympathetic direction, upon that sense of responsibility which is innate in all men who have not been robbed of their manhood.

And so the argument comes back, on a deeper level, to the idea of democracy; for national education should always be, in the truest sense, democratic. Those who are learning must feel, not that something is being done to them, but that they are achieving it for themselves. The miners and potters of North Staffordshire make sacrifices in the cause of education, because they themselves bear the responsibility of management; and the movement with which they are connected is democratic in the further sense that it is for the benefit of the group as a whole, not of isolated individuals. The miner who studies the French Revolution, the potter who reads Bergson, have no ulterior ambitions: they are proud of North Staffordshire, proud of the working class, and envy no man his birthright. What is true of groups and classes within a nation is true also of nations. Education affords a nation a means of working out its own destiny, of making clear to itself what is the nature of its mission—its distinctive contribution to the common stock of civilization.

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No nation can presume to prescribe its destiny to another. Imperialism, as we have learned to understand it of late, chastened and deepened by contact with other great forces of our time, has indeed a high and inspiring mission. There is a solemn responsibility on the part of the great organized States of the world, and especially of the British Commonwealth, towards communities which are still struggling with the elementary difficulties of political life. But those who believe most passionately that Britain, like Rome, has much to teach, must never forget, as Rome forgot, that she has much also to learn. If the British peoples are strong by virtue of their national character and history, they can only hope to impart strength to those other peoples towards whom their duty lies, not merely by training them in the common lessons of Statehood, but by joining with them in a voyage of discovery, as a wise tutor with his students, towards the secret springs of their national life. For in Empire, as in education, giving and receiving go hand in hand; and freedom, of which we often speak so lightly as though it were a boon to be bestowed, can never be *given* at all: it can only be *shared*.

There are many problems yet awaiting the united wisdom of the British nations; yet the real hope that they will be nobly met lies in the generous and manly freedom of which England is the traditional repository. Not by rule or measure, not by any State-made enactments nor by imperial or international tribunals, but through the frank comradeship of free peoples, ever drawing fresh strength from the living experience of nationality, and enlightened and confirmed by education in their distinctive powers and destiny, can the problem of the world's government find an ultimate solution.

THE NEW AUTOCRACY IN CHINA

[The following article has been written for THE ROUND TABLE by a close and experienced student of Chinese affairs, long resident in China and intimately acquainted with its language, from which he has translated the papers and documents quoted below. These have been chosen to illustrate the mind and character of the new President, his views of government, his prospects of holding the provinces together and maintaining himself in power, and the nature of his relations with Japan.]

KUBLAI KHAN is said to have remarked to his famous general, Bayan, that the Chinese cannot govern the Chinese because they only unite for the purpose of gain, and separate as soon as the immediate object has been achieved. Kublai thus disbelieved in the possibility in China of any protracted combination against outside invaders, and he attributed to this feature in the Chinese character his conquest of China by a force that never numbered much over 100,000 men.

Less than a century later this remark of Kublai appears to have been proved false by the genius of Chu Yuan-chang, the Buddhist novice, who founded the Ming dynasty. But although this dynasty lasted for more than two and a half centuries, it began to decline after Yung Lo's death in 1424, less than sixty years from its foundation. It was left undisturbed till Nurachi started his brilliant campaigns, and with a force of 50,000 routed the Ming army eight times more numerous than his own. This evidence of the decay of the Ming dynasty induced Li Tzu-cheng, a born soldier and a statesman of no mean ability, to begin a rebellion

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from his native province of Shensi, which ended after a succession of amazing victories in the fall of Peking and the brief assumption by himself of the imperial throne. Here was a ruler of pure Chinese birth, who might have equalled the greatest of his predecessors; yet rival generals threw in their lot with the alien Manchus rather than submit to being governed by their own countryman. The Manchu army, which now numbered about 150,000 men, was allowed by Wu San-Kuei's treachery to enter Chioli and Li fled westwards, leaving Peking to be captured by the Manchus without a blow. Kublai's saying might be emended to read: "The Chinese require a strong man, whether Chinese or alien, to govern them." Call the government a despotism, dictatorship, limited monarchy, or republic: the statement remains equally true. The race will only submit to its ruler so long as it fears him.

One of the most brilliant of contemporary Chinese writers has made the following observations upon this point:

"The reverence for the person of the ruler may be due to historical association or, as in the case of the founder of a new dynasty, to the mingled fear and admiration felt by the people for his exploits. So long as this fear continues the dynasty will hold together. On the nation perceiving that the dynasty is effete and can be insulted with impunity, reverence is transformed into abject contempt, and habits of ingrained fear are lightly abandoned. Nothing remains but to uproot such a dynasty and replace it by another. The Manchu dynasty regained a portion of its dwindling prestige under the Empress Tz'u Hai, but it was long foreseen that her death would be the beginning of the end. As long as a force existed which it was difficult to insult, a remnant of the old-time Manchu prestige remained, and the crumbling fabric held together for a while. When, once it falls, it can never be restored."

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All through Chinese history this principle holds good. Successful generals like Li Yuan, founder of the T'ang dynasty, or Chao Ku'angyin, founder of the Sung, men of the people like Liu Pang, founder of the Hans, and Chu Yuan-Chang, founder of the Mings, establish a new dynasty, and its prestige usually lasts unimpaired for a century or so after the founder's death. Then begins the period of decay: rebellions are rife and the central government is palpably weakening. Still the mandate of heaven is not exhausted, and usually another strong ruler restores the waning fortunes of the dynasty, though few have prolonged their existence over 250 years.

The greatest failing of the Chinese appears to be jealousy: they invariably attribute the worst motives to their public men. Rivalry between opposing factions was equally prevalent under the T'ang, Sung, Ming and Manchu dynasties. The majority of the people are perfectly aware of this defect, which there seems to be no desire to cure. They possess an exceptional capacity for safeguarding individual interests, but fall out when larger issues are at stake. When they recognize that resistance to authority will result in disagreeable consequences they promptly submit; but on perceiving that agitation will remain unpunished, they will put forward demands far in excess of their original pretensions.

I

THE foregoing remarks are intended to suggest that parliamentary government in China is an impossibility and likely to remain so. The Republic, it may be predicted, will maintain a nominal existence as long as Yuan Shih-k'ai lives. At his death, the nation will only remain united in the event of a strong man coming forward as dictator in Yuan's place.

Yuan Shih-k'ai was elected to the post of provisional

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President in February, 1912. For more than a year after his election he made no attempt to assert himself, and submitted to attacks from the press and in Parliament with a meekness very different from his methods when viceroy of Chihli. Newspaper correspondents declared that he had even lost control of his own troops, though the general belief now is that the mutiny of February 29, 1912, was deliberately planned by himself to overawe the southern delegates. It is true that in the following July he compelled the National Assembly to accept his candidates for the cabinet by a display of military force. Nevertheless, in the main he adopted a temporizing policy, and allowed Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing to leave Peking with the impression that he was afraid of them and was most anxious to conciliate southern opinion, which had never forgiven him for the part he had played in the deposition of the emperor Kuang Hsu in 1898.

It appeared certain that he would be in a minority in the new Parliament, and by the end of February, 1913, the returns indicated that the Kuomintang, or Nationalist party, would outnumber the supporters of the President by forty in the Senate and about thirty in the House of Representatives. By adroit methods Yuan converted the minority in the latter House into a majority of about thirty, and was thus able to secure the Speakership and vice-Speakership for nominees of the government party. Even so, it was doubtful if at that time he would obtain a majority for his presidential candidature in the National Convention composed of the two Houses of Parliament. He therefore encouraged his party, thenceforth known as the Chinputang or Progressives, to abstain from attending Parliament and thus to prevent the maintenance of a quorum, which is fixed at one half of the total membership.

The murder of Sung Chiao-yen, the leading orator on the side of his opponents, whose declared policy had been to limit the powers of the President, seems unquestionably to have been prompted by a prominent member of Yuan's

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government. It was clearly in the interest of Yuan to cause the removal of this formidable opponent, who was largely responsible for the framing of a provisional constitution which crippled the President's powers; but his precise share, if any, in the crime must remain a mystery, though his own supporters do not hesitate to assert that he was responsible and consider his action justified. This event, and the timely conclusion of the quintuple loan a month or so later, provided the anti-Yuan press with ample material for virulent attacks. One Kuomintang journal in Peking even went so far as to call upon the army to rise against the tyrant, with the result that it was promptly suppressed by the President's order.

Yuan had by this time (May, 1913) definitely abandoned his procrastinating attitude and made it clear to Parliament that he had no intention of being President only in name. It was clear that the new constitution would have to be so drafted as to provide him with ample powers, or the troops, ever zealous for the national good, might mutiny and place the representatives of the people in jeopardy. A large number of senators left the Kuomintang, and by the beginning of July, despite the desertion of the Kung-hotang, or Republicans, from the Government party, the Chinputang was in a majority in the two Houses of about twelve. It was not then expected that the election for the Presidency could take place earlier than January, 1914, owing to the apparent unanimity among both great parties that the drafting of the constitution must precede the election, since otherwise (it was said) there would be a risk of the President's compelling Parliament to draft a constitution on lines acceptable to himself. Even journals commonly reported to be in receipt of subsidies from Yuan Shih-k'ai emphasized the necessity of proceeding leisurely to the preparation of a definite constitution, and the present Premier, Hsiung Hsi-ling, who later changed his opinion, telegraphed from Jehol, where he was then governor, warmly espousing this contention.

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The outbreak of the rebellion on the Yangtse afforded Yuan the desired opportunity to enforce his will on Parliament. He was never under the least anxiety regarding the issue, for he knew that he possessed enough funds to buy over the rebel soldiery. Various members of Parliament had compromised themselves with the rebels, and under instructions from the President (though, as usual, he disavowed all knowledge of the matter when challenged for an explanation) eight were arrested by the military court on the charge of fomenting rebellion. This action was sufficient to strike terror into the Kuomintang, which realized its helplessness against Yuan's overpowering force, and publicly admitted the necessity of recasting its whole policy. The result was soon apparent. The election for Speaker of the Senate (necessitated by the resignation of the former occupant of the chair owing to sympathy with the rebels) resulted in a substantial majority for Yuan's candidate. The two Houses in joint session subsequently passed by 625 votes out of a total of 649 the bill recommending the election of a President before the adoption of the entire constitution. This complete *volte-face* is partly explained by a circular letter addressed to each member of Parliament by "the military and police of the north," accusing them of being enemies of the State and menacing them with destruction unless they turned from the error of their ways. It is true that Yuan subsequently repudiated all knowledge of this document and expressed his pained surprise that an attempt should be made to interfere with the liberty of action of the members, most of whom he admitted were men of high merit, though here and there a few traitors to the State might exist. There is, however, no need to interpret his disavowal too literally, as the method employed is characteristic of the man, in whom manipulation is a fine art. To give an instance, not long after his election to the provisional Presidency a decree of his which was published in the official Gazette contained the following: "The governor of Shantung is to manipulate

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the matter with all due secrecy and to report accordingly." The matter referred to had to do with some opposition on the part of the local gentry, and doubtless the methods of manipulation involved the time-honoured expedient of buying the malcontents over. Yuan, however, was gravely displeased at the publication of the decree in this form, and ordered that all copies of the offending number should be recalled and the following phrase substituted: "The governor of Shantung is to arrange the matter on a satisfactory basis and report accordingly."

As was to be expected, Yuan was elected President by a large majority on October 6, 1913. But he was greatly displeased at the strong undercurrent of opposition which enabled Li Yuan-hung (who had telegraphed declining the nomination) to obtain nearly two hundred votes, a small amount of support being also forthcoming for the rebel leaders. This opposition was manifested in face of large bodies of troops and trainbands who surrounded the precincts of Parliament and in not a few cases actually terrorized the members into voting for Yuan Shih-k'ai. Naturally this fact was indignantly contradicted by the police authorities, who took the trouble to write to the press and explain that the masses of people who collected in the neighbourhood of Parliament were there for patriotic motives of zeal for Yuan's election, but had no thought of interfering with the liberty of members. Strong in the knowledge of this patriotic support, Yuan was much chagrined by the fact that some of the Chinputang had voted against him. It had become plain to him that he could no longer count on the whole-hearted support of that party in framing the kind of constitution which he deemed essential, namely one which gave him the right to dissolve Parliament without the consent of the Senate, to appoint the Premier without referring the nomination to the House of Representatives for confirmation, and the right to take such financial or other emergency measures as he might deem necessary without first obtaining the consent of Par-

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liament. He was also dissatisfied with the provision limiting his tenure of the Presidency to two consecutive terms of five years each, and allowed the following statement to appear in his subsidized journal, the *P'ingpao*:

"The restoration of autocracy has nothing to do with the length of the President's term: those who fondly fancy that by debarring him from a long period of office they will stop a revival of despotism are acting like one who carves a ship and expects to re-make it into a sword. If China means to have a Cromwell or a Diaz, she will not be restrained by the letter of the constitution. Parliament having deserted her, she will turn elsewhere."

It was fast becoming clear to Yuan that he could not obtain a free hand while Parliament existed in its present form, but he was reluctant to solve the problem by force, and, therefore, sent a message to the House of Representatives demanding a revision of the Provisional Constitution which effectively crippled his power, having, indeed, been drawn up at Nanking with that very object. This message was ignored. Yuan also required that his delegates should be allowed to lay the views of the President respecting the permanent constitution before the committee of members of Parliament now engaged in drafting that instrument. His delegates presented themselves before the committee but found themselves denied admission. Yuan is the last man to tolerate an affront of this kind, and when, a few days after this event, a telegram from Chang Hsun (obviously inspired by the President) urged him to dissolve the Kuomintang as a rebel organization, it became clear to anyone who had followed the situation that Yuan had at last made up his mind to strike. In passing, one may remark that the expedient of calling for (ostensibly unbiassed) opinions from the provinces in support of a particular policy is a very old one in China, and has often been resorted to by the head of the state. Yuan's drastic decree of November 4, 1913,

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nominally limited expulsion from Parliament to members of the Kuomintang, but the police (obviously acting upon instructions) construed the document in a most liberal manner and deprived an appreciable number of members belonging to other parties of their certificates of membership. As is inevitable in China on such an occasion, considerable harshness was shown towards some of the dispossessed members, several of whom were kept in quite unnecessary detention.

Yuan's decree dissolving the Kuomintang will not be regarded as one of his best efforts. It was drafted by a member of his secretariat, though attempts were rather unjustly made to saddle Liang Ch'i-ch'ao with the authorship. That distinguished scholar knew nothing about the document till after its issue, but it is safe to surmise that, had he been willing to draw up such a decree, he could have made a far better case for Yuan's *coup d'état* than the one promulgated. The fact that the members of the Kuomintang were disqualified for being connected with a rebellion which had been crushed two months previously, naturally caused the reader to wonder why this step had not been taken months before. The answer is that Yuan wished to secure his election in due form before acting. This is a very natural reason, but it robs the decree of most of its cogency as a logical state paper. Parliament, having lost more than half of its membership, could no longer form a quorum, and though the President had ordered in the decree that the reserves next on the roll of election were to be called up from the provinces to replace the expelled members, this device was of small avail (as, indeed, was intended) owing to the fact that the reserves were also in nine cases out of ten Kuomintang and thus equally ineligible. It was soon clear to the surviving members that Parliament was doomed and that, when next a legislature met, it would be on an entirely re-organized basis, after the President's ideas. Public opinion being successfully muzzled in Peking, hardly a word was spoken against the decree,

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but many of the Chinputang were most indignant at the President's procedure. Much was hoped from Li Yuan-hung, who was expected to persuade the President that the maintenance of Parliament was essential; but, whatever his real opinion, Li has remained silent. The Kungmingtang or Citizen's Party, a new organization of which the President's chief secretary, Liang Shih-yi, is leader, gave wholehearted support to Yuan, and this party, as might be expected from its controlling the largest supply of funds, is now the strongest of all, though for the present the reign of political parties appears to be over.*

Yuan, having definitely made himself dictator, had next to bring into existence some body which could relieve him of the sole burden of responsibility, while remaining completely under his control. The cabinet has ceased to count as a factor in the situation, since every order emanates from the President's palace. For the sake of satisfying public opinion, however, it was essential to entrust the task of preparing the constitution and of revising the organization of Parliament to some nominally independent body. Consequently Yuan decided to establish the Council of Government, through which he intends to govern until such time as a new legislature is in being. A certain number of members of Parliament is included in this body, but care has been taken to find places for none who is not an enthusiastic supporter of the President. It consists of eighty-three councillors, eight appointed by the President, ten by the cabinet, ten representing the various ministries, two representing the judicature, and forty-six from the provinces, besides four from Mongolia, two from Tibet and one from Kokonor. In other words, Yuan is creating a system of administration which Liang Ch'i-ch'ao aptly called "Enlightened Despotism," a republic without the people. The councillors are mostly men of mature age and

* Parliament has since been formally dissolved, and the President has also decreed the dissolution of "all grades of self-governing bodies throughout China."

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in many cases have had ample experience of public life under the Manchus. The chairman, Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang, served with distinction as viceroy of Yunnan and Kueichou in the last days of the dispossessed dynasty. He can be relied upon to give unwavering support to the President, and made it clear in his opening address that he considers Parliamentary government in China an absurd anachronism, adding that what the country needs is a man and not a legislative body. In his inaugural address after election to the Presidency, Yuan Shih-k'ai had deplored the decadence in national morals and the prostitution of the words Equality and Liberty: he warned the nation of the grave need for sobermindedness and moderation. In his opening speech to the Council of Government he enlarged upon this theme and explained that he was weary of the obstacles and hindrances which had been placed in his way by Parliament and had summoned this Council to work with him towards progress in the administration.

“So far [he continued] there has been abundance of theory with absolutely no result. I am quite unable to take an optimistic view of the Republic and on the contrary regard the situation with the most profound alarm. Since the Republic started, every moral principle inculcated by our sages has been trampled under foot. As regards our foreign relations, you are as well able to judge as I am of China's condition: it is as if we were steering a shattered craft through waves as high as a wall when the least carelessness means inevitable destruction. The word ‘Patriotism’ is now in all men's mouths, but what I should like to ask is, in what way do they intend to show their patriotism. If they say that they mean to sweep away outworn methods of government and to inaugurate the fair beginning of a time, I quite agree, but the process must be orderly and gradual and may not be done by leaps and bounds. To speak in a parable: a new form of government is like an infant, whose food and drink must be regulated with circumspection if one desires it to thrive. If in our zeal for the infant's growth

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we give it several days' nourishment at once, there is small hope of its ever attaining manhood. It is even so with patriotism; empty theories are quite useless, and only method will accomplish any result. I am advanced in years and served the Manchu dynasty for a generation: I had already gained an undeserved reputation in the world and was in peaceful retirement at my country seat. What was it that induced me to emerge from seclusion? Because I wished to save my countrymen and my own posterity from falling into slavery, and to avert crowning disaster. To accomplish this result, we must all be prepared to make some sacrifice, even as, to use a homely illustration, I must sacrifice tea leaves for my cup of tea. History will judge our efforts rightly and we may ignore the calumnies of our contemporaries. Reforms must, indeed, be taken in hand: under the Manchus abuses had reached their zenith and I sought to improve the administration. After my retirement from office I little dreamed that a few short years of evil government would bring things to their present pitch, when insensate doctrines of communion are propagated and our country is fast reduced to the level of the brutes. No nation can change its habits on a sudden, any more than one can change the order of the seasons or turn day into night. India under the British retains the time-honoured turban, and Japan, despite its ardour for reform, has not abandoned the wooden clogs for boots. What China needs beyond anything is a strong central government, for of what avail are laws when the nation lacks cohesion? Foreign legal authorities have well said that a State does not require a system of law at its inception: what is essential is a strong central authority."

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II

IT is significant that the only Chinese Journal which ventures to attack the new President openly is owned by Japanese proprietors.

Yuan has effectually muzzled the Chinese press, and no journal not owned by foreigners and published outside the Treaty Ports dares to attack him personally. Criticisms of his cabinet are, indeed, plentiful, but there is reason to believe that these are inspired by Yuan himself or at any rate by his entourage, as it is an open secret that relations between the President and the Premier, Hsiung Hsi-ling, are strained, the latter resenting the interference of Yuan and his staff in every department of the Government, and the position of insignificance to which the cabinet is reduced. Thus, the *P'ingpao*, a semi-official organ, has published an article accusing certain ministers of shameless corruption. It reminds the Premier of the adage that reputations are built up in a lifetime and lost in an hour and warns him that the best way to escape calumny is to behave with circumspection. Such an article could not possibly be published without the concurrence of Yuan, who has also instructed his press to attribute the decree dissolving the Kuomintang to the Premier's suggestion, though it is alleged that Yuan had fixed the whole procedure before taking Hsiung into his confidence.

The language of the Japanese organ just mentioned, the *Shunt'ien-shipao*, is in strong contrast to that of its contemporaries. It never loses an opportunity of making the President ridiculous, and openly accuses him of aspiring to the Throne. He is warned of the fate which overtook the great usurpers of history, and given unmistakable hints that Japan will not be a silent spectator if he perpetrates this "great wickedness." No wonder, says the *Shunt'ien-shipao*, that he fears to leave his palace and face

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his fellow countrymen whom he has deceived: "he is even as an uncomely bride who shrinks from encountering her husband's parents."

There can be little doubt that these views represent Japanese official opinion, though a Japanese paper published in Tientsin in the English language accords a general support to the President and approves of his assumption of a dictatorship. But this approval is intended to appeal to foreign readers and is not indicative of Japanese policy. Japan deplores the triumph of the bureaucrats and the complete disappearance of the heroes of the revolution.

With the removal of Li Yuan-hung from Wu Ch'ang the last protagonist of the south in the rising against the Manchus is no longer a factor in politics. He is the President's honoured guest in Kuang Hsu's prison palace, which is only connected with the mainland by a draw-bridge. The choice of a residence certainly strikes the ordinary observer as rather unfortunate, though the President explains it by the need of securing Li Yuan-hung against assassination and his desire of lodging the vice-President near his own residence. There is probably some truth in the Japanese suggestion that Li Yuan-hung did not fully endorse the President's methods towards the legislature: he was inclined to sympathize with the view of the Chinputang (the leadership of which he had just resigned on the plea that military men must not take part in politics), that Yuan acted illegally in expelling the Kuomingtang by decree without obtaining the consent of Parliament. By inducing him to come to Peking the President has achieved a master-stroke, and ensured that none shall be admitted to Li's presence who could possibly be suspected of opposing the policy of the Government. As long as Yuan lives, Li will be a cypher; and reading between the lines of his letter to the President asking to be relieved of his duties as Tutuh of Wu Ch'ang, one is struck by the language, which is that of a man whose work is over and who wishes to be done with public life. Li is evidently

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easily influenced, and had he remained in Wu Ch'ang, he might have been persuaded by some of his staff to enter upon open opposition to the President. It is suggested that his readiness to come to Peking was due to his feeling himself the puppet of one or two Hupei officers, and that he was beginning to doubt his power of controlling the troops in case these men rebelled against Yuan.

However this may be, it is certain that the collapse of the southern rebellion last summer came to Japan as an unpleasant surprise, and that she has looked for a divided China; as the inevitable result from which she would necessarily have benefited. Japanese politicians regard Yuan as the enemy of their country; and though several members of the cabinet, notably the Premier, Foreign Secretary and Minister of Justice, have pronounced pro-Japanese leanings, not a single member of the President's entourage can be called a friend of Japan. It is no wonder, then, that the prospect of Yuan's dictatorship continuing as long as he lives is profoundly distasteful, and that the Japanese press in Peking is perpetually inveighing against the weakness of the Chinese people in submitting to an autocracy far more inexorable than that of the alien Manchus. Japan's one hope is in Yuan's death, which would mean certain anarchy and foreign intervention. It is true that his life cannot be called a good one and that a plot to assassinate him on the occasion of his inauguration only miscarried by an accident. It is natural that Japan should sympathize with the plight of Parliament, as so many of the more prominent members, like Wu Chang-lien and Chang Chi were educated in that country, and held strong pro-Japanese opinions. In attacking the unconstitutional act of the President in expelling the Kuomintang the Japanese press asks him the following question:

"According to Yuan the members of the Kuomintang in Parliament, numbering over 400 members, had disqualified themselves from membership owing

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to complicity with the rebels, therefore, he was justified in expelling them. But he had owed his election a month before to the votes of many of these disqualified members. Hence his election is invalid and the recognition of the Republic by the Powers ought also to be treated as invalid."

Nothing, in fact, could well have been more unconstitutional than Yuan's action on that occasion, but the Powers' recognition was addressed to him personally much more than to the Republic. Japan does not welcome a strong central Government, and there is small chance of her antipathy to Yuan being overcome. But the following extract from the Japanese journal already quoted, will show how completely his success is admitted; even by his enemies.

"Very different from the popular conception of a President is Yuan Shih-k'ai. He is an absolute dictator, whose whim is law and who has no ambition to surround himself with worthy officials. His net enmeshes all and sundry, and his creatures fill every post. As they are all mediocrities, no decision can be taken without reference to his arbitrament. China is now a despotism and the republican theory is honoured in the breach. An autocrat holds the reins, Parliament is dead, and the cabinet a superfluous appendage. Every measure, great or small, emanates from the palace of the President; the members of the cabinet sit like the representative of the corpse at a memorial service, receiving their emoluments with nonchalant ease: the cabinet provides a comfortable sinecure for a reposeful old age.

"But let the President remember the example of that great man, 'the First Emperor,' whose ambitious schemes founded a united China (in A.D. 221). Yet, because the whole power was concentrated in his hands, rebellion broke out in many directions and the fabric collapsed after his death. Does not this show the impracticability of absolute rule? Even granted that Yuan exceed that emperor in ability (a bold assump-

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tion), such a government will remain unstable to the end. Wild rumours are rising in swarms and the body politic is smitten with a murrain. The venomous theory is instilled that this nation needs an absolute ruler, as if the government of a State could be changed like the signboard of a butcher who sells sheep's head to-day and dog's meat to-morrow. Republican principles are to be stamped out as loathsome anachronisms, and the man in the street exclaims that China will soon possess an emperor. The existence of the Republic hangs on the scruple of a hair. Yuan is the man of destiny: he must receive a free hand and no restriction may be placed on his manipulations. Hence it is proposed to elevate him to the throne or at least to elect him President for life. Yet he was ordered by the Manchus on their abdication to effect an arrangement with the southern forces for a united China. He has proved faithless to his trust and the desired harmony between north and south has not been achieved. The Kuomintang are partly to blame, but how shall Yuan, who has violated republican principles and failed in his duty to his old masters, be permitted to assume the title of sovereignty? Patriots are implored to remember that China does not need an autocracy to ensure good government. If so pernicious a doctrine is believed, the state of this Republic will soon be beyond the aid of physic. But let Yuan recall the adage that even as water can sink or float a ship, so the people can make or mar a ruler. Though the recent rebellion failed owing to the nation's reluctance for a second revolution, no rule can be permanent unless broad-based upon the people's will."

Whatever the justice of these observations, they leave but little doubt as to the views of Japan.

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III

THE fact, however, remains that, despite all threats, Yuan has secured the dictatorship which he coveted and will retain it as long as he lives. He is without a possible rival, as Ta'en Ch'un-hsuan, who at one time commanded a following among conservative opinion, hopelessly compromised himself in the late rebellion, and like Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing is an exile from China. In the event of Yuan's death, it is extremely dubious if Li Yuan-hung could hold China together, for rivals would come forward in every province and a state of things would follow similar to the disintegration after the collapse of the T'ang dynasty, with the certainty of foreign intervention in addition. Writers, whose views deserve respect, have stated that Yuan never desired the downfall of the Manchus, and accepted a Republic, not from conviction, but because he was betrayed by the imperialist delegate, T'ang Shao-yi, at the conference with the republican leaders in Shanghai in December, 1911. It is more likely that Yuan never contemplated the retention of the Manchu dynasty: his policy throughout seems to have been to obtain the supreme power for himself. It was impossible for one of his temperament to forgive the ignominy of his dismissal by the wretched Regent in 1909, and it is evident that he bided his time in retirement, well knowing that the dynasty was doomed and that his opportunity would come. Sun Yat-sen has stated in a magazine article that he received messages from Yuan offering co-operation against the Manchus: such messages cannot have been genuine, for Yuan is the last man to appeal for assistance to visionaries of Sun's type, with whom he was not even acquainted. When he declared in an interview in November, 1911, that China did not desire a Republic, he was evidently giving his real opinion, but when he spoke of his wish to retain the Manchu child-Emperor in a nominal sovereignty he desired

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to gain credit with the world for his apparently unswerving loyalty to a dynasty which had shamefully ill-treated him.

His policy has been wholly consistent from first to last; he meant to assume the supreme power, peacefully if possible, but if not by force. It is only with reluctance that he adopts violent methods, and for that reason he made every effort to conciliate Sun Yat-sen and his party after the former's resignation of the Nanking presidency. He has spent large sums in purchasing opponents, and has been criticized for vacillation on this ground, though all the time never deviating from his aim of concentrating the whole authority in his own hands.

He has, of course, his faults. It is impossible not to regret his displays of favouritism to undeserving henchmen and former protégés: the number of his advisers is legion, and among them (the observation applies only to Chinese) is not one of outstanding merit. Even writers friendly to the President deplore the waste of public funds in bestowing lucrative posts as a reward for past service and the gross corruption which is prevalent in his entourage. Yet his remarkable talents commend him to many who cannot but resent these defects, and it is interesting to note that former supporters of the continuance of the Manchu monarchy, in a constitutional form, such as the present Minister of Justice, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (whose reforming influence over Kuang Hsu in 1898 contributed to that monarch's practical deposition), are now expressing satisfaction at his attainment of absolute power.

No better testimony to the strength of Yuan's position can be given than one or two quotations from authorities of this stamp.

Speaking of the unsuitability of parliamentary government to China, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao says in his magazine, *Justice*:

"The Chinese Parliament cannot, like the Church

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in the Middle Ages or the despotisms of Europe and Asia, inspire the nation with a respect born of immemorial prestige and thus ensure its loyalty. It cannot, like the British Parliament, win national confidence by its time-honoured historical association and gradually increasing power. You cannot expect an institution which was utterly alien from every Chinese tradition, to spring up in a day and enjoy national influence, especially when nine-tenths of the members, whatever their talents, had never been heard of by the country at large. The Chinese people will inevitably remain indifferent to individuals or to institutions which are unable to show a record of past achievement which is in all men's minds. Once when a statesman deplored the decadence of the Chin dynasty [third century A.D.] the reply given was that the principles on which that State had been founded differed entirely from those of the great dynasties of antiquity. Hence we may say that a long time would elapse before Parliament could expect to obtain the confidence of the nation, even though each one of its members emulated the ancient sages in virtue and in unswerving effort for the public good.

"On the abdication of the Manchu dynasty the nation had lost its central stay: the country was seething like a cauldron: men were sated of anarchy and longed for peace. They were ready for the moment to accept any substitute to which they might transfer their allegiance, even as the coarsest diet will satisfy the starving man or as sack-cloth raiment will prove effectual as a bar to cold. So for the moment China knelt reverently in worship to its new Parliament, as if it were natural heir to the accumulated prestige of the Manchu dynasty and could gather the nation in its fold like guests at an inn. Thus Parliament was given a great opportunity, of which it totally failed to avail itself. In three months it completely disappointed the national expectation: its eight hundred members have bustled about like so many ants on their ant-heap: they took three weeks to elect a Speaker and the lapse of one hundred days found them still wrangling over

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rules of procedure. Quorums were seldom formed and the majority of the House would frequently stampede before the close of a sitting. If a quorum were duly formed, the debates were marred by language which would disgrace a village scold or by conduct like that of wanton boys rioting in class. Hours were wasted in futile brawling and at eventide the House separated like a flock of birds with nothing accomplished. State affairs were simply neglected, though they were careful to vote themselves a salary of 6,000 dollars per annum. These facts were patent to the public eye, but when we come to unravel the dark mysteries of private intrigue, we find that the members were not ashamed to sell themselves to the highest bidder and were amenable to bribes. One would prefer to draw a veil on their shameless corruption, were it not too notorious to be concealed.

"So low has their credit sunk that we find associations formed in Peking to punish Parliament for its waste of public funds in voting to itself an enormous salary: generals have telegraphed from the provinces to administer reproof, like a stern head master birching his pupils. The man in the street regards them with unmitigated contempt and the press assails them with reviling epithets. If in three months their reputation has sunk so low, what ultimate depths of abasement are they destined to reach hereafter? It is as if the father of a family were to submit to reproof from his children or the head master of a school were to apply to his boys for instruction: it is as if a judge referred to the suitors regarding the form of his verdict. Could they ever retain their self-respect or would they not hang their heads in despondent silence?

"I care about the good name of Parliament, but I care infinitely more for the State. To me it would be a matter of indifference if Parliament were swept out of existence, provided the State benefited. A nation must have a centre if it is to exist, but the present régime possesses no centre, for its old centre has been swept out of existence and none is available to take its place. It was for this cause that some of us were in

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favour of retaining the Manchu monarchy as a symbol during the period of transition between the old and the new order. It would have served as a connecting link and might have prevented ancient standards from being overthrown, besides assisting in the orderly development of new ideas. Such a course would have been wholly consistent with the ordinary principles of evolution, but it was not to be. The old order was only too ready to vanish from the scene and signed away its own surrender. Dead embers can never be rekindled into life. If the tutelary guardian of a Buddhist temple is thrown into a drain and becomes covered in filth, how shall he ever take his old place at the shrine, arrayed in all his pristine glory? Or, though one may restore him to his pedestal, how shall his worshippers display their former reverence?

"Even so, China has existed for several thousand years under a monarchy: it has been her rallying point and her central stay, but its restoration is henceforward beyond the bounds of possibility. Even allow for the sake of argument that such a restoration is possible, its time-honoured dignity which gave it the right to be a rallying point for the nation has disappeared for ever. If China can exist without a centre, no more need be said; if not, a centre must be found, or the nation is ruined. One may as well expect the sea to dry up or the hills to vanish away as look to Parliament to provide this substitute for the monarchy. Parliament has committed suicide, and how shall an institution which cannot even protect its own existence expect to be treated as sacrosanct? The indications now are that the embodiment of the nation's reverence must be an entirely new form of government which shall overthrow that now existing. Happy will China be, if it is so, for otherwise she is like an orphan in a friendless world and will fall a prey to outside aggression. A multitude which is torn by dissension and rushes like a herd of distracted swine on its own destruction constitutes a plague spot in the world and cannot long maintain existence."

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The concluding lines of the article above translated point plainly to the remedy advocated by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, namely that Yuan Shih-k'ai shall govern China as the head of a military dictatorship. He would have preferred the retention of the Manchu monarchy, but, recognizing that this cannot be, offers this alternative to hold the country together. His views deserve respect, for few men command more influence with Chinese *literati*.

One of Liang's ablest followers, Wu Kuan-yin, now a political adviser to the Government, has recently published an article on the drafting of the new constitution which puts forward a similar view. He recommends that the first article of this instrument shall run as follows: "The government of China shall be a united Republic." In a footnote he says:

"Recent writers on the constitution usually propose to include the words 'For all time,' thus making the first Article read: 'China shall be a united Republic for all time.' I am not in sympathy with this view for the following reasons:

"1. The world is always advancing and government cannot escape from this universal law. Hence, even though a Republic were proved to be a good form of government, the advance of civilization might still discover a better in its place. Why, then, should we endeavour to tie the hands of our successors and force them to adopt an immutable form of government for all time, instead of affording to them the opportunity of changing it, if a better is forthcoming? How much more is this the case when a Republic is proved to be a bad form of government for China! The last year has provided us with a spectacle of dangers accumulating in relentless succession: everywhere the springs of calamity are concealed and the defects of a republican form of government stand out plain to the eye. Yet people are actually found to advocate the continuance of this sorry state of affairs unto the end of time, and would withhold from others the right to

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amend it. Such persons combine heartlessness with bigoted obstinacy.

"2. No institution can endure unless it finds favour in the national sight. If the nation continues to approve of a Republic, this form of government will be maintained unimpaired, even if the words 'for all time' are omitted from the constitution. If at a later day the nation should come to regard the Republic with the loathing one feels for an adder or scorpion, the inclusion of these three words will not suffice as a safeguard for its continuance. It will be swept out of existence, just as was the dynasty of the First Emperor, though he fondly fancied that it was destined to endure for ten thousand generations. In fact it perished with his son. We shall be wise to profit by this warning and not make ourselves ridiculous by imposing impracticable restrictions on our posterity."

The Republic being confessedly a failure, the question is being asked whether Yuan intends to found a dynasty. It is believed, indeed, that several prominent generals have urged him to follow the example of Chao Ku'angyin, founder of the Sung dynasty, whose army placed the yellow robe on his shoulders at the Bridge of Ch'en. But Yuan, that "sage master of many devices," as he has been appropriately called, knows well that such a dynasty could not be prolonged beyond his own life, apart from the fact that he has repeatedly pledged himself not to imitate the career of a Napoleon, and is said to have remarked in conversation that he means to retain the Republican "signboard." Having secured the reality of power, unlike most Chinese who revel in face-saving epithets, he is indifferent to the empty title of sovereignty. He is worshipped by his troops, and, in addition to his formidable existing force, has lately recruited a new division from his native province of Honan, which will be stationed at some central point in the south. There is small risk of any further wholesale attempt at rebellion as long as he lives: spasmodic outbreaks will doubtless occur, but he has succeeded in enforcing the

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authority of Peking in the south and even in Canton, where one of his own henchmen now rules as military governor. Critics have asserted that so far he has accomplished nothing: the best answer is that he has at least kept China together in circumstances of unparalleled difficulty. His enemies, of whom there are many, compare him to Ts'ao Ts'ao, the great strategist of the third century of our era, who betrayed his sovereign and founded an independent State. There are certainly points of resemblance between the two men, especially in their remembrance of services rendered, their cherishing of a grudge, and their preference for persuasion in preference to force. The comparison is not, however, meant by Chinese as a compliment, Ts'ao Ts'ao being regarded as the typical traitor in their history.

An extract from a speech delivered to his officers by Yuan himself will make a fitting conclusion to this study of his aims.

"In this twentieth century [he said] a newly constituted State must needs possess a strong army to maintain its independence. China differs from England set in the encompassing sea or from America alone on its sundered continent. The military system of this Republic must be modelled on the great Continental Powers, such as Germany or France. I make this statement in all confidence, but at present the weakness of our nation renders construction a task of extreme perplexity. The people can hardly support further burdens of taxation and we are destitute of fresh revenues which can be pledged as security for foreign loans. We must begin by increasing the producing power of the people and thus open up new springs of prosperity by gradual development. My present policy is thus simply to obtain assistance from foreign capital while aiming at the development of our industries. As soon as the condition of the country warrants it, we must consider ways and means for increasing our standing army. When first I was placed in charge of the military organization under the Manchus, I

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deemed the first essential to consist in founding academies for the development of a staff of officers and made special efforts to attain real progress in military education. With the establishment of the Republic the army must be re-organized, but unless we encourage talent and improve the standard of knowledge, we shall not be able to take our place in the world by the side of the Powers.

"For the space of three years I was in retirement and took no part in the shaping of China's destinies for weal or woe. On a sudden the revolution burst. I hurried to the scene and have exhausted my mental and physical energies with the one object of maintaining the situation. When I had to deal with foreign relations, for long no government existed: when I sought to restore order at home, I was long without the means of obtaining a loan. The Powers regarded our plight with such suspicion that rumours of impending division of north and south were bruited abroad. I was even as a traveller who pauses in perplexity on his journey at the parting of the ways. Yet, despite my scanty merit and shallow capacity, I have felt it my duty, though now on the threshold of old age, to take over the task entrusted to me by my countrymen, though my efforts to save China are sorely handicapped by the lack of coherent purpose among educated men. If I appeal to them to perform a difficult task, words without deeds are the rejoinder; if I appoint them to posts, they hang their heads and nonchalantly decline to proceed.

"Thoughts such as these might make one despair of the future of China. Yet who should let difficulties deter him? It is the gnarled timber that proves the temper of the blade. At present the lack of education in China is such that not one in a thousand comprehends the needs of the day. It rests with the intelligent minority to inculcate the way of wisdom, lest the foolish rustic sink into slavery or become a beast of burden for aliens. I can only trust, in conclusion, that you will strive with a common purpose, so that our army may be constituted on a homogeneous basis

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and may loyally obey the orders of the central government."

Clearly Yuan Shih-k'ai possesses many of the qualities of a great statesman. The vice-President, Li Yuan-hung, has compared him aptly to the great rock, known as Tichu, which stands unmoved amidst the rioting rapids of the Yellow River. Like General T'an Tao-chi, a famous warrior-statesman of the north in the fifth century A.D., "he may be called the Great Wall of China."

"He alone has the ability to form a strong central government and the prestige to maintain union. He has borne a heavy burden on his shoulders, has restored peace at home and won respect abroad, so that he deserves to be compared with the greatest heroes in our history. The nation turns expectantly towards him; he is a second Washington, on whom the future of China depends."

UNITED KINGDOM

THE KIKUYU CONTROVERSY

THE Anglican Church has been seriously exercised during the past few months over what has become known as the "Kikuyu controversy." The questions at issue are important, and the controversy itself brings clearly into prominence the peculiar difficulties, which face the Established Church.

In November last, the religious world was surprised by the publication of an open letter addressed by the Bishop of Zanzibar to the Bishop of St Albans, and entitled "Ecclesia Anglicana: For what does she stand?" The purpose of the Bishop of Zanzibar therein was to submit to the Bishop of St Albans that "having regard to her exceedingly chaotic system of truth," the English Church "is entirely unfit to send missionaries to heathen or Moham-medan lands." He pointed particularly to three incidents within the year to bear out his contention—the first was the publication by seven Oxford men of a "modernist"—and to the Bishop of Zanzibar clearly "heretical"—book entitled *Foundations*, in which some attempt was made towards reconciling religious belief with modern thought, the authors of which were clergymen, and one actually Chaplain to the Bishop of St Albans; the second was the Conference of Protestant Missions with the Church Missionary Society at Kikuyu in British East Africa in June, 1913, which met to discuss the question of a possible federation between the different missionary bodies working in that country. The Bishop of Zanzibar regarded the proposed scheme for federation then drawn up as having

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such a character as to be disloyal to the doctrine and principles of the Anglican Church, and on further grounds accused the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa, who were present, of the "grievous faults of propagating heresy and committing schism." The third incident was that the Bishop of St Albans, as the Bishop of Zanzibar alleges, publicly inhibited from ministering in his diocese "a priest who had invoked our Lady and two other Saints, and had delated him to his own diocesan as an offender against Church Law and Catholic Truth."

It is on the second of these incidents—the Missionary Conference at Kikuyu—that public attention has concentrated itself. This Conference was the culmination of a movement towards closer Missionary union in British East Africa, which had been in progress for some years, and the resolutions passed at it, embodying a scheme of federation, had been submitted almost word for word to a similar conference in 1909. The causes impelling the various churches towards as close a co-operation as possible will be patent to anyone who has any first-hand knowledge of such a country. It is a land of vast distances, and scattered population, inhabited by primitive Bantu tribes. They have no religion. The country, as the Bishop of Uganda says, is "still emphatically a pagan country." A few years ago it was almost unexplored, and neither Christianity nor Mohammedanism extended beyond the coast line. Then the Uganda railway was built, and within the last twelve years not only has an active Mohammedan propaganda commenced, but representatives of many different denominations have established themselves at various centres. Moreover, the railway has reversed within a single decade every condition of native life. "Settled government, European colonization, facilities for travel, the erection of townships, the demand for labour" have revolutionized East Africa. So far as Christianity is concerned, what is to be the future of this rapidly changing society, still almost pagan, and for this reason peculiarly malleable? "As regards religion

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(says the Bishop of Uganda), British East Africa is perhaps as nearly a *tabula rasa* as any country could be. Its ecclesiastical history has yet to be made. No mission has so far obtained a dominant influence over any one tribe, in that no tribe is yet professedly Christian. No self-governing native church exists. Everything is still in its earliest stages of development, plastic and ready to the hand of the maker; and the supreme question is: In what mould shall it be cast?

"No one, bearing in mind the above conditions, can fail to see a very obvious danger. Given . . . a dozen different agencies—working independently, each in its own way—and the result is obvious. Each will reproduce itself, and we shall see in East Africa a united Mohammedanism, a united Roman Catholicism, and, outside these, a Christianity represented by a dozen widely differing types, mutually independent, if not mutually opposed."

It was with the idea of the possible formation in the future of a united native church, that the proposals for federation were put forward. Briefly, these proposals may be summarized as follows. British East Africa will be divided into distinct missionary districts, each church being left free to develop its work within its own defined area; a common form of service, as far as possible, is aimed at, as also a common form of church organization. The basis of the federation is stated as follows:

(a) "The loyal acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as our supreme rule of Faith and Practice: of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as a general expression of fundamental Christian belief: and in particular, belief in the absolute authority of Holy Scripture as the Word of God: in the Deity of Jesus Christ, and in the atoning death of our Lord as the ground of our forgiveness.

(b) "Recognition of common membership between the Churches in the Federation.

(c) "Regular administration of the two Sacraments, Baptism and the Lord's Supper by outward signs.

(d) "A common form of Church organization."

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Under this scheme, therefore, each church would recognize and welcome a baptized member of another church; if he desired, it would admit him to communion; each church would also allow a minister of another church to preach in its buildings, when invited to do so, though not—at any rate in the case of the English Church—to assist in the administration of the Sacrament. The form of such administration is left to each particular church, provided there is “regular administration of the two Sacraments, Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, by outward signs.”

The missions represented were the Church Missionary Society, the Church of Scotland Mission, the African Inland Mission, the United Methodist Mission and the Nilotic Independent Mission.

At the conclusion of the conference, Holy Communion, according to the English service, was celebrated by all present, in a church belonging to the Established Church of Scotland, no other being available.

The proceedings of the Kikuyu Conference filled the Bishop of Zanzibar with indignation and dismay. In his view, there had been no conference of such importance since the Reformation, and the Church of England has been by it finally brought to the parting of the ways. The proposal of the conference, to use his words:

(a) “Does not contain the Creed, commonly called the Creed of St Athanasius.

(b) “Does not contain the Rite, or Sacrament, of Confirmation.

(c) “Does not contain the Rite, or Sacrament, of Absolution.

(d) “Does not contain Episcopacy.

(e) “Does not provide a Priest for the Celebration of the Holy Communion.

(f) “Does not contain a rule of Infant Baptism.

(g) “Does not know the Catholic Church, or the Communion of Saints, except in such a general sense as

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is already admitted by the four Protestant bodies that have joined the Federation."

For these reasons and owing to the fact that the Sacrament of Holy Communion was "given to many members of Protestant bodies whose very existence is hostile to Christ's Holy Church," he claimed from the Archbishop of Canterbury that "these teachings and actions may be declared contrary to the faith of the Catholic Church and to her practices, and may be utterly repudiated and forbidden, lest the witness of the church be falsified and a multitude perish from the way of truth"; and, furthermore, that the Archbishop should obtain from the two Bishops in question "a complete and categorical recantation of the errors which they have taught in word and action."

On the arrival of the Bishop of Zanzibar in England, his charges were considered by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Archbishop has refused to allow the inquiry, which he is ready to make, to take the form of proceedings against the two Bishops for heresy and schism. But he has promised to exercise in the matter his responsibilities as Metropolitan, and, in the first place, to request the advice of the Central Consultative Committee of Bishops created a few years ago, and representing all branches of the Anglican Church, whether in England, Scotland or Ireland, or the Dominions or Dependencies. Before this body he will put two questions:

(a) Do the provisions of the proposed Scheme of Federation contravene any principles of Church Order, the observance of which is obligatory upon the Bishops, the Clergy, and the layworkers of the Church of England at home and abroad? If so, in what particulars?

(b) Due consideration being given to precedent, and to all the circumstances of the case, was the action of the Bishops who arranged and conducted the admittedly abnormal Communion Service in question consistent or inconsistent with principles accepted by the Church of England?

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Since this Consultative Committee does not meet till July, there for the moment the matter stands.

Meanwhile, the public charges of the Bishop of Zanzibar have stimulated an exuberant and heated controversy in the press between churchmen, both lay and clerical, of all shades of opinion, which has broadened out from the particular points raised by Kikuyu into a discussion of the fundamental character and principles of the Anglican Church.

To an onlooker, what is striking is the unanimity with which all sides assert the serious nature of the existing position. Dr Gore, the Bishop of Oxford, a leader of the High Church party, deplores the fact that the three sections of the Church—the critical, the Catholic and the Evangelical—are pursuing their principles to a point where they become intolerable to each other, and seriously thinks that unless there is some speedy change the Church “will go the certain way to disruption.” Lord Halifax agrees that the dangers Dr Gore refers to can hardly be exaggerated. For the other side, Dean Henson, the Dean of Durham, asks us to realize how nearly and by how swift a process the Church has within recent years, owing to the growth of Tractarian tendencies, been brought to the grave spiritual disaster of complete religious isolation. Lastly, Dr Sanday, writing with wide knowledge of what modern criticism means for the interpretation of dogmatic religion, deplores the attack by the Bishop of Zanzibar on such a book as *Foundations* and on what it stands for, and states “in all seriousness, that unless a legitimate place in it can be found for these men, the days of the Church of England—and even of wider interests still—would be numbered.”

The fundamental difference of opinion between what are known as the Catholic and Protestant sections of the English Church—which has always existed in one form or another, and which the present controversy clearly reveals—is best illustrated by quotations from two leading

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protagonists, Lord Halifax on the one hand, and Dean Henson on the other. "No sacrifices, [says Lord Halifax] no concessions can be too great to facilitate in every possible way the admission of individuals and of separate religious bodies into the fullest communion with the Church, except the sacrifice of any portion of that which in our belief our Lord has entrusted to the Church's keeping. What no portion of the Church can do, without exposing itself to the charge of unfaithfulness to the doctrine and discipline it believes has been entrusted to it, is formally to acknowledge the right of those who deny that doctrine and discipline to communicate at its altars . . . The question is not whether there may not be individual cases in which exceptions may not rightly be made, as, for example, whether one who has not been confirmed, or one belonging to another communion who on his own responsibility presents himself at the altar, should be repelled, but whether the Church can rightly and with impunity dispense formally with what in its belief our Lord has entrusted to its charge.

"Because God's grace overflows the channels He has appointed, does that justify us in doing that which inevitably leads to a denial of, or disregard for, those channels? It is not a question of judging others, but of maintaining our own faith . . . When the Church of England assimilates its treatment of the orders conferred by the various Protestant Churches to that which it adopts in reference to the orders conferred by the Roman or Eastern Churches, it will be possible to discuss the question; till then *causa finita est*."

"Observe [says Dean Henson] the fatal simplicity of the reasoning, and its inexorable character. It takes for granted that the divinely-appointed guarantee of a valid Eucharist is an episcopally ordained priest: and that the vitalizing factor in a Christian Church is a valid Eucharist. Apart from the Bishop, there can be no true Priest. Apart from a true Priest, there can be no valid Sacrament. Apart from the valid Sacrament, there can be no visible Church. The

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logical process is simplicity itself. It follows, therefore, that it is impossible for a devout and considering Anglican to take any action, which might seem to endanger the position of the Episcopate as the essential element in the Church, and, indeed, its constituting factor. A Church without Bishops can only be called a Church by courtesy. To hold communion with such a Church is an act of Schism!"

The Dean of Durham's statement would, no doubt, be accepted as broadly accurate by the High Church party. "We Churchmen [says the Bishop of Bombay], who repudiate the notion that the Holy Spirit withdrew his influence from the Church after the latest books of the New Testament were written, will remain unalterably firm in our belief that the Episcopate was begun and maintained by His inspiration, and that the succession is an essential element in the idea of the Episcopate, and that the Episcopate and the succession are parts of our heritage which we may not barter away for any proposed gain in unity or efficiency or economy."

Here we have the doctrine of the Apostolic Succession and all that flows from it presented from two sides. The one, looking back to the dim ages of early Christianity, sees in the episcopal form of Church Government a divine institution ordained by God on earth, and in an episcopally-ordained priesthood the channel and only true channel of His grace; the other regards episcopacy simply as a form of Church Government, efficient, no doubt, but not in its nature more divine than other forms of government and offering in itself no bar to communion with non-episcopal churches. The one lays stress on the authority of the Church as a mystical body, infused with the Holy Spirit through the agency of its divine organization; to the other, what is all important is the relation of God to the individual soul. The one regards the Orthodox Greek and the Roman Catholic Churches when contrasted with Protestant "bodies" as essential, though in some degree

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erring, parts of the Holy Catholic Church, and looks forward to a not far distant day when the Anglican Church will be reunited with both; in the view of the other, before the hope of any such re-union can so much as dawn, these two Churches have to make the difficult passage from mediæval to modern conceptions of Christianity. To the one, Protestant non-episcopal churches seeking God as they do "in ways which He has guided His Church to avoid," may, through His abundant mercy, achieve a spiritual duty, but are not parts of the Catholic Church, and are in truth not churches at all; to the other, to unite such bodies with it should be the aim of the English Church. To the one, the Reformation is almost an unrelieved calamity; to the other, it marks the dawn of spiritual liberty and of the right of private judgment. In their extreme forms, the one is as difficult to distinguish from Roman Catholicism, as the other is from pure Nonconformity.

If these two parties were to pursue their principles to their logical conclusion, clearly they would be mutually intolerable, and we should be near that disruption which the Bishop of Oxford dreads. But is there, in truth, any more reason now, than there has always been, why either party should be logical and extreme? It is the peculiar characteristic of the English Church that she has always known how to combine these two differing elements, and has gained in true catholicity by so doing. It is easy to deride her open-mindedness, and to lament what the Bishop of Zanzibar terms her chaotic system of truth. Other churches, no doubt, have known better how to maintain at any rate outward uniformity. But in truth men are not made to think alike in religion any more than in politics, and every church must have its "high" and "low" as every State has its liberals and conservatives. It would be calamitous to the English Church that either party should possess the strength and determination to eject the other.

From her High Church party, the Church draws zeal, spirituality, an intense conviction of the unseen world, a

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vivid religious life; from the Low Church earnestness, and a profound belief in that great gift of the Reformation, the principle of individual liberty of conscience; from the Broad Church, tolerance and breadth. It is the harmony, and often the clash of these elements, that gives to the Church her peculiar English qualities. It is her task to avoid the intolerance and rigidity which threatens her on one side, and the narrow, cold, unspiritual sectarianism which lays wait for her on the other.

But there is another danger to the Church, and one still more full of difficulty. How far are what the Bishop of Oxford calls the critical modernist school to be allowed to go? Clerics, when fighting each other, often forget that in the long last it is the laity which decides the victory. What does the ordinary man think of all these contentions about High Church and Low, orders and succession, Catholic and Protestant, Roman and Anglican? Do they not all sound unreal to him, when he is perplexed about the very foundations of faith and morals? Many things that his fathers believed without question are to him impossible. Science and criticism have given him a new conception of the world. Is it not patent that the vast masses of the people stand outside all churches? If the Church is to recover her influence with the masses, with the artisans, and with the intellectual classes, it will never be by refusing to recognize the profound influence of modern thought or by not meeting it openly. The problem is one, no doubt, of tremendous difficulty. Witness the fact that to the Bishop of Zanzibar *Foundations* is a book full of heretical and wholly inadmissible doctrines; while to its authors it was an attempt to bridge over for the modern Oxford youth the gulf which it finds between ancient faith and modern thought. The Church herself is right in moving with extreme slowness. The time is not yet when her doctrines can be reformulated, and to attempt such a task now would split her into fragments. But she can, at least, avoid the fatal mistake towards which a large and well-meaning

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section of her clergy is pressing her of attempting crudely to suppress new ideas, which in any case are far too potent for suppression.

The critical school merely reflects some part of what the ordinary man is thinking. There are high ecclesiastics who are prepared to admit criticism up to a point but who draw a barrier at what they deem to be essentials. But the plain man draws no barriers. Criticism, if valid at all, is valid everywhere. Nor can the Church ignore questions which are discussed vigorously and without reserve day by day in the halfpenny press.

The time is one of transition and flux, and so disturbed and muddy are the waters of opinion that any present restatement of principles, such as the Bishop of Oxford pleads for, seems out of the question. For that we must await the advent of a calmer and more peaceful age.

Many religious souls in these days are fearful, because the dogmatic foundations to which they have chained themselves seem slipping away. But dogma is not religion, and for religion there is no fear. So long as man is a creature of mystery, and, finite being himself, reaches out towards infinity, so long will he need religion and a Church wherein he may seek after God in communion with his fellow men.

Meanwhile, taught by the past and looking forward to the future, it is our clear duty so to act that we may hand on to our children intact the heritage of a Common Church, so far as the intolerance and frailty of our ancestors has preserved it to us.

CANADA

I. THE SESSION OF PARLIAMENT.

NO doubt there was anxious deliberation by Ministers over naval policy before Parliament assembled. The question was bound to arise during the session and the Government had to decide whether or not to resubmit the proposals that were rejected by the Senate a year ago. It was the conviction of the Cabinet that to abandon the central feature of its programme would involve grave loss of prestige, while by no other method could Canada so speedily and effectually strengthen the naval forces of the Empire. But since there was no prospect that the Opposition would consider a contribution of Dreadnoughts or that the Senate would reverse its action of last session it was decided not to introduce any naval measure.

This decision is regretted by a section of both parties. There is a middle group which urges compromise. There are Liberals who would support an immediate contribution of Dreadnoughts if the Government would declare that its ultimate object is the organization of a national navy. There are Conservatives who would support a national navy, who, indeed, contemplate no other permanent policy, but who believe that years must elapse before any effective Canadian navy could be created and, therefore, strongly favour Mr Borden's proposals. But it is understood the official leaders of the Liberal party would not consider contribution in any circumstances and, therefore, the

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Government had to make complete submission or resubmit proposals which could not pass through the Senate.

There are other reasons for the decision of Ministers not to precipitate any discussion of naval policy during this session. This is the third session since the Borden Administration came into office. At the first, ministers were unfamiliar with their duties. Only one member of the Cabinet had belonged to any previous federal Administration. Mr Borden himself was wholly without official experience. There was friction in the Cabinet and in the Conservative Parliamentary party. Across the floor of the House was Sir Wilfrid Laurier and other Oppositionists who had enjoyed long terms of office and behind these was a united and aggressive party. Hence it was natural that at the first session of the Parliament few measures should be introduced and that departmental responsibility should lay heavily upon the shoulders of Ministers. During the second session there was long and desperate obstruction of the naval proposals. In consequence of this action important private and public measures received inadequate attention. Many Bills and proposals had to be abandoned. There was danger that the Government would be discredited by neglect and inaction. It was felt that to have another comparatively abortive session would be infinitely damaging. But there was reason to apprehend that naval proposals would again be obstructed. There would remain probably only one more session before the Government would have to go to the country. Moreover, as Ministers reasoned, nothing of value would be accomplished by an interminable naval debate in the Commons, when it was certain that the Naval Aid Bill would be again rejected by the Senate. Hence the decision to concentrate upon Redistribution and other measures which demand attention.

The Constitution requires that there shall be a redistribution of constituencies after every decennial census. In 1911, delay arose over the premature dissolution of Parliament in order to test the feeling of the country towards the

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Trade Agreement with Washington. There has been delay by the Borden Government owing to the pressure of other questions and the feeling that all that was necessary was to have the constituencies distributed in readiness for the next general election. There are difficulties and complexities in the problem. The British North America Act gives Quebec sixty-five members and requires that the unit of representation for Quebec shall determine the representation of the other provinces. Owing to loss of population, or slow growth of population, the three Eastern Provinces will lose four members. Ontario will lose four members and the rural representation be reduced through the greater concentration of population in the cities. Twenty-one additional members will be due to Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. The net result will be a considerable increase in the representation of the commercial and industrial communities and an enormous increase in the representation of the Western Provinces.

Not since Confederation have we had any such revolutionary disturbance of the balance of political power as this redistribution will effect. The Eastern Provinces demand that their representation shall not be reduced below the minimum that was fixed when they entered the union. This condition was exacted by British Columbia when the Province came into Confederation. There is some evidence that Prince Edward Island sought a similar arrangement, but the condition was not embodied in the contract. Entering the Union with six members, the Province may have only three representatives in the next House of Commons. To the demand of the Eastern Provinces that the minimum established at Confederation shall not be reduced Quebec and the Western Provinces are opposed, and there is no evidence that Ontario is generally sympathetic. For Mr Borden, as a representative of Nova Scotia, the position is peculiarly difficult, but it is doubtful if he can make any substantial concessions to the Eastern communities.

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The Bill as submitted by the Prime Minister provides that the various Provinces shall be represented in the next parliament as follows:

	<i>Present Parliament</i>	<i>Next Parliament</i>
Alberta	7	12
British Columbia	6	13
Manitoba	10	15
New Brunswick	13	11
Nova Scotia	18	16
Ontario	86	82
Prince Edward Island	4	4 or 3
Quebec	65	65
Saskatchewan	10	16
Yukon	1	1

It is much to expect that any measure of redistribution submitted by the Government will be wholly acceptable to the Opposition. In connexion with all such measures in Canada there have been allegations of gerrymandering and appeals to party feeling. Generally Oppositions have had legitimate grievances. But following the example of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Government has had the Bill committed to a joint committee of five Conservative and four Liberal members. Of this committee the Hon. Robert Rogers will be chairman, and apparently a sincere attempt will be made to produce a measure which the Opposition can accept. The committee will sit in private, reporting its finished work to the House towards the close of the session. Clearly if both parties in the Commons agree the measure will not be rejected by the Senate. What is important in this connexion is that when redistribution for the Commons is effected the Western Provinces will be entitled to nine additional representatives in the Senate. With these seated the Liberal party would have a majority of only twelve in the Upper Chamber. So reduced, the majority would quickly disappear and the Naval Aid Bill and other Conservative measures would have a clear way through the Senate. It will be observed

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that Mr Borden has left the committee to recommend whether or not the representation of Prince Edward Island shall be reduced.

After Redistribution the tariff and the prevailing commercial stringency will chiefly engage the attention of Parliament. The new Liberal fiscal policy is expressed in the phrase "free food." It is demanded that all duties on field and animal products shall be abolished. The object proclaimed is to admit freely all such products from other countries and particularly from the United States in order to reduce the cost of living. Under the Underwood tariff there have been heavy shipments of cattle, poultry, cream and other products to the neighbouring country. Inevitably this produces scarcity and increases prices in Canada. There is also a vigorous demand for removal of the duties on wheat and flour, so as to secure free admission of these products to the United States under the reciprocal provision of the Underwood tariff. The Legislature of Saskatchewan, controlled by a Liberal Government, and the Legislature of Manitoba, controlled by a Conservative Government, have united in this demand. It has been urged upon Mr Borden by a deputation of Western Grain Growers. It is supported by the whole Liberal press and a few Conservative journals. The concession is opposed by the milling interest, is not regarded favourably by the railways, and has the active hostility of the great bulk of the manufacturers of older Canada. Even in the West, feeling is by no means unanimous. Flour milling is a natural industry for the Western country, and where mills exist the proposal is vigorously opposed. With the decline of land dealing the need of factories to retain and increase the town populations is freely expressed. It cannot be doubted, however, that the very general feeling of the West is favourable to "free wheat," and, however the Government may doubt the ultimate value of the advantages to be derived, probably it will hesitate to perpetuate grievances which denial of the concession will accentuate. We shall not know the mind of

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the Government until the Minister of Finance makes his financial statement. Whatever is done in this connexion, there will be no radical tariff changes nor any submission to the "free food" propaganda of the Opposition. There will be a measure of civil service reform, a bill affecting the powers and the organization of trust companies, and some progressive labour and industrial legislation. But apart from Redistribution, the main subject of controversy between the parties in Parliament and in the country will be, as in the period from 1878 to 1896, the tariff.

II. NAVAL DEFENCE.

THERE is a strong feeling in the country that the naval controversy, at least in its present stage, should reach an end. The disagreement between the parties may have been inevitable; and the discussion which ensued was certainly not without value as a means of informing the public on the whole subject. The one party had no permanent policy ready; it proposed a temporary plan. The other party, having introduced a permanent policy, refused to accept the plan, until it knew how far the plan was consistent with its policy. Thus the party warfare began. Neither side was able to force the position of the other, and at the moment both sides are resting on their arms. The Senate would strike down the Naval Bill again, if it had the chance. The Government refuses to give it the chance. The Prime Minister has expressly declined—if the metaphor may be changed—to continue setting up pins in the senatorial bowling-alley. Still, however necessary the party manœuvres may be, the result of them is nothing, and many people, though they sympathize with one party or the other, are coming to feel that behind all the protestations of willingness to defend the country and the Empire, the ships have vanished, like the Cheshire cat behind its grin. They observe

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the difficulties into which the delay here has thrown the British administration. In their judgment the Government should take the one means of terminating this stage in the contest, which it can take consistently with its dignity. It should declare its permanent policy. Once the policy were known, the parties might be able to unite upon it. Even if they could not, and the party warfare recommenced, at least the issues would be larger, and the conclusion of the whole campaign would be brought nearer.

As to the character of the permanent policy few suggestions are heard, and those not very valuable. The public prefers to leave details to its leaders and to experts. Still one or two proposals should be mentioned, if only to show the state of opinion. Canada, it is said, might contribute to a common Imperial navy, if she obtained a measure of control over policy and ships. The value of one navy so strong that local defences would be needless could easily be appreciated here, where large organizations are employed for all purposes. For the present, representation on the Defence Committee and on a joint naval board might serve as an adequate share of control. Such a policy, however, while it might commend itself to many Conservatives and to some Liberals, would scarcely be acceptable to the Opposition, which has advocated a Canadian fleet. An alternative suggestion is to carry into effect the Naval Service Act of 1910. It would be possible under this Act to carry on the training of officers and men after the fashion adopted by New Zealand. Dockyards could be built, and smaller ships at least, to be followed, if necessary, by the larger types. This policy could not produce its fruits rapidly. It might, therefore, be accompanied by the Naval Bill, which proposed to render effective aid as quickly as possible. The Opposition would find difficulty in refusing to accept the whole scheme. The only possible pretext for a quarrel between the parties would be furnished by the clause of the Naval Service Act relating to control. Under the Act the Canadian Government was to control the ships, and to decide in the

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event of war whether they should join the British Navy or not. Some members of both parties have always felt that this provision destroyed the value of the Canadian fleet; alone it could do nothing, and it would be effective as part of the British Navy only on condition that the Admiralty could always rely upon it. To meet this view the Naval Service Act might be amended in the sense of the present New Zealand Act, which gives the Admiralty direction of New Zealand ships in any crisis. Or, if such an amendment were thought impossible, the subject of common management could be raised at the next meeting of the Imperial Conference.

Such suggestions as these must, of course, be considered in their relation to party obligations and undertakings. The part of the first suggestion requiring the construction of dockyards and smaller ships seems to have been covered already in the Prime Minister's speeches. The Opposition, on the other hand, would insist that the Canadian service, while managed here, was to have been fitted at every point into the Imperial Service. The proposals simply indicate that public opinion is active, and that in many quarters a settlement would be welcome.

III. CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT IN SASKATCHEWAN.

IN January, 1913, the Province of Saskatchewan appointed a commission to inquire into the methods by which European farmers unite to meet the requirements of their business and life. The commissioners had the advantage of being associated with an American commission chosen for the same purpose. The report which resulted from their inquiries is an interesting and stimulating document. Even if many of the results of continental farming cannot be attained in a new and scattered community like ours, the report, nevertheless, must have

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considerable value as setting up an ideal towards which the New World can direct its efforts.

In the old farming communities of the Continent borrower and lender live side by side. The farmers have long been accustomed to co-operation in various forms. Most of them have spent their whole lives in one neighbourhood and are intimately acquainted with each other's affairs. Owing to these circumstances they are able to cover a wide sphere in their co-operative activity. With the example of continental success before them the commissioners notice that there are three main problems confronting the farmer: the first, that of obtaining money at somewhat lower rates of interest and under more favourable conditions; the second, that of organizing co-operation for the sale of produce and the purchase of supplies, especially machinery; and the third, that of promoting social intercourse. The report deals primarily with the first problem; and the commissioners have shown great wisdom and restraint in putting aside what seemed too difficult of immediate attainment and selecting as their guide the procedure of the Australian and New Zealand Governments in treating the same subject.

The bill recently passed by the Saskatchewan legislature follows closely the suggestions made by the commissioners at the end of their report. It provides for the incorporation of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Farm Mortgage Association. For the conduct of this Association three commissioners are to be appointed, of whom one is to be styled the managing commissioner and to be in receipt of an adequate salary. The first business of this commission will be organization. Groups will be formed of not less than ten persons who are to unite in mutual approval of and application for loans from the commission on first mortgages of not more than forty per cent of the value placed on their property by the officers of the commission. On the application being approved bonds will be issued with the mortgages as security, and will be sold accompanied by the guarantee

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of the province. The money will be lent to the farmers at such a price as will not do more than cover the actual expenses of arranging the loans. It is understood, however, that some slight profit may accrue, which is to be utilized for the building up of a reserve. A certain element of mutual responsibility is supplied in the provision that each group shall be jointly liable to the extent of fifty per cent of any defaulted loans. No loan is to be granted except for permanent improvements and productive purposes. No definite limit is placed on the total amount of money to be advanced. The whole framing of the bill indicates, however, that the experiment, if proved successful, may develop into something more extensive.

The present rates of interest paid by the Saskatchewan farmers for their loans range from eight to ten per cent, and are in some cases higher. Again, since the mortgages generally run for terms of not more than five years, various recurring expenses make the conditions more onerous. Under the co-operative plan it is proposed that mortgages shall run from fifteen to thirty-five years, and shall be repayable by equal annual or semi-annual instalments including interest. In this way the farmer will never be faced by the maturity of a large capital debt which he is quite unable to pay.

The report points out what is undoubtedly true, that the machinery for placing capital at the disposal of agriculture has by no means reached the same high efficiency as that which meets industrial requirements. The unprecedented development of industrialism, which the whole world has experienced during the last few years, has probably had the effect of devoting an over-large proportion of the world's savings to immensely expensive industrial machinery. Too much importance can hardly be given to any reasonable effort to correct the balance as between industry and agriculture which has clearly been disturbed to the detriment of the latter. The world's scarcity of loanable capital from which the Saskatchewan farmers

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are suffering can be in large measure attributed to this over-emphasizing of industrial needs. For instance, it is probable that Canada has at the moment more railways than are necessary, and that some of the expensive improvements in western towns might have been spared. The ill effects of over-industrialism are not confined to immediate financial disturbance. Along with it has gone a radical change in the character of the populations from which immigration must be drawn. The immigrants who in the thirties and forties cleared and settled the forests of Ontario were in the main sturdy country folk. Now for the most part immigration must be drawn from the vast urban populations that have been built up in Europe of recent years.

The report of the commission gives some interesting figures in regard to the probable agricultural indebtedness of Saskatchewan. The commissioners estimate that in the form of mortgages the farmers owe to loan companies and the like some \$65,000,000, to farm implement companies some \$35,000,000, and that for other debts, including bank accounts, pre-emptions, payments on land purchase, etc., they owe as much as \$50,000,000, which makes a total indebtedness for purely agricultural purposes of about \$150,000,000. The commissioners hold, also, that some thirty million acres out of a total amount of arable land in the province of about fifty-eight million acres are held by farmers, the average farms being each of about three hundred acres. Of these thirty million acres it appears that about fourteen million acres are more or less under cultivation, and that for the year 1913 rather under ten million acres were under crop. The bill seems a large one. However, it appears that the crops of the four main grains, *i.e.*, wheat, oats, barley and flax, brought to the farmer about \$110,000,000, and there is reason to believe that with the proceeds the farmers repaid a very large part of their floating indebtedness, possibly as much as thirty-three per cent. It is possible, also, that the commissioners in their

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desire to be entirely frank, somewhat over-estimated the liabilities.

Modern immigrants are conveyed to their destination by great transcontinental railways, which inevitably tend to scatter them widely. When this process occurs over a new country with a severe climate, and at such great distances from the bases of supply that all necessities are expensive and all markets are distant, the immigrants must for some years necessarily undergo considerable hardship. Those farmers who come from the trained farming communities of Ontario and the United States in most cases do well when engaged in farming proper, in spite of hardships and in spite of high rates for money. They are also less open to the temptation before which many settlers in the West have fallen, that of taking up with speculation in view more land than they can properly cultivate. Where this element of speculation has entered into the acquisition of land it is, of course, a necessary consequence that the money required in the form of loans must be greater than the land actually under cultivation ought to be obliged to carry.

The Saskatchewan farmer undoubtedly feels that the rates of interest which he is paying for money are excessive and that he is on the whole rather unjustly treated by the financial organizations of the East, through which he obtains his money. The time, however, is easily within the memory of comparatively young men when in the Province of Ontario the farmer was paying even higher rates for money than the Saskatchewan farmer is paying to-day. At the present moment in Ontario first class loans on farm mortgages are being negotiated at seven per cent, and seven per cent is the rate at which industrial organizations of a high class are now borrowing their money in Europe. Certain crucial years in the history of Saskatchewan have happened to coincide with a period of "tight money" all over the world, and this coincidence has at least something to do with the rates that the Saskatchewan farmer has

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to pay to-day. The complaint made against the five year mortgage loans is perhaps not altogether just. At least it might prove very difficult for a loan company to rely on a single valuation in a remote district if a loan were to run as long as from fifteen to thirty-five years.

After all it is a wonderful accomplishment for a relatively small population to have produced under existing conditions so vast a mass of produce, and a great area devoted to producing these fundamental necessities of life is an asset of infinite value to the Empire. As time goes on the farmers will obtain their money more cheaply and more easily, and as population becomes more compact and as greater permanence of settlement is established, the whole mode of life in the West must be materially changed for the better. The Government of Saskatchewan is wise in encouraging a more scientific co-operation and in doing something towards hastening, what in any case is inevitable, easier and better-organized financial machinery for agricultural purposes.

IV. ORIENTAL IMMIGRATION

A British Columbian View

THE Order-in-Council of the Dominion Government prohibiting the immigration of labourers and artisans of all nationalities until March 31, came at a most opportune time. It prevented additions to the army of unemployed which the money stringency had brought together in every large centre of population. It postponed the still more serious danger to British Columbia which would result from a large influx of British Indians. Already one man in every five is an Oriental; and the decision of Chief Justice Hunter that the "continuous journey" regulation was *ultra vires* took away the last barrier to an unimpeded flow of British Indians into the Province. Every serious-

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minded student of the situation hopes that the time gained may be used in arriving at a fair and reasonable arrangement with the authorities in India by which what will be a calamity, both to this country and the Indian immigrants themselves, may be averted.*

Western business men, who have been seeking the markets of the Orient and extending trade there, have acquainted the Oriental with the position and value of the rich lands of the West. Armies of missionaries have been carrying into every part of the East the religion which has made the civilization of the West. The three great empires of the Orient—India, Japan and China—are awakening and seeking wider fields and richer opportunities for life. Their teeming millions are no longer content within the old, narrow limits of existence, but are crowding out, seeking with greedy eyes the unoccupied spaces. Nothing can stop the movement. It must be directed where it will do least harm and may bring the highest ultimate good to Oriental and Occidental alike.

The West Coast of Canada and the United States offers to the Oriental attractive climatic conditions. These regions have already felt the pressure which he can exert. His coming in larger numbers must be checked, mainly on two grounds. The first ground is an economic one. The Western peoples have been cradled in sterner climates where a somewhat elaborate economic machinery is necessary to maintain efficiency. Their life has become more

*The regulation required that the immigrants should have made a continuous journey. It was declared inoperative on technical grounds. The Dominion Government therefore prohibited immigration of all artisans and labourers into British Columbia by ocean ports or from the United States until March 31st, and afterwards reintroduced the regulation in a form intended to remove the technical objections. It again requires that every immigrant of Asiatic race shall have at least \$200 in his possession. The latter provision does not apply to the subjects of any Asiatic country as to which other statutory regulations are in force or with which an agreement has been concluded inconsistent with the requirement of \$200. These orders in council would seem to render it difficult to carry out the wish expressed in the text; but it is understood that the Government is seeking to find some more satisfactory and permanent solution of the whole problem.

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complex, until now no Western-born citizen can live on a decent level without a fairly large economic equipment. The Oriental peoples, for the most part, come from a genial climate and have lived, through long centuries, lives of great simplicity. No serious evil can ever come to Oriental lands from the incursion of large numbers of Western labourers. But the coming into a Western community of a multitude of Orientals is fatal to its working classes. The experience of the Hawaiian Islands shows the result. There the middle class has disappeared; only millionaire employers and coolie labourers remain; and the condition of the coolie is very little, if any, better than it will soon be in the land of his origin. The Western working-man has been fighting a slow but winning fight for a fairer share in the products of civilization, but if he is to be subjected to an unrestricted competition from Oriental workmen, all hope of a decent livelihood amidst the rich resources of British Columbia is gone. These resources are such as to demand large amounts of capital for their development, and already they have in great part fallen into the hands of a few capitalists. Admit Orientals freely and a homogeneous democracy becomes impossible. There will soon be only an immensely wealthy group of employers and a vast horde of Orientals, exercising no control over the distribution of the results of their labour and ground down to a condition where even they could not advance to the larger life which they desire.

The other argument against Oriental immigration is to be found in the field of politics. The Occidental people are, almost without exception, more or less trained in forms of democratic government, and are prepared in a comparatively short time to take their place as citizens of the new Western democracies. Still, the task of welding even these races into one national life proves an almost impossible one, as can be seen from the experience of the United States. Canada already finds this task laid upon her. Add to these vastly diversified Western people hordes of men from

Oriental Immigration

Oriental lands, who will require at least two or three generations in which to attain the Western standard of democracy, and the burden placed on the nation will be too great for it to bear.

The one safe course is that of rigid restriction. The present proportion of Orientals to Occidentals in British Columbia is much too high. Any large increase of the number of Orientals at once disturbs the standard of wages and creates large colonies of unassimilable material in the slums of the great cities, which are a menace to the cities and a curse to their denizens. It is not a question of higher or lower. Any unprejudiced observer must be impressed with the magnificent qualities of all the Oriental peoples. They have a destiny quite as great as ours. But it is hard for a white man who is starving to be unprejudiced in his attitude to the yellow man who in all innocence, so far as ill intent is concerned, is taking away his daily bread. Ugly clashes have already occurred and are bound to occur with increasing frequency, if this immigration is not strictly limited. Such clashes will make a good understanding between the Occidental and Oriental races impossible.

Restriction is possible with perfectly good feeling on both sides. The gentlemanly understanding with Japan is being honourably lived up to and the number of Japanese is not increasing. The disgraceful head tax on the Chinese, which does not restrict, should be done away with, and, by an understanding with the Chinese authorities and a heavy fine on steamship companies bringing in Chinese, this class of immigration should be stopped, for a time.

The British Indian is the least adaptable and the most unpopular Oriental in Canada. Those who are here and intend to remain should be permitted to bring their wives and families, but the millions of India should be made to understand that for economic and political reasons which will sooner or later affect them as well as us, it is not expedient that any more of them should be allowed to

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enter Canada until the white population of British Columbia has largely increased.

In the meantime the task of statesmanship throughout the world should be to direct these tides of splendid Oriental humanity to those many and rich parts of the earth's surface where Western democratic institutions and standards of living will suffer least by their coming and where they may find the opportunity to win the larger lives for which they long. When, in the coming days, the standards of life and the political institutions of East and West more nearly approximate, barriers against the free coming and going of any man into any part of the world will not be required.

V. THE TARIFF

ONE of the chief virtues of a tariff is that it affords such excellent material for the party controversies, broad generalizations and easy explanations in which we all like to indulge. To some people the tariff appears as the source of all evil, of high prices, trusts, combines, the exodus from the country and the slums and poverty in cities. Others consider it no more closely related to general economic conditions than the moon to a turnip-patch. Such extreme opinions can help the public very little in the present difficulties.

"Free wheat" and "free food" both sound most attractive, especially in a season of high prices and tight money. Unfortunately there are said to be obstacles in the way of both. Those affecting "free wheat" have been discussed in the first note. The issues raised by "free food" are not yet so fully before the public. At present Canada imports some \$54,000,000 worth of dutiable food, on which it pays more than \$11,500,000 in duties. Whether all these articles, or how many of them, would be affected by the proposed change in the tariff, has not

The Tariff

yet been made clear. Some of the duties are imposed upon products not grown in Canada, and are consistent with the most extreme free trade theory. Many of the products come from those of the British West Indies which now have reciprocal trade arrangements with us, and from New Zealand, which also has such an arrangement. Presumably the tariff amendments would not be allowed to nullify such arrangements. How far the free importation of the remaining articles would reduce or even check the increase of prices here would depend upon many conditions. Theoretically the removal of a tax and the enlargement of an area of supply should bring about this effect; and the legislator must keep such a general consideration in mind. At the moment, however, the result will depend on the ratio which the imported articles bear to the whole supply and to the whole demand. Many foods, for example, now imported from this country to the United States may form such an infinitesimal part of the total amount on hand and needed there as not to affect prices one way or the other. Canada, in the interval, may, by increasing production find itself even less dependent than now upon imports of this kind.

Here at least is an important and valuable result of the discussion. We are all learning that the production of many food-stuffs in Canada has declined, and that we should be able to secure cheaper food by getting more out of the soil. Agricultural societies and colleges and departments are active in every direction. The farmer is being overwhelmed with advice and attentions. If he does not drown, like the man who could not decide between the life-saving devices thrown to him in time to reach one, the balance of farm and factory may be redressed.

Other proposals concerning the tariff, e.g., that the British preference be increased, that free trade with Great Britain be established within five years, and that the duties on agricultural implements and cement be removed, will scarcely find general acceptance immediately. They

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involve such a departure from the view still held by both parties that Canadian manufacturers should receive adequate protection, that the people will adopt them, if at all, only after much longer and much more careful consideration.

The "free wheat" controversy will be of special interest to British readers, because of its bearing on the Preference. If United States wheat enters Canada free of duty, the case for securing the British market to wheat which comes from this country cannot but be greatly affected.

Canada. February, 1914.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE TURMOIL OF POLITICS

IT is hard to remember a time in Australian politics when there has been so much cry about so little wool as during the last few months. Not only have the principal legislatures—those of the Commonwealth, New South Wales, and Victoria—been doing nothing in particular, but they have been making an inordinate fuss about it. In two cases this has been due to the practical equality of parties and the pressure upon members' minds of the possibility of a general election. In the third—the Victorian—it is the great disproportion between parties that has wrought the mischief.

It must always be remembered, in discussing Australian politics, that the key to them lies in the permanent existence of at least three parties among the electors. Fusions and coalitions usually disguise this phenomenon in the purely parliamentary sphere; but outside the Houses it is always easy to distinguish three types of opinion—for which Conservative, Progressive and Socialist would be adequate names if only those words could be disentangled from their existing British associations. Where only two parties show on the surface, the one is made up of the Conservatives *plus* those Progressives who object to the Labour pledge, the other comprises the rest of the Progressives *plus* the true Socialists. Now in Victoria practically all the Progressives object: consequently the Labour party in Parliament, consisting only of Socialists, is in a marked minority—20 members, in fact, out of 65, while the Ministerialist

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"Liberals" include 33 Progressives and 12 Conservatives. At the head of the Ministry, moreover, is a man capable beyond the ordinary—head and shoulders, indeed, above the rest of his Cabinet and party—but also (perhaps therefore) inclined to be autocratic.

It is not difficult to demonstrate, with these factors given, what must result and has in fact resulted. Mr Watt, a strong Progressive, is master of his Cabinet and dictates its legislative proposals, some of which are much disliked by the Conservative section of the party. If the Opposition were strong enough to be a danger, party loyalty would overcome this dislike; the Opposition being hopelessly weak there is room for dissensions among Ministerialists and for revolt when the leader's whip cracks too loudly. Early in the session the beginnings of a revolt were evident, and took some trouble to suppress; when towards the close of it the Ministry introduced a Redistribution Bill whose chief features were the addition of five members to Parliament's present number and the maintenance of a great disproportion between the voting strength of country and city electorates (the country quota is about 8,000 and the city's about 13,000), the Liberal majority was again split, and with the help of 12 recalcitrants an amendment moved by the leader of the Labour party was carried by two votes. Mr Watt resigned. Mr Elmslie, the Labour leader, apparently relying on a few vague expressions of sympathy from followers of Mr Watt, still indignant against the Conservative revolvers, assured the Lieutenant-Governor that he could form a stable Ministry. But directly his Ministry was formed the absurdity of the new situation became evident, the Liberals fell into each others' arms again, and the Elmslie Cabinet had to leave office even before they had time to be re-elected in their respective constituencies.

In itself all this petty manœuvring is unimportant and resultless; the story of it is worth telling mainly because it illustrates so clearly the permanent framework, so to speak, on which the ever-varying phenomena of Australian politics

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are built up. The two-party system, unstable because the proportions of the three elements which go to its making are always altering: the few really able leaders, constantly hampered by the unreliability of their following, and almost driven into autocracy by the weakness of their colleagues: the little storms out of a clear sky, mutterings and revolts and reconciliations and Cabinet reconstructions, all impeding the course of public business often for the pettiest of excuses: these persist, whatever Ministry is in office, supported by whatever temporary coalition, in whatever State we consider. But they are not always so nakedly evident as in Victoria this spring.

In New South Wales the combinations have been different, but the elements are the same. Labour includes a proportion of the Progressive element; hence the parties in the last Parliament were almost equal. On the other hand another important section of Progressive voters, objecting intensely to the Labour pledge but equally dissatisfied with the present Liberal leaders, found themselves practically unrepresented. The legislature's spring session was of almost negligible value, both parties treating it merely as a shop-window in which to display their programmes for the coming elections; the real campaign went on outside, amid bitter recriminations and personalities. New parties sprang up like mushrooms, in the hope of attracting the unrepresented Progressive vote; a section of the Roman Catholic community insisted on making an issue out of the long-since abolished State aid to denominational education; Mr Wade, the Liberal leader, did himself no good by reiterating against a Labour Minister a series of charges which he had declined to follow up before a Royal Commission. These irrelevancies for a time distracted public attention from the one serious issue—had the Labour Ministry been extravagant?

There were, of course, many other complaints against it. It had violated nearly every "plank" in the Labour platform: it had neglected nearly every promise made

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before it came into office: it had used its patronage to get an inconvenient colleague out of the country at a critical moment; it had mismanaged immigration, behaved with gross rudeness to the Governor-General, and introduced such fantastic legislation that the Legislative Council became almost popular by rejecting it. (In case this list of its misfeasances should seem less than impartial, it should be noted that it is summarized not from any Liberal newspaper but from the notoriously Radical *Bulletin*.) And "it" in almost every case mentioned above means the present leader, Mr Holman, a man as able as Mr Watt and as autocratic by nature, but more tactful, and tempered by at least two colleagues of similar ability.

All these demerits in the end affected the electors but little. They seem to have been entirely counterbalanced by the personality and record of the Liberal leader. In the crisis of the campaign Mr Holman, with excellent partisan judgment, sent broadcast through the country constituencies packets of printed slips to be pasted on every available fence and tree, containing the one word "Wadeism." That was his real answer to all the charges except that of extravagance—"whatever we have done or been, would you rather be governed by Mr Wade?" Mr Wade is an honest, highminded, intensely sincere politician—but he stands for dullness, for "lack of imagination," as an Anglican bishop said the other day. And dullness is fatal in Australia. As for the charge of extravagance, its usefulness in an electioneering campaign depends rather on the nature than on the amount of the alleged over-expenditure. The mass of the voters knows nothing of the natural history of the loan-market, and is apt to regard taxation as something the other man pays; if a Minister promises large developmental expenditure, with its obvious corollary of increased demand for labour, he scores many points over an opponent who can only prognosticate increased taxation and advise judicious retrenchment. It was, indeed, a notable feature of the late elections that the Minister for Works, who was

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responsible for most of the huge borrowing of late years, handsomely defeated, in a suburban constituency which he contested for the first time, the popular member of the Opposition who had previously represented it.

So Labour is firmly seated in power in New South Wales for another three years. What it will do is past guessing; of the two able and on the whole moderate Labour politicians whose inclusion made many people optimistic about the McGowen Ministry three years ago, Mr Beeby has left the party and Mr Carmichael is said to be leaving the Cabinet, while the extremist section of the Labour voters has gained strength in the interim. Unfortunately, too, nearly all the "independent" candidates whose views more or less coincided with those of the unrepresented Progressive electors have been defeated, and the new Parliament will be as strictly representative of the party machines as the last was. The public works already promised or begun will cost every penny the State can raise, either from taxation or loans, and, while there is justification for nearly all of them from the developmental point of view—for the State suffers much from under-development—it will soon become impossible for the present population to bear the increasing burden. In steady immigration lies the only hope of lasting solvency; and Mr Holman's record in the matter of immigration is a poor one.

In the Federal sphere, where the proportion of Progressives to Socialists within the Labour party is higher than in any State, and the numbers under the two-party system are practically equal, the spring session has produced even less result than was expected. The first half of it was used solely in manœuvring for position. When the Government in the second half sat down to serious work, it was nearly always able to command a majority without depending on the Speaker's vote—partly because discipline was slack in the Labour ranks, partly because of the sudden and most regrettable deaths of the two most brilliant among the younger Labour members, Charles Frazer and Ernest

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Roberts. The latter, indeed, died actually in harness, struck down by heart-failure at the foot of Queen Victoria's statue in the Queen's Hall, on his way from the House to the Library; and his death is further evidence of the overstrain imposed on members who take their parliamentary work seriously, of which the deaths of Mr Kingston, Sir Frederick Holder and Mr Batchelor and the breakdown of Mr Deakin and so many others have already afforded indubitable proof.

No Ministerial majority in the Representatives, however, could compensate during this session for the huge (29-7) Opposition majority in the Senate; and it was the Government's intention to force through the Lower House two Bills which the Senate was sure to reject, thus commencing the process by which, under section 57 of the Constitution, a complete dissolution of both Houses simultaneously may be brought about. The chosen Bills were an Electoral Bill full of controversial proposals, of which the restoration of the system of "postal" voting was one, and a Bill prohibiting the grant of preference to Unionists in the distribution of employment on public works. The cumbrousness of the first Bill, however, by giving opportunity for unlimited obstruction defeated its own end, and Mr Cook was forced to abandon it in favour of a two-clause Bill merely restoring the old system of postal voting, which the last Parliament had annulled. The second Bill was a two-clause Bill from the first. Both now passed the Lower House; the Senate rejected the second, and altered the methods prescribed in the first, while accepting the "postal" principle for sick and infirm voters. Nominally this action has set clause 57 to work; if three months hence the same Bills are again passed by the Representatives and treated in the same way by the Senate, the Governor-General may ordain a double dissolution. But the dissolving power is one of the very few which the Governor-General exercises on his own responsibility, not necessarily accepting the advice of his Ministers; and the Opposition believes that he would hesitate to inflict

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a big election campaign on the country for the sake of two small Bills, one of which is mainly formal (since the Ministry has already prohibited preference to Unionists by administrative action), while the dispute about the other is reduced to a question of detail. Moreover, the results of the New South Wales elections, and the dissensions among Victorian Liberals have made many Federal Ministerialists less eager than they were to risk a new election campaign.

The Referenda, rejected at the last general election, were re-introduced into the Senate, in pursuance of the declared intention of the Labour Party to submit them again to the country at the earliest opportunity, and, of course, obtained without difficulty the necessary "absolute majority" of the Senate. Equally of course, they were rejected by the House, but the deadlock provisions applicable to an amendment of the Constitution provide that, on a second rejection, amendments which have been twice passed by one House "may" be submitted to the electors by the Governor-General. In this matter, however, the Governor-General would act on the advice of Ministers, and it may be taken that Ministers, so long as they are kept in office by the House of Representatives, would not allow the amendments to be submitted against their own judgment.

The real work of the session has been the routine work of providing supply. And that, just because in the ordinary course of routine it has expanded so fast, needs a new section for its discussion.

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II. FINANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND IMMIGRATION

SIR JOHN FORREST proposed to spend during the financial year (July 1, 1913 to June 30, 1914) twenty-four millions of revenue and savings and three millions of borrowed money. To avoid confusion, it must be explained at once that the Commonwealth for the present borrows only from its own trust-funds, mainly the proceeds of the note-issue over and above the statutory reserve. Also, since the Appropriation Act was not passed till the year was half over, and expenditure up to that time could only be on the base of last year's accounts, it is practically impossible that the whole sum voted should be actually spent. But we can only take the accounts as the Treasurer gave them out.

Of the borrowed money about half is allotted to the Western Transcontinental Railway, nearly half a million to the development of the Northern Territory, and the rest to meet the cost of permanent public works, mainly for the Post Office. £300,000 was set aside by the Treasurer for permanent works for the Defence Department; but the Senate, maintaining the Labour principle of debiting all defence expenditure to revenue, dropped that item from the Loan Bill, and the cost has been transferred as it wished.

Of the twenty-four millions, more than six go to the States, more than three to meet the cost of the old-age pension system (which has increased by 50 per cent in the last two years), and nearly seven in Post Office current expenditure—almost the whole of this, however, is recouped. Another four millions is set down for expenditure on permanent works; defence works, including the building of the squadron, account for over two and a half millions of this, practically exhausting the savings of previous years. Omitting these savings, and writing off all recouped Post Office expenditure, the year's accounts may be thus summarized:

Finance, Development and Immigration

<i>Revenue</i> (in millions).	<i>Expenditure</i> (in millions).
Customs and Excise 15	To the States . . . 6 $\frac{1}{4}$
Land tax . . . 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	Old Age Pensions . . 3 $\frac{1}{4}$
Miscellaneous . . . $\frac{1}{2}$	Current defence . . . 2 $\frac{3}{4}$
	Post Office deficit . . . $\frac{1}{4}$
	Other current: . . . 3
	<hr/> 15 $\frac{1}{2}$
	New works, chiefly
	for Post Office . . . 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
	<hr/> 17
<hr/> 17	
(Savings, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$, Balancing Defence works, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$)	

Now there are less than five million people in the Commonwealth; so that each inhabitant contributes more than £3 in customs duties and nearly 6s. in land tax towards the Federal revenue, of which 25s. goes at once into State Treasuries. Of the remaining £2 or so 13s. 7d. goes to pay pensions—a continually increasing drain—12s. 6d. is absorbed in ordinary current expenditure, and less than £1 is left to cover the total cost of defence, which is this year well over that sum and will increase for many years yet. (This year's deficit, as already mentioned, has been met by using savings, which will not be available in future.)

The situation is sufficiently serious. No Treasurer dares suggest a lowering of pensions, and none can save much on the ordinary current expenditure. Increased taxation is hardly likely, partly because Liberal Ministries pride themselves on reducing taxation where possible, partly because several States are looking forward to tapping that source of revenue. One of two things must be done: either the cost of defence must be cut down, or the population must be increased at least as rapidly as the rate of expenditure—which means much more rapidly than at present.

There are signs, unfortunately, that too large a section of the Parliament has hankerings after the first course. Labour,

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it must be remembered, acts unanimously on many occasions when it does not think unanimously. The defence policy of the late Government was supported by the votes of quite a few followers who disliked it intensely. If their party was in office, they would be compelled to support it again; in Opposition, they express their feelings more unguardedly. On the Liberal side, too, there are members who have never cordially accepted their leaders' decision to maintain the Kitchener and Henderson schemes. And the two sets of dissentients together make up a body capable of putting pressure on any Ministry not absolutely determined to put the schemes through. The Minister for Defence, Senator Millen, is whole-hearted in the matter; he sees the danger, too, and is scrutinizing with the utmost care every item of his estimates in the hope of making appreciable savings without damaging the schemes; but the dissentients are querulous, and that influential journal, the *Age*, is echoing their cry; in other respects also the machinery of the Department is not running smoothly; so that every one interested in defence politics is fidgety and apprehensive.

In these circumstances it is more than ever urgent that the confused and inadequate systems—or lack of systems—by which the six States expensively attract a few immigrants should be revised and co-ordinated into some thorough Federal scheme. A great deal has been written about Australian immigration, but the main defects of the present arrangement are easily defined, and in reality not very difficult to remedy. The machinery, through sextuplication, is unnecessarily costly; neither of the two great parties has, as a whole, begun to realize the vital importance of immigration, and State policies are therefore discontinuous and often petty; official efforts are usually confined to attracting one class of immigrant, the “expert agricultural labourer,” who is daily becoming more difficult to find; and the voluntary immigrant, the man who pays his own passage-money, or brings his family with him, or arrives with a little capital which he hopes to invest in a small Australian farm, is not

Finance, Development and Immigration

only neglected, but often harassed with official red-tape and insufficiently guarded, or even warned against private hardships of a quite unnecessary kind. Perhaps all these defects are in the last resort reducible to one—the Australian public has not yet really understood how *essential* it is, not only to the welfare of individuals, but to the continued existence of the Commonwealth as such, that population should be brought in. The advocate of immigration on a large scale has to appeal to different sections of the community by different arguments—to the farmer by reminding him how scarce labour is just when he needs it, to the rich, by pointing out that the immigrant small farmer usually votes for Liberals,* to the politician by explaining the virtue of a sound immigration policy as a party cry. He can raise applause on a platform by his advocacy, but he cannot either raise funds for the private encouragement of his cause or arouse enough public feeling against neglectful Governments to force them into more strenuous or better-planned action.

Consequently State Governments play with the notion as they please, and usually discourage private enterprise—which is not unwilling to be so discouraged. The other day an appeal was made in the columns of the *Sydney Morning Herald* for a sum of £650, required to help immigrants already in employment here to bring out their families; this amount was to be not altogether a gift, as experience shows that quite 90 per cent of such sums are repaid by the beneficiary. In the richest city in Australia, full of men who are perpetually crying out for immigrants, the response was £10 16s. The trouble was that the immigrants had been told when they left England, that they could obtain certain terms from the State Government for bringing out their families, and in the interim those terms had been considerably

* This has just been strikingly exemplified. A few weeks ago the promoters of a scheme for land-settlement in New South Wales were vainly endeavouring to interest in their proposals the principal bankers and merchants of Sydney. Labour has won the elections—and the merchants are now chasing the promoters with offers to support their scheme.

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increased. In the end an appeal was made to the Prime Minister, who told Parliament that he was inclined to advance the money; and the State Government, shamed by this publicity, then agreed to keep to its original bargain.

The New South Wales Government is usually the greatest offender in these respects; but none are free from blame, either as regards lack of co-operation or discontinuity of method. One sorely-needed practical reform was advocated as long ago as 1908 by Mr Deakin, and has since been accepted in principle by all succeeding Federal Governments, and rejected by nearly all State Governments—the establishment of the Federal authority as the sole immigration agency in Britain, the States making annual requisitions on it for the number and kind of immigrants they desire; in this way the demand could be steadied and made regular, and long-term contracts could be safely entered into with the shipping companies. But the only lasting reform must be one that goes behind all practical details, and awakens the intelligence of the Australian people to understand that they need immigrants, not the immigrants them—that instead of doing the Englishman a favour by letting him come to Australia, they must take up whole-heartedly, as Canada does, the work of inducing him to come here.

III. THE COST OF LIVING

THE slackness, and the misguidedness, of our immigration politics have their effect also on the cost of living in Australia, into which inquiries of various kinds have been made in several States this year. The judge of the Federal Arbitration Court is perpetually engaged in such inquiries, since on them he has to base his awards of the "minimum wage." Judge Heydon, of the New South Wales Industrial Court, has undertaken a parallel inquiry of his own. The Commonwealth *Statistician* contributes periodical

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pamphlets to the discussion. And the various Governments and Parliaments, more especially the Federal and those of New South Wales, have attacked the same problem directly or indirectly through Select Committees and Royal Commissions on housing, house-rents, and the manufacture and distribution of various food-stuffs.

The increase in the cost of living during the past few years is, of course, a world-wide phenomenon; but the Australian side of it presents some noteworthy features. Judge Higgins, for instance, in an investigation which covered the mining districts of south-eastern Australia, classified them into four divisions as follows:

- (1) Up-country districts, e.g. Omeo in Victoria and New England in New South Wales;
- (2) Sydney, Newcastle, South Australia, western Victoria, and the west coast of Tasmania;
- (3) Melbourne, and Launceston (Tas.);
- (4) Ballarat, Bendigo and eastern Tasmania.

Division 1 was rated 1s. a day higher than 2; the difference between the others was rather less. Apart from the distinction between Sydney and Melbourne, to which we must return, the other differences are mainly accounted for by the distance over which food-stuffs of the simpler kind had to be carried. Ballarat and Bendigo are mining towns closely surrounded by small farms; Newcastle, the South Australian mining districts and the Tasmanian west coast are much further away from their supplies—except that Newcastle has dairies in the immediate neighbourhood. To some extent the same factor has weight as between Sydney and Melbourne; most of Sydney's food-stuffs have to be brought further and over more difficult country. But in the case of Sydney—which, says the *Commonwealth Statistician*, has been more expensive to live in than Melbourne since 1901 by from 5 to 14½ per cent—two other factors operate gravely. The residential area has grown hugely since Federation, owing to the establishment of manufactures in what was before that time mainly an importers' town, and

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because until quite recently State policy was centred on dragging to Sydney the whole commerce of the State. Consequently large suburban areas which used to be devoted to market-gardening have been built over, while for some reason new areas have not been opened up in their place. And in spite of this huge expansion the population has grown still faster, so that the demand for small dwelling-houses has far exceeded the supply, and rents have gone up alarmingly. (It must be remembered that the climate and the habits of the people practically preclude life in tenements or terraces, wherefore the ground-area occupied by each resident is exceptionally large.) During 1913 well over £7,000,000 has been spent on buildings—a million and a half or so by public bodies, a similar amount by private persons in the city area, and more than four millions by private persons in the suburbs: in 1912 six and a quarter millions was so spent: and yet rents went up in those two years by from 25 to 80 per cent in many suburbs, while in the city they often doubled. According to the Commonwealth *Statistician* rents in Sydney are about 25 per cent higher all round than in Melbourne.

While immigration to and settlement in the up-country farmlands go on at their present snail's pace, and while the class of immigrant chiefly brought in drifts back so steadily to the cities, this rise in rents and food-prices is bound to continue. However, it is not intended here to summarize or to discuss the results of the various inquiries already mentioned, but rather to call attention to their existence, which is the more notable because for far too many years Australian Governments have been content with purely empiric legislation and administration. Even the gigantic and all-important task of federating the six colonies was undertaken without any such careful precedent inquiry as distinguished the creation of the Union of South Africa. But when the federation campaign was just over, three notable Commissions were set on foot—one by New South Wales to examine the case for old-age pensions, another by the same State and

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one by Victoria to recommend improvements in the local education system. The valuable results of these three, and the gradual assumption by various Governments of the right to determine wages by judicial action of some sort (which involved detailed inquiries of a public nature), stimulated the growing habit of basing legislation on research, and the latest crop of Commission results is distinctly encouraging. Two deserve special mention—the careful report on housing and town-planning prepared by Professor Irvine, of the University of Sydney, and the series of reports on food supplies and prices still being issued by Mr T. R. Bavin.

Australia. January, 1914.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE INDIAN QUESTION BEFORE UNION

THINGS move quickly in South Africa. In December the strike of Indians in Natal, the organized march of a thousand of them into the Transvaal in defiance of the immigration laws, and the conflicts with the forces of the State which followed, involving loss of life and property, appeared to have opened a new chapter in the history of the relations between the Government and the people of India on the one side and the self governing dominions of the Empire on the other, wherein all the resources of statesmanship would be taxed to find a satisfactory solution. In January a general strike of European workers, called by the Federation of Trade Unions in support of a strike of the railway servants, ranged the whole community on one side or the other of a domestic dispute. In this the Government was fighting with all the forces at its disposal against the efforts of a small body of men, controlling nominally the whole body of organized labour, to extort by means of the general strike compliance with certain demands, as to the reasonableness of which there was wide difference of opinion. One nail, according to the Greek proverb, drives out another, and the perplexities of the Indian question have for the moment been lost sight of. It is, however, a question fraught with difficulties and dangers not only for South Africa but for the whole Empire. It has not been settled, but only overlaid for the moment by the more urgent matters of the day.

In order to understand the present trouble it is necessary

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to go back to the state of affairs existing in the Transvaal just after the war, when the people who had fled from the country on the outbreak of war were returning, and others were coming in to try their luck under the new condition. The British Government had not given any undertaking in the terms of peace as to the restriction of Asiatic immigration. In view, however, of the strong sentiment held by both the European races against Asiatic immigration on any extensive scale and of the anticipation that the Crown Colony form of Government, which was established after the war, would soon give place to a responsible government, it was decided only to allow Asiatics to come into the Transvaal who had actually been settled there before the war. This policy, it was thought, would respect the rights of the Indians who had been in the country before the war on whose behalf the British Government had frequently put pressure on the Transvaal Republic, and, at the same time, would leave the incoming responsible government free to deal with the question of what restrictions, if any, were to be placed on Asiatic immigration for the future. The legislative machinery for giving effect to this policy was found in the Peace Preservation Ordinance, which was passed just after the war, and which empowered the Government to prohibit anyone from entering the new colony except under permit. As the country settled down this restriction was in practice allowed to fall into abeyance as regards Europeans, but it was maintained in regard to Asiatics in order to carry out the policy above mentioned. In the case of the Orange River Colony no such policy was necessary. There the Republican Government had before the war put on the statute book and enforced a law excluding Asiatics altogether by name from entering and settling in the State, and that law remained and still remains in operation.

The Transvaal Government, however, was very soon confronted with the difficulty of determining between applications for permits to enter the country made by Indians

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who had genuinely been resident before the war, and those made by new-comers, who either personated previous residents, or supported their applications by affidavits as to previous residence which it was difficult either to accept or reject. The Transvaal, owing to the opportunities which it offered of lucrative trade with the natives, was the great centre of attraction to a certain class of Asiatics. Loud complaints were constantly raised by the European trading communities, more especially in the country towns, of a large influx of Asiatics, which was strongly controverted by the leaders of the Indian community. The actual figures, so far as any trustworthy figures could be obtained, did not disclose any serious increase in the Asiatic population, but at the same time there is no doubt that the Indian trader, especially in the country towns, was much more in evidence than before, and was rapidly gaining ground over the European storekeeper. One object lesson in this process—and there were several—was of more weight in the minds of the people than any statistics which could be produced by the immigration office. Besides, the Transvaal had then no control over the ports, whether those of the British colonies or of the Portuguese Province, and immigrants coming from these ports, or from the large Indian population resident in Natal, had only a land frontier between them and the Transvaal. This added to the general sense of insecurity, and brought a demand for more stringent legislation.

Before dealing further with this stage of the question it is necessary to describe the position in Natal. Until the recent troubles there the Indian population of Natal had been uniformly peaceful and apparently contented. The Transvaal had always been the storm centre of Indian trouble. It was, however, the presence of the Indians in such large numbers in Natal that gave much of its significance to the agitation in the Transvaal. Without them the numbers elsewhere would not have justified any apprehension on the part of the European people, so long as immigration could be prevented or materially restricted.

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The Indians in Natal have for the most part come there not as individual immigrants but in pursuance of a definite policy of providing labour for the sugar fields of Natal. The Indian labourer was brought in under indenture bound to work out his contract under the penalties of the criminal law. He was a cleverer and more industrious worker than the native. He was cheap and his wants were few. No wonder that the Natal sugar planter should have looked to the Indian coolie as specially designed to provide the labour which he required. There was only one blot on the scheme. The Indian showed a tendency when he had served his term of indenture to stay on in Natal as a free man, whereas the planter's idea was that he should either re-indenture or go back to India. Natal did not want the Indians, but only their labour, and accordingly from time to time efforts were made to secure that those who did not re-indenture should perforce be returned to India. The Government of India, however, has consistently set its face against this, and, as the controllers of the sugar industry and the coal mines and other industries which were springing up in Natal on the basis of the imported labour were persuaded that they could not dispense with the Indian immigrant, the Natal Government was driven to look for expedients which, while not making it obligatory on the Indian to return on the expiration of his indenture, would yet put some pressure on him to do so.

This was the origin of the £3 tax, of which so much has been heard lately. By an Act passed in 1895 (No. 17 of 1895) it was provided that the indenture to be entered into by the immigrant should contain a clause by which he undertook at the expiration of his contract either to return to India or to remain under indentures. If he failed to carry out this part of the contract, and remained in Natal unindentured, he was required to take out a yearly pass or licence at a cost of £3. In 1903 an amending Act was passed by which the children of the indentured immigrant, whether born before or after his arrival in Natal, were made subject to the

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necessity of going to India or of serving under indenture in Natal, or in the alternative of taking out the annual pass or licence and paying the tax of £3. The Act did not apply to children who had reached the age of sixteen in the case of boys and thirteen in the case of girls before it took effect, or to the grandchildren or later descendants of the indentured man. This is the legal scope of the £3 tax. In practice its collection has been perfunctory.

Shortly after the establishment of the Union the Indian Government, being dissatisfied with the opportunities permitted to Indian immigrants to settle in the country after the expiration of their indentures, refused to allow any further recruiting of indentured labourers, and the supply is therefore stopped. There has not been the collapse in the industrial fabric of Natal which was always foretold as the result of any attempt to restrict the supply of cheap indentured Indians. The sugar industry has been passing through a time of unexampled prosperity. At present (census of 1911) the Indian population of Natal numbers upwards of 130,000 of which probably from 20,000 to 30,000 have been born in the country.

The first attempt at legislation on the part of the Government of the Transvaal, with the object of restricting Asiatic immigration, took the form of a registration law, which was passed by the nominated legislative council in 1906. The Imperial Government refused assent, on the ground that responsible government was about to be instituted, and that the new elective parliament should be left to deal with so difficult a question. One of the first acts of the new parliament after the grant of responsible government in 1907 was to pass a law in identical terms with that which had been passed by the Crown Colony legislature, and it thereupon received the Royal assent. The fact is that any Government, which endeavoured to restrict in any way the entrance of Asiatics into the Transvaal, with no control of the ports, and with open land frontiers on almost all sides, was bound to fall back on a system of registration as the only means of

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ensuring an effective check. Registration of course implies identification, and that, in the case of an Asiatic population such as we have here, meant a system of finger prints. Accordingly the Act required all Asiatics resident in the Transvaal to be registered, and to carry certificates of registration marked with their finger impressions. The enforcement of this Act met with strong opposition on the part of the Asiatic community culminating in the so-called passive resistance movement. The prisons were filled to overflowing with Indians who refused to register, and strong appeals were made to the sympathies of the British, and still more the Indian public, supported by allegations of maltreatment, some of which were well founded, but in all of which the facts were carefully presented or distorted so as to inflame the passions of the Indian peoples. This agitation marked in two respects a definite stage in the relations of the Indians in South Africa to the Government and the European community. It brought forward a leader and an organization, and it definitely connected the agitation of Indians here with that which is making itself felt in India for fuller political rights.

Several attempts were made by the Government with the assistance of the leaders of the Opposition in the Transvaal Parliament to arrive at an amicable settlement with the Indian leaders. One of these appeared to have succeeded. The Government agreed to certain concessions asked for by the Indian leaders, and they on their part advised their people to comply with the requirements of the law as to registration and all but a few did so. Afterwards, however, Mr Gandhi on behalf of the Indians repudiated the agreement, on the ground that the Government had not fulfilled its undertaking, and he now definitely put forward the demand for equal treatment under the Immigration law for Asiatics with Europeans, i.e., that they should not be excluded by name, or as Asiatics, but should be subject to the same tests, educational or other, as Europeans.

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II. THE INDIAN QUESTION TO-DAY

WITH the advent of Union the question of a general law regulating immigration had to be dealt with, and the Government was desirous of framing it so as to avoid, if possible, another conflict with the Indians here. The Imperial Government was equally anxious to secure a peaceful settlement of the question, having learned by bitter experience the extent to which the grievances of British Indians in South Africa were used to spread disaffection in India. It seemed as if there should be no insuperable difficulty in the way of such a settlement. The Indian leaders here (and in this they were strengthened by the advice of Mr Gokhale when he visited the country), recognized that they must, for the present at least, yield to the overwhelming weight of public opinion in South Africa against any further Asiatic immigration. All they asked was that Asiatics should not be excluded by name. Subject to this they were willing to see tests of so elastic a nature that the Government would be able in practice to exclude Asiatics, provided a certain limited number were admitted to serve the needs of the Asiatic community as priests or professional men. They asked, however, as a condition of this, that the Indians lawfully resident in South Africa should be fairly and reasonably treated. This of course covers a number of claims which have been or might be put forward on behalf of the Indian community, varying in importance from the abolition of the special tax levied on certain Indians in Natal (which has already been explained), to the claim for full political and civil rights, which has never been formally put forward by them, but which, on the other hand, has never been renounced. No definite list of claims or grievances was formulated, and all the discussions which took place, even when Mr Gokhale was here, were informal, but by a sort of tacit agreement questions such as that of equality

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in respect of political rights and the right to hold land, were left in the background, and attention was confined to less contentious matters, such as the abolition of the special tax in Natal, the removal of obstacles in the way of obtaining trading and hawking licences by Indians, the more sympathetic administration of immigration laws, the provision in the new immigration law of an appeal from the decision of immigration officers, the admission of wives of Indians who have settled here, notwithstanding that they had been married under rites admitting of polygamy and therefore not recognized by the law of the Union as constituting a legal marriage.

As regards the special tax in Natal the Government had expressed themselves in terms which were generally understood as indicating that they intended to repeal it, though no definite promise was given. The question of the admission of wives is a more complicated one. It really involves the recognition of non-Christian Indian marriages as legally valid. The Indian leaders have at various times professed that they would be satisfied if provision were made in the law for the admission of a wife in cases where the Indian resident here, though married under a law which allows him to have more wives than one, yet announces his intention of being in fact monogamous. Such an arrangement, however, would in practice be unworkable, and either would be abandoned or would lead (as it is intended to lead) to the legal recognition of Indian marriages.

The Immigration Bill ultimately became law after various amendments had been accepted by the Government, which met some of the criticism directed against it in its original form by the Indian community. An appeal was allowed on questions of law from immigration officers. Amendments were accepted safeguarding the existing rights of Indians registered under the Transvaal law and also preserving the right of admission into the Cape Province existing under the previous law, though it is contended by the Indian leaders that this right is even now not fully secured and

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depends on the administration of the Act. On the point of the admission of wives the Government accepted an amendment allowing the admission of a wife "by a monogamous marriage." It was clear, when the amendment was moved and accepted, that if a court of law was asked to interpret these words, it was most unlikely that they would be construed as applicable to a marriage which was monogamous only at the will of the parties. It was thought, however, as the Government had accepted the amendment—presumably with the object of meeting the claim put forward by the Indians—that it at any rate would not seek a decision of the courts on the interpretation of the words. This anticipation, however, was not realized, for very soon after the passing of the new Act a case was brought before the Court in Natal, at the instance of the Government immigration officers, contesting the right of a "wife" to come in under this description, and the decision, as was expected, was adverse to the claim.

The policy of the Government in regard to the £3 tax was equally calculated to provide material for raising disaffection among the Indians. As has been already stated the Government, if not bound by a formal promise to remove the tax, had, at any rate, let it be understood that there was no serious obstacle in the way of its removal. When parliament met, however, it appeared that a majority of the Natal members were opposed to its removal, and the Government, which at present enjoys the support of the members most closely interested in the sugar industry, decided to leave things as they were. These two questions (the admission of wives and the repeal of the £3 tax) were the main points on which, after the passing of the Immigration Act, Mr Gandhi set himself to rouse the resistance of the Indian community. Natal was selected as the scene of his chief activity. A strike was declared of Indian labourers employed on the sugar estates and the coal mines, and upwards of 1,000 of them were started on a march into the Transvaal, as a protest against the provisions of the Immigration Act,

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which maintained the old inter-colonial barriers against Asiatic immigration. The "marchers" were stopped and taken back without any serious violence, but, in one or two places where the Indians were on strike, there were disturbances which were not suppressed without loss of life. The Indian leaders, including Mr Gandhi, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for their share in the breaches of the Immigration Law, and, after order had been restored, the Government appointed a Commission to inquire into the causes of the strike and disturbances, the use of force in restoring order and the alleged maltreatment of Indians and to make any recommendations on any of these matters. The Commission, immediately on its appointment, recommended the release of Mr Gandhi and the other leaders of the Indian community, in order that they might be able to put their case forward, and this recommendation was at once acted upon by the Government. No sooner was Mr Gandhi at liberty, however, than he repudiated the Commission, on the ground that the Indian community had not been consulted as to its constitution, and that two of the members were not impartial. He announced that the Indian community would give no assistance to it in its work, and present no evidence before it. He also announced that a second march on the Transvaal was to be ordered for the first days of the new year, but this was subsequently postponed. Then there came the strike of railwaymen throughout the Union, followed by a sympathetic general strike in the Transvaal, and Mr Gandhi declared that he would suspend further operations whilst these disturbances were going on, so as not to embarrass the Government by too many troubles at once. When the strike came to an end, an exchange of letters took place between Mr Gandhi and the Government in which the former repeated his objections to any Indians appearing before the Commission, or to any evidence being put forward in support of the allegations of maltreatment, harrowing accounts of which had been spread broadcast both in England and in India at the time. The

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Government has strenuously denied these allegations. It has appointed a judicial commission consisting of a Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and two eminent members of the legal profession and courts the fullest inquiry before that tribunal. The complainants, however, refuse to appear unless the Indian community is consulted or represented in the appointment of the Commission, and with this demand the Government refuses to comply. Mr Gandhi undertakes, while holding aloof from the Commission, to abstain from any so-called "passive resistance" movement until the Commission has issued its report. He also recapitulates the "points on which relief has been sought." Two of these require legislative changes, viz., the abolition of the £3 tax in Natal and the recognition of the wives of immigrants. The others are administrative matters, viz., the administration of the Immigration Act so as to secure (a) that Indians, who under the former law could enter the Cape Province, should not be debarred under the more stringent provisions of the new Act; and (b) that Indians who may be admitted on special qualifications should not be excluded from entering the Free State Province, in spite of the retention of the old law of that province forbidding the settlement of Asiatics; and the administration of existing laws affecting Asiatics, with due regard to vested rights.*

* The Report of the Commission was published on March 17. It recommended unanimously that the £3 licence should be abolished, the marriage grievance met by new regulations, and various administrative irritations under the Immigrants Exclusion Act removed. The Viceroy, speaking in the Legislative Council at Delhi on the same day, declared these recommendations to be satisfactory, and they have been well received by the public in India.

The Real Issue

III. THE REAL ISSUE.

THESE points, it will be noticed, are described as "points on which relief has been sought." If they were the only "points" that stood between us and a peaceful settlement of the question of the position of the Indian population in South Africa, the problem would be an easy one. But behind these is the claim of the Indians as British subjects to move freely throughout the Empire. In South Africa their spokesmen carefully keep that claim in the background. They know that, in the present state of South African opinion, it would be disastrous to fight on that issue. But they do not give it up. Sir M. Bhownaggee, speaking as one of a deputation to the Secretary of State on the subject of the recent troubles in Natal on the 1st December last, put forward certain "claims which the people of India had a clear right to submit to the Crown as its loyal subjects." These claims were:

1. The release of the passive resisters and strikers now in prison.
2. The amendment of the Immigration Act to remove the racial bar, the refusal of domiciliary and existing rights and the repeal of legislation which offends against the religious and marital status of the people of India.
3. The abolition of the poll tax.
4. The institution of a thorough inquiry into the responsibility resting on both parties, the Indian and the Colonial, for recent events, by a tribunal with adequate Indian representation.
5. The adoption ultimately of such measures by the Crown as shall secure to British Indians throughout the Empire the rights of citizenship, which have been guaranteed to them by the solemn pledge of the Crown.

In numbers 2 and 5 what may be called the ultimate objects of the Indians here are clearly and frankly stated.

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In South Africa, however, just as they do not at present ask for the removal of racial distinctions in the administration of the immigration law, so they do not put forward, and even disclaim, any demand at present for the rights of citizenship. They ask at present for "recognition," that is, the right of the Indian community to be formally consulted before any step is taken by Government affecting their interests. It is the policy of the leaders not to summon their hosts to action on a cry which will range European sympathies against them. When they proclaim war against the State, or as they call it, go into passive resistance, it is on one of the less contentious items of the list—the humiliation of giving finger prints, the £3 tax, or the non-recognition of their marriages, which is represented as a slur on the reputation of their women. Unluckily the colour prejudice of the people here, and the unsympathetic administration of laws made primarily in the interests of the European population, seldom fail to furnish them with a call which brings their people together, teaches them organization and sacrifice for a common object and as a rule leads to a "settlement" which leaves them, in some respects at any rate, better off than before. And if, behind all this, is the aspiration after the higher objects mentioned before, it is not merely the aspiration of a few idealists but the demand of a people, civilized and educated so far as their opportunities allow, who have made South Africa their home or who have been born there. It is time for us to recognize this, and to consider what our answer to it is to be. We have seen the bonds of Imperial union drawn closer by consideration of the needs of common defence against external aggression. Conferences of ministers of self governing dominions meet regularly, at which this question, as a rule, overshadows all others. Perhaps, now that the conference habit is established, it would be useful to seek common counsel on this question of the relations of the European and coloured races in the self-governing dominions of the Empire, if thereby some common tradition may be built up under which both may find room

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for growth in freedom and peace. Without that there is the danger always present that ignorance and prejudice will use their natural weapon of undistinguishing repression and sow thereby a crop of bitterness and strife, dangerous to the unity of the Empire as it now stands.

South Africa. February, 1914.

NEW ZEALAND

THE GREAT STRIKE

THE most remarkable event in the history of New Zealand for 1913 was the strike which occupied approximately the last two months of the year. Except for the maritime strike of 1890, which changed the face of New Zealand politics by instituting the Liberal-Labour regime, the history of the Dominion supplies no comparable experience. But the struggle through which we have just passed, though it is not likely to produce equally momentous consequences, was intrinsically of greater gravity, owing to the immense advance which the organization and ambitions of Labour have made in the interval, and in particular to the ascendancy which revolutionary doctrines have recently acquired in the counsels of the party. In this respect the great Brisbane strike of 1912 (which was fully described in *THE ROUND TABLE* for June, 1912) presents a closer parallel. Each represented a deliberate attempt on the part of a large section of organized labour to dictate to the State by means of a general strike, and in both cases the State had to summon special forces to its aid before the attack upon its authority could be repelled.

In New Zealand, as in Queensland, the levy was not on the military basis which was shortly afterwards to be applied to a similar crisis in South Africa. The Government invited the citizens to enrol as special constables, and the peculiarly impressive and picturesque feature of the

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struggle was the enthusiastic response which the appeal drew from the country districts. The instruction provided by the experience of Brisbane was on this point followed and bettered. Both as special constables and as wharf labourers the farmers contributed the bulk of the power that reasserted the authority of the law and broke the strike. Mounted farmers guarded the wharves, and patrolled the streets while other farmers loaded and unloaded the ships which the strikers had refused to work and had forbidden others to work. A struggle which might otherwise have added another commonplace chapter to the history of the secular antagonism between capital and labour thus assumed the appearance of a battle between the farmer and the advanced guard of urban socialism. The two forces which had long been in a state of more or less veiled antagonism were brought face to face. The battle was carried to the gates with an almost Homeric directness, and the farmers won a complete and unconditional victory.

Though the revolutionaries had long been proclaiming "the paralysing of industry from the North Cape to the Bluff" as one of the objects of their policy, the great struggle was precipitated before they were ready by followers who had mastered their general teaching too well to be under specific control. January or February would have been the month selected by the leaders of the Federation for their experiment in general paralysis if they had been free to choose. It is in these months that both the exports of wool and other produce and the passenger traffic reach their maximum, and it was early in February, 1914, that the agreements under which the waterside workers and the seamen were working were to expire. There was accordingly an impression among the employers that an early date in 1914 had actually been selected by the Federation for the trial of strength. But when the forces are assembled and the fighting spirit is in the air, an accident may easily precipitate a conflict before the projected time. In the

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present case the accident was supplied by the grievance of men who took no direct part in the critical operation.

On October 18, 1913, the Wellington Shipwrights' Union struck by way of protest against the refusal by the employers of certain demands which had been presented, though not for the first time, on the previous day. The strike was unreasonable in that it was practically without notice; but the general opinion is that the strikers had substantial grounds for complaint, especially in regard to the discontinuance by the Union Steamship Company of the practice which had prevailed for nearly forty years of paying the men for the time occupied in going to and from their work at the patent slip. The change involved a loss in wages of 9d. a day. In anticipation of the strike the shipwrights had cancelled their registration as an industrial union under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and registered under the Trades Union Act as a branch of the Wellington Waterside Workers' Union—a large and powerful union affiliated to the Federation of Labour.

On October 22 the Wellington Waterside Workers' Union held a "stop-work" meeting for the purpose of considering the grievances of the shipwrights. The strike of the shipwrights was not in contravention of any award or agreement, but by holding a meeting in working hours the Waterside Union violated the fundamental clause in its agreement with the shipping companies, which provided for the continuity of work. While the meeting was being held members of the union who had stayed away from it were taken on by the employers. The union then demanded that those who attended the meeting should be reinstated in the places which they would otherwise have had, but the employers refused, though they were quite willing to give these men the next jobs that offered in ordinary rotation. The union persisted in the demand for full reinstatement and resolved that no work should be done until it was conceded. The employers retorted that

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the action of the men in stopping work and refusing to return had terminated the agreement. Before the day was out the union had formally declared a strike. On October 23 the working of the wharves by free labour was attempted, but on the following day a riotous crowd, which broke the barricade erected at the head of the main wharf, and surged past the inadequate force of police, compelled the crews and clerks engaged in the handling of cargo to desist. It was clearly impossible to proceed further until the police had been greatly strengthened. The cargoes were accordingly left untouched and the strikers' pickets, at the head of the wharf and even at the ships' sides, were allowed to say what goods might pass to and fro, and what might not. The rule that everything was contraband except passengers and their luggage was strictly enforced. For the idle ships the possibilities were considered sufficiently serious to justify their removal on October 28 to an anchorage in the stream, and except for "H.M.S. Psyche" and an occasional passenger steamer the wharves were left absolutely bare.

The successful establishment of this lawless tyranny in the chief port and capital city of the country was a strange spectacle which made even the most thoughtless think. And the fact that it remained unchallenged for ten days naturally provoked loud complaints against the inactivity of the Government. But the Government was proceeding steadily with its preparations, and by November 3 had a force of 2,000 special constables enrolled, half of which consisted of mounted men from the country. By blocking the export of butter and cheese the stoppage of the port had brought hundreds of small farmers face to face with ruin, and, following the Queensland precedent already mentioned, countrymen of all sorts and conditions volunteered for service in the streets and on the wharves. According to the Commissioner of Police, one mounted man is worth three men on foot for constabulary work. The thousand mounted men who came from their farms to the rescue of law and order in Wellington were certainly a force

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admirably qualified by courage, dash and discipline for the work, and the authorities could have doubled the number without reducing the quality, if they had thought it necessary to accept all the offers made. At first it looked as though their soldierly qualities would be severely tried. The successful assertion of mob rule on the wharves had intensified the very ugly spirit already animating the strikers and their sympathisers, and filled with high hopes the criminals and the hoodlums who find their opportunity in a time of great popular excitement. When on November 5 the force of mounted "specials" rode through the city to take possession of the wharves and clear the way for traffic, the men were assailed by an angry mob along the greater part of the route with stones and other missiles and unprintable execrations. The forethought of some miscreants had even made provision for the laming of the horses. The whole display was one of the most disgraceful ever witnessed in the capital city and brought forcibly home to many of its citizens the narrowness of the dividing line between civilization and barbarism, and the ease with which it can be crossed in a time of excitement. The slackness of some of the regular police who had been aggrieved by the recent refusal of the Minister of Justice to permit them to form a union, also suggested that the Government would have been very unwise to attempt to defy the mob with the small force which alone was at its disposal until the "specials" had been mustered.

Previously to this march of the mounted men there had been several serious conflicts between the police and the mob, in which firearms were occasionally used by the latter, but without serious results. And on the following day, when the way to the wharves had again to be cleared in order that the working of cargoes should begin in earnest, there were general apprehensions of very serious trouble. But a better tactical disposition of the force and a knowledge that the prohibition against retaliation had been removed combined to falsify these fears. The display of organized force had so

Intervention of the Farmers

effectively done its work that the actual exercise of force proved to be unnecessary. The Strike Committee's ten days' reign was at an end, and except for occasional assaults upon isolated "specials," who shared equally with "scabs" the bitter hostility of the strike leaders and the mob, and much intimidation of strikers anxious to return to work and of others desirous of taking the vacant places, the King's writ has run without challenge upon the wharves and in other parts of the city ever since.

The authority of the law, which was temporarily in abeyance, has since asserted itself effectively by the prosecution and conviction of a large number of offenders. Among these were six of the strike leaders, whose arrest on November 11 and 12 was one of the most impressive events of the struggle. After an interval exceeding a fortnight in each case, five of them were bound over to keep the peace. The President of the Federation was also sentenced to three months' imprisonment for inciting resistance to the police, though released on bail pending appeal, and with others was committed for trial for the indictable offence of seditious language.

II. INTERVENTION OF THE FARMERS

THE activity of the farmers did not stop short at the policing of the wharves and the streets. They also set to work as wharf labourers to load and unload the ships. The employers astutely decided to have no free labour, and a new Waterside Workers' Union was accordingly formed and registered under the Arbitration Act. The seventy original members of this union were practically all either farmers or farm labourers. Day by day the membership increased until in five weeks the total exceeded 2,000—500 more than the membership of the union on strike. Of this total not more than 300 were repentant strikers, and the

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large majority were countrymen, of whom, however, about 300 had returned to their homes, and some 200 more had gone to sea to replace seamen and firemen who had struck. There was a dramatic and picturesque element about all that the farmers contributed to the breaking of the strike, but nothing that they did was more effective or produced a profounder impression than this. The prophecy of the strike leaders that the farmers might load the steamers with produce but could never get them away from the wharf seemed a likely one when it was made. But when after the "Opawa" had been loaded by farmers at Auckland and Wellington her departure for London was delayed by the strike of fourteen of her firemen, nearly all the vacancies were promptly filled by farmers. Nor was this an isolated instance. The Union Company was frequently able to draw upon the new Waterside Union in Wellington to fill gaps in its crews; and of the Seamen's Union formed in Auckland under the Arbitration Act to man the coastal steamers abandoned by the strikers, the Secretary reported that the first 200 members were mostly farmers and farm labourers. Such enterprise and versatility on the part of the agricultural community had been as little expected by the public as by the strike leaders, and probably surprised the farmers themselves. Though New Zealand is essentially the country of small farmers the difficulties of organization have presented a bar to the full realization of their power. But there is nothing that succeeds like success, and this confidence and the prestige engendered by this remarkable display of strength may perhaps be far-reaching in its political and industrial effects.

It was, of course, clear from the first that if the strike was not speedily settled it was bound to spread, and might spread indefinitely. Most of the miners and watersiders of the Dominion had been affiliated to the Federation of Labour under its original constitution; the seamen were bound to sympathize; and the power of such a combination to cripple traffic and industry was obvious. Alarmed by the

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apparent imminence of the great conflict which had so long been prophesied, the public lost no opportunity of urging a peaceful settlement upon both parties. Much time was spent in conferences for this purpose. The Waterside Workers' Union had handed over the control of its case at the outset to the Federation of Labour, and the Federation accepted the responsibility, though the action of both bodies involved a breach of the Federation's new constitution, adopted less than four months before. A committee representing the employers generally undertook after a short interval a similar office for the shipping companies. Representatives of these two bodies met in conference, the Prime Minister, Mr W. F. Massey, acting as chairman during the later stages of its deliberations.

From start to finish there was no difference of opinion as to the substance of the settlement. The parties were at one in their readiness to renew the violated agreement without any alteration in the rates of pay, the hours of work or the general conditions. The whole controversy turned upon the sanctions to be provided for its enforcement. The first stipulation of the shipping companies was that the agreement should be registered under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act "in order to secure a definite guarantee that the terms of the agreement be carried out faithfully." Two of the other proposals subsequently submitted in the alternative by the companies were that the agreement should be renewed for three years with a penalty of £1,000 for stoppage of work, and that the whole matter should be submitted to Mr Justice Williams as arbitrator. All these proposals in turn were rejected by the Federation of Labour, and on October 31 when the Employers' Committee was reconstituted in a manner which purported to make it representative of the whole of the trading, producing and manufacturing interests of the Dominion, these proposals were all formally withdrawn. Two days later, however, the Federation of Labour, after a conference with representatives of many unaffiliated

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unions offered to accept an extension of the agreement with the addition of a penalty clause, both the period and the penalty being left for future determination.

As this proposal was identical in principle with one previously submitted by the employers, their acceptance of it was confidently expected. Their rejection of the proposal meant war to the knife, but they rejected it nevertheless. A resolution passed by the Employers' Committee on November 4 declared their inability "to enter into any agreement with an organization which refuses to register under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act." The Committee pointed out that an agreement with a body registered under the Act could be judicially interpreted and enforced by means of penalties. An agreement of this kind has when filed in the Arbitration Court the full force of an award of the Court, but an agreement with a body which, like the old Waterside Workers' Union, is registered as a trade union under the Trades Union Act, but not as an industrial union under the Arbitration Act, cannot be effectively enforced. If, however, the Federation had been induced to agree to a £1,000 penalty as originally asked by the employers, and this amount had been deposited or effectively secured, the employers would have had the benefit of a sanction as effective as any that the Arbitration Court would have been likely to supply. The Federation put this argument with considerable force in its reply and expressed itself as still willing to provide every reasonable safeguard against another breach of agreement. "It cannot, however," the reply proceeded, "do the impossible. It cannot undertake to compel its members to vote against their will in favour of a system which they have deliberately but lawfully set aside."

Both sides had indeed changed front during the past week. The employers insisted upon registration which they had previously agreed to waive; the Federation was willing to submit to a penalty clause which it had previously declined to concede. The reason for the change of front in each

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case is probably to be found in the facts that the strikers were in complete possession of the Wellington wharves at the opening of the negotiations, and that the force which was to oust them was almost completely organized a week later. The Federation of Labour at first considered itself able to dictate the terms of peace, but adopted a humbler attitude when the overwhelming superiority of the forces that its lawlessness had brought into the field became apparent. A converse change had come over the spirit of the employers. The preponderance of public opinion was decisively in their favour, but there was considerable doubt as to the propriety of their insistence upon the registration of the unions under the Arbitration Act. This demand was felt by many who were entirely without sympathy with the policy of the Federation of Labour to be in a sense usurping the province of the Legislature by insisting upon a step which it had left to the free choice of the unions themselves. The inconsistency of the demand with the previous attitude of the employers was regarded as a further weakening of their case. Probably the real ground of the final decision of the employers and its real justification are to be found in their need for protection and the community's need for protection, not against the vagaries of an unregistered union but against the leadership of the Federation of Labour. In spirit and personnel the leadership has undergone no appreciable improvement from the reconstruction effected in July last, which, as described in *THE ROUND TABLE* for December, has theoretically given the organization a broader basis. The community has no confidence in the men or their aims or their motives. The employers were not fighting so much for compulsory registration as against the "Red Federation." On the first of these issues if it had not been combined with and subordinated to the other they could not have relied upon a general support.

The reference of the whole dispute to Mr Justice Williams, or some other arbitrator, is a method of settlement

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which has been much discussed. The ultimate readiness of the Federation of Labour to abide by such a reference went far to convince Mr W. M. Hughes and the Sydney unions of the reasonableness of the Federation's attitude. But they overlooked the fact that the proposal had been rejected by the Federation while the issue was still in doubt. Long before the certainty of defeat had induced the Federation to adopt the proposal for arbitration as the likeliest mode of "saving face," the employers had contracted obligations to thousands of workers who had come to their rescue at the critical time. To ignore those obligations was plainly impossible; and if they had not been ignored there would not have been much to arbitrate about, since the places of all the original strikers had been filled and, with the important exception of the miners, those of nearly all the others. The fact, however, that many of these vacancies were filled by men from the country and others not desirous of retaining the places permanently, shows that there would have been a freer scope for an arbitrator or conciliator with wide powers than the employers or the Government were willing to allow.

III. SEAMEN AND COAL MINERS

LONG before November 4 when the negotiations for the settlement of the Wellington Strike proved abortive, its spread to other places had begun. In self-defence the shipping companies had refused to take cargo to or from Wellington, but this had not prevented the waterside workers of the other chief ports and of most of the smaller ones from following the lead of the Wellington Union. The seamen came out, at first spasmodically, but afterwards in pursuance of a general call, consequent upon the employment of "free labour" to work the wharves. The movement was not confined to crews on New Zealand articles,

Seamen and Coal Miners

but the strikers were disappointed by the refusal of the men on most of the home liners to obey the call. Had this hope been fulfilled the gravity of the position would have been greatly aggravated. As it was, the dispatch of the "Athenic" on November 18 with a cargo of produce, valued at about £300,000, which had been almost entirely loaded by the farmers themselves under special police protection, mostly of their own supplying, was hailed as the turning-point of the strike. A fortnight earlier over 70,000 tons of shipping had been lying idle in Wellington Harbour, and Auckland was in much the same position. The coastal services were restored with surprising rapidity by "scratch" crews, composed sometimes of officers from vessels which were laid up and occasionally, as already mentioned, of farmers and other members of the new Waterside Unions, the requirements of the Shipping and Seamen Act with regard to the training of crews having been suspended by the Government for this purpose. In Auckland there was soon a sufficient supply of men offering permanently for the work to justify the formation under the Arbitration Act of a new Seamen's Union, which soon had a large membership.

The coal miners, who, with the waterside workers, form the nucleus of the Federation's strength, also responded heartily to the call to strike. At Huntly, the chief coal-mining centre of the North Island, the miners had struck on account of alleged "victimization" a few days before the watersiders' troubles began. On the great coalfields of the west coast of the South Island every mine was soon idle and the Otago miners followed suit, though many of them belonged to arbitration unions. Practically the whole of the coal-mining industry of the Dominion was thus brought to a standstill. A remarkable feature of the strike on the West Coast was the leading part played by the State coal miners. Though these men earn an average of 18s. per day and limit their working week to four days, the State mine at Runanga is the birthplace and the stronghold of the "Red Federation." Not only were the

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Runanga miners among the first to strike, but they took the lead in the intimidation, incendiarism and sabotage whereby the attempt to keep the Brunner mine partially open was frustrated. The combination of permanent employment by the State, high wages and universal suffrage affords no guarantee against the spread of revolutionary doctrines. Not only are the miners the most intractable of our workers, but their work touches most nearly the main source of the motive power of the manufacturing and transport industries, and their places are the most difficult to fill in a sudden emergency. It was in reliance on these facts that the strike leaders declared when the initial engagements were going against them that they could win the whole campaign with folded hands. These hopes were, however, soon shattered, or, at any rate, deferred *sine die*. There was a shortage of coal sufficiently serious to cause inconvenience and expense, but nothing approaching to a coal famine, though some businesses and many small households felt the pinch severely. By shipments which they had bespoken before the middle of December from South Africa and Japan the Employers' Committee estimated that there would be a sufficient supply of coal to keep industry going at its present rate until the end of February. There was, of course, a chance that the South African mines might be closed to us, as the Australian mines were already closed, by the "solidarity" of labour. But although one of the Federation's orators, in an attempt to persuade the Chinese fruiterers to boycott a cargo of imported fruit which had been unloaded by Arbitrationists, addressed the representatives of a race with which Labour had never before attempted to cultivate fraternal relations, as "brother Chinamen," nobody supposed that our brethren of Japan would be so carried away by such blandishments as to decline to sell their coal to our merchants. The extra cost of about 10s. a ton was, of course, a heavy tax, but the country could afford to pay it longer than the West Coast miners could subsist on strike pay.

The Strike in Auckland

IV. THE STRIKE IN AUCKLAND

OF all the centres of the Federation's activity Auckland was by far the most interesting, because there the call was most widely and enthusiastically obeyed, and the public was roused to the greatest energy in reply. The early stages of the struggle in Auckland were much the same as in Wellington, but there was a greater concentration of energy on both sides. On November 8, after the Auckland wharves had been in possession of the strikers for more than a week, they were seized in the early morning while the strikers were asleep by a strong force of regular police and special constables, both mounted and on foot. The Strike Committee had previously announced that the approach of special constables to the water front would be the signal for a general strike, and they at once proceeded to put the threat into execution. The carpenters, bricklayers, general labourers, Harbour Board employees, drivers, cooks and waiters were called out, exemption being granted to the drivers of bread carts, parcel delivery carts and carts collecting refuse.

The response, both in numbers and in enthusiasm, was highly gratifying to the Auckland Strike Committee. It was estimated that there were from 6,000 to 7,000 men on strike, and that 1,000 more were thrown out of employment as a consequence of it. Business was paralysed, the transport services were at a standstill, and citizens were put to an immense amount of expense and inconvenience. But the trouble passed almost as suddenly as it had grown. Within three days after the call the restaurants were reopening, largely with their previous staffs; within four days carters, carpenters, painters, bricklayers and general labourers were returning wholesale; within a week about 1,000 of the strikers had resumed work. The estimate of the number of men working in the affected trades during the

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second week of the Auckland general strike was as follows: 17th November, 2,165; 18th, 2,680; 19th, 3,095; 20th, 3,580; 21st, 4,340; 22nd, 4,750. It is not to be wondered at that when the places of the strikers were being filled at this rapid rate, mainly by the strikers themselves, the Strike Committee deemed it advisable to call the strike off on November 23. The transport workers were alone excepted, but the exception was greatly reduced by the return of the tramway employees to work three days later. These men had resolved to strike if "free labour" was employed, but the carrying out of their resolution was anticipated by a shortage of coal, which compelled the tramway company to suspend the service. With the seamen and watersiders still out the port of Auckland, like that of Wellington, was as busy as ever; and on December 8 the special constables were relieved of duty on the Auckland wharves. The thoroughness with which Auckland had been seized by the epidemic was evidently one reason for its rapid recovery. The vague terrors with which the threats of a general strike had been hitherto associated in the minds of the people of New Zealand have been much reduced by this interesting experience.

In Christchurch and Dunedin the strike gave comparatively little trouble. The separation from the sea of Christchurch, which is served by the port of Lyttelton, may have had something to do with its immunity. A notable feature of the struggle in both Lyttelton and Dunedin was the inability of the strike leaders to keep order. In Auckland and Wellington it was absurdly alleged on behalf of the strikers that it was the enrolment of special constables that provoked them to disorder. Yet in Dunedin the Strike Committee resisted the urgent solicitations of the Mayor for a guarantee that peace would be preserved if no "specials" were employed, and in Lyttelton after the guarantee had been given the anger of the watersiders when they saw the arbitration unionists getting to work rendered it valueless. In most of the smaller ports the wharf labourers

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obeyed the summons from Wellington, and refused to work; but there was little or no disorder, nor was there much difficulty experienced in filling the vacancies.

The difficulties of the position would have been seriously increased if the railway men had joined the strike. The lesson of the strike of 1890 has, however, never faded from their memories, and the benefits to which they are entitled under a provident scheme generously subsidized by the State have supplied them with an additional argument for caution. In July last the representatives of the Amalgamated Railway Servants' Union were the first and the most conspicuous of the seceders from the Unity Congress, nor was their loyalty to the State in doubt at any period of a strike that was the outcome of the same aggressive spirit of which they had resented the triumph at the Congress. The seamen, who represent the other main branch of the workers in the transport industry had, as already mentioned, joined the strike at an early date. But the Dunedin branch of their union was known from the outset to have had serious misgivings on the point, and this feeling spread through the rank and file of the whole body as the hopelessness of the struggle was revealed.

On December 19, the Dunedin, Wellington and Auckland branches of the Federated Seamen's Union all decided in favour of the resumption of work. This decision knocked the bottom out of the strike, and the acceptance by the seamen of the shipping companies' stipulation for the registration of their Union under the Probation Act meant not merely that the strikers had gained nothing, but that the companies had gained a point of considerable importance which was not even in issue when the struggle began. On December 20 the whole strike was formally declared off except as regards the miners, from whom it was still expected that a stubborn resistance might be forthcoming. But in January the miners accepted the inevitable, registration of their unions being made a condition of this settlement also. The only fear now is that the great

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advantage which the unreasonable claims of the Federation of Labour has put into the hands of the employers may be pushed too far, and that bitterness may be engendered through the assertion by some of the new unions of an exclusiveness for which there is no warrant, either in the spirit of the law or in the temper of the people.

The Government is really entitled to the utmost credit for the thoroughness, calmness and courage with which it faced the position and organized the special forces which were absolutely necessary for the protection of the community. Nor has the public been slow to give the Government the credit that is its due. The Opposition party, on the other hand, has suffered not a little in the public estimation by the uncertainty of its attitude to the great struggle. The party did not commit itself to the open support of the strike, but it failed to give the Government the hearty support which the grounds of the emergency was felt to demand. It was the alliance with Labour that brought the Liberals into power after our last great strike, and kept them there for more than twenty years. That alliance has since been weakened, if not shattered, and it is inevitable that the desire to restore it should affect the Liberals with a blindness to the faults of Labour from which a position of complete independence would have saved them.

V. THE GOVERNMENT'S NAVAL POLICY

SINCE the opening of Parliament, students of the Imperial problem have anxiously awaited the statement of the naval policy of the present Government. After a long delay the policy was announced to the House on October 28 last in the form of a statement which was read by the Prime Minister, in the absence through illness of Mr Allen, the Minister for Defence. There is prefaced to the statement itself a summary of what has been done by past Governments

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in the matter of naval defence. In 1887 by the Australasian Defence Act it was provided that New Zealand should pay £20,000 per year as a proportional part of the cost of the establishment and maintenance of a more efficient naval force in Australasian waters. No alteration was made until 1903. Under the New Zealand Naval Defence Act of that year the subsidy was increased to £40,000 per year. In 1908 by the Naval Defence Act the subsidy was increased still further to £100,000 per year for ten years from May 12, 1909. The gift of the battle cruiser, "New Zealand," followed in March, 1909.

In 1909 the Imperial Defence Conference met in London and an important agreement was made concerning the future defence of the Pacific. Under this agreement a Pacific fleet was to be established consisting of three units, one in the East Indies, one in Australian waters and one in the China Seas. Each unit was to consist of a large armoured cruiser of the Indomitable type, three second-class cruisers of the Bristol type, six destroyers of the River class and three submarines of the "C" class. The battle cruiser, "New Zealand," was to be the flagship of the China unit, and by arrangement between Mr McKenna and Sir Joseph Ward a portion of the China unit was to be stationed during peace time in New Zealand waters. The ships were to be manned as far as possible by New Zealanders. On August 11, 1909, in a letter to Mr McKenna, Sir Joseph Ward made a proposal to the Admiralty substantially in the above terms, and suggested that the New Zealand portion of the China unit, consisting of two new Bristol cruisers, three destroyers and two submarines, should be completed by 1912. On August 18, 1909, the Admiralty accepted the proposal and suggestions of Sir Joseph Ward.

In the early part of 1912 the Liberal Government consented to the battle cruiser being stationed wherever the Admiralty wished. That alteration of the agreement of 1909 was approved by the present Government of New Zealand. In 1912 the new arrangement between the

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Imperial Government and the Commonwealth of Australia commenced. When the Australasian unit of the Pacific fleet was completed the Australasian squadron was withdrawn by the Imperial Government.

As far as New Zealand was concerned this was the position of naval defence when Mr Allen went to England in December, 1912. He was commissioned by the New Zealand Government to interview the Imperial authorities and to place the arrangements for naval defence on a more permanent and definite basis. It must be remembered that up to this time the Admiralty had not carried out the agreement made with Sir Joseph Ward in 1909. Mr Allen was informed by the Imperial authorities that the position had materially changed, and it was not considered advisable to proceed with the agreement of 1909. Under these circumstances a new agreement was made. New Zealand was in the future to train her own personnel and for that purpose the Admiralty was to provide a training ship and a complement of officers and men. It was further arranged that the Imperial Government should station two light cruisers in New Zealand waters for the protection of commerce and for Imperial purposes.

When Mr Allen returned to New Zealand he submitted this proposal to the Cabinet and suggested besides that a cruiser of the "Melbourne" type should be built. The Government, however, considered that the proposal for the two light cruisers was too great a departure from the agreement of 1909 and suggested to the Imperial authorities that two cruisers of the Bristol type should be substituted for two light cruisers, and in that case New Zealand should provide £150,000 per year. The offer was not accepted.

The following telegram from the Secretary of State, under date October 2, 1913, explains itself:

It was confidently anticipated in 1909 that stationing of the Bristols in New Zealand waters could be arranged without interfering with the general strategic disposition of naval strength necessary in the interests of the Empire as a whole. Available Bristols are

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required elsewhere; in particular, two have been sent temporarily to the East India and China Stations respectively. At present they would be superfluous in New Zealand waters, as there are no possible enemy ships of equal speed to be dealt with there.

It was necessary to go into the history of New Zealand's past negotiations and arrangements with the Imperial authorities in order to understand the reasons for and objects of the policy which the Government proposes to adopt. That policy may be summarized as follows:

1. The building in Great Britain of a modern cruiser of the Bristol type, to cost about £400,000, such cruiser to be under the control of the New Zealand Government during time of peace and of the Admiralty in time of war or whenever urgently required.
2. The training of a New Zealand personnel. The Government proposes to take over the "Philcmel" and employ her as a training ship.
3. The training of officers. With this object two cadets will be entered yearly at Osborne or Dartford and six, if possible, at the Australian Naval College. In addition "special entry" cadets will be received by the Admiralty.
4. For the men there will be two methods of entry to the New Zealand Naval force:
 - (a) As boys between the ages of fourteen and a half and sixteen to serve up to eighteen and for seven years afterwards.
 - (b) As youths and men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five to serve for seven years. Facilities for the men to transfer to the Royal Navy will be provided.
5. Dockyard accommodation will be provided at Auckland.
6. Finance. In addition to the annual payment of £140,000 to meet sinking fund and other interest charges on the battle cruiser, there will be a further

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annual appropriation of £100,000 to pay the cost of carrying out the policy as outlined above. Any balance remaining after New Zealand expenses are met will be paid to the Admiralty.

The concluding paragraph of the statement indicates the goal which the Government ultimately hopes to reach.

In placing their opinions on the subject of naval defence before the House the Government are not only thinking of the present, or even of the immediate future, but of what may happen in years to come and the necessity of making preparation therefor. The British Dominions in the Pacific should aim at nothing less than British naval supremacy for this hemisphere. It may take many years to bring it about, but more difficult tasks have been accomplished by people of the British race. The co-operation of the Imperial authorities with Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the encouragement of the aspirations of these young countries by consulting them when possible with regard to Imperial defence matters, the pride of possession, the traditions of the past, are all factors which make for unity, strength and nationhood, and which will in time give us the same position in the way of naval supremacy in these seas that is held by our kinsmen on the other side of the world.

On December 3 Mr Allen moved the second reading of the Naval Defence Bill, which embodied that portion of the naval policy of the Government requiring the sanction of the House this session. Mr Allen's speech was on the lines of the statement referred to above. Its main features were an enunciation of a new policy for the defence of the Pacific Ocean and a recapitulation of the chief points of difference which had arisen between the New Zealand Government and the British Admiralty. The system of subsidy was again criticized by the Minister, who stated that the Bill was a final departure from that system of naval defence. Mr Allen pleaded almost passionately for the recognition and nurture of a national naval sentiment. He asked that the Dominion should begin, in however humble a way, to make personal sacrifice for its defence on sea as well as on land. He opposed the subsidy because it was an obstacle to the consummation of his ideal and did not provide the Dominion with an effective defence in its own waters where

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such a defence was urgently and perhaps immediately required. A quotation from the report of Mr Allen's speech will make clear his position :

Speaking of subsidies he said that New Zealand had seen New Zealand men trained for the British Navy by British officers and yet had no say in it whatever, just as she saw her ships manned and controlled by the British Admiralty. Had this not gone on long enough? Surely their brains were worth something to the Empire? It was not good enough merely to go on putting their hands into their pockets. The New Zealand ideal was a truly Imperial ideal in wanting to have some responsibility in the training of their own naval men and the naval defence of their own shores.

Speaking on the present international position of the South Pacific Ocean, he said that New Zealand was not entirely satisfied with the state of affairs in the New Hebrides. He hoped that some day Canada, Australia and New Zealand would unite with the Mother Country for the defence of the Pacific. In the East New Zealand was protected by an alliance, but as a New Zealander he considered that we should not rely upon an alliance but upon the Imperial Navy. The Dominion, therefore, should endeavour to place itself in such a position that it would have the security of naval strength in the Pacific and not merely a certain amount of security based upon an alliance.

In discussing the details of the Bill the Minister of Defence pointed out that the naval forces automatically came under the control of the British Government in time of war. There was no such provision in the Australian scheme. The transfer of men to the British navy for experience and training was also provided for. He hoped that they would be able to take a small step towards the evolution of a satisfactory controlling body for the Pacific, a board, perhaps, upon which Australia, Canada and New Zealand would be represented. His proposal was similar to that of Sir Joseph Ward in 1909, but the Dominion would pay £100,000 per year to the maintenance of its own personnel and not to the British Admiralty.

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The most important contribution to the remainder of the debate was that of Sir Joseph Ward. He attacked the principle of the Bill and asserted that the financial burden of the scheme would be far heavier than the estimate of the Government. The policy was a dangerous one because it aimed at the establishment of a local navy and thereby flouted the expert opinion of the Admiralty. The Admiralty opposed the institution of local navies. If in the face of that opinion any Dominion chose to establish a local fleet unit, then the Admiralty would give that Dominion all possible advice and assistance. He believed, however, that the British Government was the best judge of the naval necessities of the Dominion.

Sir Joseph then reviewed the prospective cost of the maintenance of the Bristol cruiser. At the lowest the cost would be £150,000 per year and might be as high as £200,000 per year when interest and depreciation were added. Sir Joseph based his figures upon the difference between the estimated and actual cost of maintenance in Australia. He agreed with Mr Allen that the defence of the Pacific Ocean was an urgent problem, but thought that the maintenance of a central Imperial navy of irresistible strength was the best solution of that problem. He argued that the cost of the Government scheme would be excessive now, and would increase indefinitely in the future, and that the scheme itself would not fulfil the purpose for which it was designed. In any case the agreement of 1909 had been suspended only and not revoked.

Only five other members spoke in the debate—the Prime Minister and Mr Fisher and Mr Herries, all members of the Cabinet, in support of the Bill; and Mr Russell and Mr Wilford, both members of the Opposition, against the Bill. The second reading was carried by thirty-one votes against twenty-one. In Committee on the Bill Sir Joseph Ward moved an amendment to test whether members were in favour of a proposal for a separate navy and whether a referendum should be taken before severance from the

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Imperial Navy was completed. This amendment was lost by thirty-one to twenty-one.

The significant feature of the debate was that no Government member spoke or voted against the Bill, and no Opposition member spoke or voted in favour of it. The Bill was driven through all its stages under the crack of the party whip. The sound Government member trusted implicitly to Mr Allen and accepted the whole of his proposal without a query, while the good Oppositionist, taking the time from his leader, voted unhesitatingly for the rejection of the Bill. Neither kind of partisan could have given reasons for the faith that was in him. The Bill contained a radical alteration of the system of naval defence in this Dominion and was perhaps the opening of a new and important era in its history; yet the Parliament of this country gave to the affirmation of a principle of such far-reaching importance not so long and serious a consideration and hardly so intelligent a consideration as was given during this same session to the affirmation of a principle governing the future construction of tramcars. On this occasion at least Parliament only too faithfully represents the people of New Zealand.

New Zealand. January, 1914.



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